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An uphill battle: President Noboa’s approach to escalating violence in Ecuador

After being re-elected to serve his first full term as Ecuador’s president, Daniel Noboa faces significant challenges to improve the country’s dire security situation. His approach will define the country’s security trajectory for the coming years, writes Shannon Lorimer.

On 24 May, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa was re-elected to serve his first full term, after assuming office in early elections in 2023 when former President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly. Noboa inherited a severe and growing security crisis. Although jailing thousands during his first term saw a marginal decline in crime, unprecedented levels of violence in early 2025 reveal the range of challenges Noboa must address to produce a meaningful improvement to the security environment.

What is driving escalating violence?

Over the past decade, the expansion of the global narcotics trade, in conjunction with the persistent weakening of Ecuador’s democratic institutions, has made the country fertile ground for the proliferation of both domestic and international criminal groups. Further, its strategic location in terms of its export-oriented ports to international markets, a modern road system and its position between the largest cocaine producers – Colombia and Peru – make it an increasingly attractive destination for money laundering and drug trafficking. These dynamics have seen international and local criminal organisations increase their presence in the country. As these groups grow stronger, they have increasingly diversified and proliferated their illicit revenue generating activities, expanding to illegal mining, human trafficking, fuel theft, extortion and kidnapping, while competition for control over these economies has further driven extreme violence.

How effective was Noboa’s first term security policy?

Policymakers have faced a range of challenges in developing a coherent response to the violence, including resource constraints amid plans for further crime crackdowns, as well as the country’s security forces’ limited experience in dealing with powerful local and transnational criminal organisations – most evident in the assassination of presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, who had run on a campaign of combatting organised crime. Noboa’s declaration of an internal armed conflict in January 2024, followed by a militarisation of public security and the repeated imposition of states of emergency, initially prompted the first decline in the homicide rate since 2019. However, these measures also bred increased fragmentation and disputes within gangs, resulting in violent competition for control of illicit activities. Consequently, extortion and kidnapping have soared. While the year-on-year increases in kidnapping and extortion are not as substantial (15 percent and 1 percent respectively), the long-term comparisons are more telling, with kidnapping increasing 215 percent from 2018 to 2024, and extortion rising 1,300 percent in the same period. Noboa’s security strategy also prioritised influencing public opinion, necessary to win a referendum in April 2024 enabling the government to introduce some of the tougher security measures, like involvement of military forces in police patrols. However, in focusing on the public narrative, he has not articulated strategies that can sustainably reduce violence in the long term.

While the year-on-year increases in kidnapping and extortion are not as substantial (15 percent and 1 percent respectively), the long-term comparisons are more telling, with kidnapping increasing 215 percent from 2018 to 2024, and extortion rising 1,300 percent in the same period.

How will his new security policy address these challenges?

Some of Noboa’s proposals, notably the construction of larger, better-equipped prisons – with significant financial resources mobilised for the projects – could help improve the security situation by tackling a key driver of gang violence: Ecuador’s overcrowded prisons, where powerful criminal groups remain based and exert significant control, enable continued recruitment and coordination of illicit activities. However, Noboa has not sufficiently articulated how he will address the proliferating cocaine trade, as well as emerging criminal economies, like illegal gold mining. With Ecuador’s underfunded and under sourced security forces already struggling to clamp down on the organisations in control of these trades, it is unclear how Noboa plans to reduce the power of these groups.

Outlook

The continuation of Noboa’s presidency may signal some necessary stability after years of political turbulence. However, his administration faces significant challenges in improving the security situation, and his ability to address these challenges in the short term will shape the security trajectory of the country in the years to come. In the absence of a more concrete and coherent security strategy, soaring rates of kidnapping, extortion and other illicit activities will likely persist.

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