From 16 January, a wave of violence swept through Colombia’s Catatumbo Region, Norte de Santander Department, along the border with Venezuela, killing at least 80 people and displacing tens of thousands of residents. The violence highlights some of the weaknesses of President Gustavo Petro’s ‘Paz Total’ (Total Peace) policy. ‘Total Peace’ allows for the government to negotiate with militant and criminal groups using different legal tools and strategies, which is a break from traditional military-led counterinsurgency and law enforcement efforts. The outbreak of violence and the emerging humanitarian crisis will likely prompt a shift in the government’s negotiation tactics with armed groups in the coming months.

What prompted the escalation?

Catatumbo has long been a hotspot for violence, with multiple armed and criminal groups vying for territorial control of the resource-rich region. When Petro took office in August 2022, he brokered a truce between the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and factions of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) group who remain opposed to the 2016 peace deal brokered between FARC and the then Colombian government. This agreement facilitated a reduction in violence between the two groups, with each consolidating control over their separate territories, and sometimes coordinating with one another over illicit activity. Even during the truce, the ELN maintained vast territorial control across much of the region, underscoring both its strength, and Catatumbo's strategic importance. If a militant group were to gain complete control of Catatumbo, it would have unrestricted access to drug trafficking routes across the Colombian-Venezuelan border, and control over the natural resources in the area – both opportunities to generate substantial revenues. This latest surge in violence has been linked to several disputes between the two rivals, including accusations by the ELN that FARC rebels were working with the government, and claims that FARC rebels had killed civilians, highlighting the persisting competition between the two groups.

Clashes between the ELN and FARC rebels persisted into February, resulting in significant casualties, primarily among the FARC faction. Additionally, reports indicate that approximately 104 fighters from a FARC rebel faction have deserted the group. The clashes have also prompted the government to temporarily suspend the operations of its state-owned oil company. As the Colombian military struggles to regain control, hindered by an unclear mandate amid ongoing ceasefires with smaller factions, the need to adjust President Petro’s ‘Total Peace’ plan and curb the ELN’s growing influence has become increasingly clear.

A pivot for Petro’s peace policy

While this latest violence marks a blow to Petro’s strategy, the approach first started losing momentum last year, with 85 percent of Colombians perceiving the security situation to be worsening, according to a June 2024 poll. By September, many of the policy’s initial achievements, including ceasefires with the ELN and one of the larger factions of the FARC rebel group, had broken down following violations by these groups. The government remains in peace negotiations with at least 10 other groups across the country, but progress has been limited, with an uptick in extortion and child recruitment into armed groups recorded in some areas. Furthermore, an array of criminal and militant groups, particularly the various FARC rebel groups who rejected the 2016 demobilisation agreement, have continued to expand their presence in various parts of the country.

This recent escalation in Catatumbo will likely cement a shift in Bogotá’s counter-insurgency strategy, pushing the government further away from national peace talks and towards more regional-level engagements alongside increased military pressure. This strategy will allow the government to focus on specific regional issues in its attempt to prevent violence against civilians, while using hard power to gain leverage over powerful groups. In late January, for example, the government called on the ELN to stop endangering civilians, and launched security operations countrywide.

Challenges to regional peace

The increased military pressure signals a shifting of gears that may be necessary to incentivise the armed groups to cooperate with peace negotiations. However, the Colombian military remains low on morale and resources, and are at a further disadvantage by earlier ceasefires that have allowed militant groups to clandestinely increase their power and control without government interference. A more regional approach to peace negotiations may aid in addressing the fragmented groups, conflicts and grievances across the country, although this approach is also likely to be slower, hampering Petro’s ability to ensure some successes before the end of his term in 2026. Moreover, failure to introduce effective and well-planned regional level agreements may create territorial vacuums which could be exploited by other militant groups.

Petro’s limited prospects

As Petro enters his final year in office – amid expectations of elections in mid-2026 and a constitutional restriction preventing him from seeking a second term – the window for achieving a significant reduction in violence continues to narrow. While the electoral race has yet to formally commence, the prospects of the ruling Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact for Colombia) coalition retaining power appear to be limited. Furthermore, if Petro fails to implement substantial improvements in the security landscape before the end of his term, his successor is unlikely to have either the political will, or the congressional backing to pursue anything similar to the Total Peace strategy.