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Will They/Won't They: A call to remobilise fuels concerns of further FARC attacks in Colombia

While a recent call to remobilise has raised concerns of renewed FARC attacks in Colombia, a return to widescale kidnap for ransom as a source of funding is uncertain. Factionalism within FARC creates ambiguity about the group’s leadership and, as a result, its overall objectives and preferred tactics, writes Lenoy Barkai.

The signing of a historic peace deal in 2016 between the far-left rebel group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) and the Colombian government, saw the vast majority of FARC rebels demobilise and begin the process of reintegration into Colombian society. Nevertheless, intermittent attacks by dissident FARC members and other far-left militant groups, such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN) have continued in subsequent years, a constant reminder of the ongoing militant threat in the country. 

FARC/ELN numbers

Thus, when two former FARC commanders – both key players in the peace deal’s negotiation – announced their return to armed struggle in late August 2019, many feared that the frequency and impact of these attacks would intensify. Already, on 22 September, at least 16 people, including two police officers and 14 civilians, sustained injuries when suspected FARC dissidents threw a grenade at a police station in Sardinata, Norte de Santander.   

However, in their declaration to form a “new guerrilla” group, the dissenting FARC commanders noted that they did not intend to use kidnap for ransom as a means of income generation. This decision stands in contrast to longstanding FARC tactics, and those of the dissident factions operating in the country since 2016. 

Between 1970 and 2010, the group was behind approximately 24,300 kidnap for ransom attacks in the country. However, in the run-up to the signing of the 2016 peace agreement, FARC 
apologised for its conduct in this regard. In a recorded statement, a FARC commander going by the alias Iván Márquez said: “We want to acknowledge…that during the conflict the FARC also caused great pain with the retention of people for ransom. That conduct, while always used to sustain the needs of the rebellion, resulted in harming entire families.” Márquez is one of the two primary dissenting commanders now calling for a return to arms. 

Prior to demobilisation, FARC had also made commitments to end kidnap for ransom. In early 2012 it announced that it would give up this tactic, a move many hoped would bolster peace negotiations that were then ongoing. However, this commitment did not fully hold up. For example, later that year FARC rebels kidnapped a French journalist (released after a month) and, in a prominent case in 2014, they kidnapped a high-ranking Colombian general (released two weeks later). FARC dissidents, for one, have not refrained from kidnappings. In May 2017, for example, dissident members kidnapped a member of a UN project team near Miraflores, Guaviare province. More recently, in March 2018, a dissident FARC faction kidnapped and killed two Ecuadorian journalists and their driver, who were covering the group’s activities. The same faction was blamed for the subsequent abduction and murder of an Ecuadorian couple.

On 3 March 2019, local media reported that security forces had rescued a local national who had been kidnapped in Teorama, Norte de Santander, near the border with Venezuela. The victim had been abducted in January 2019 by dissident FARC members. Reports did not confirm if the militants had issued any ransom demands.

2019attacks

Furthermore, even if the dissenting commanders’ intentions are genuine, there remains considerable doubt over their ability to enforce them. Those FARC dissidents who rejected the 2016 peace deal from the outset have since splintered into multiple factions, many operating largely independently and branching off into various criminal activities. According to police estimates, for example, FARC dissident groups generate up to 20 percent of their income through extortion activities. The extent to which these groups will agree to fall in line behind Márquez and his supporters remains to be seen. 

Ultimately, more than 70 militant and criminal groups operate across the country. According to Colombia’s counter-kidnapping police unit, common criminals and organised criminal groups have accounted for the vast majority of kidnapping cases in the country since 2016, followed by the ELN. The FARC commanders’ call for remobilisation thus adds even further uncertainty to an already crowded criminal and militant landscape when it comes to the kidnap for ransom threat in the country.

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