Who's Watching Whom? Terrorism in South Africa

On 8 September 2015, the US Embassy in Pretoria issued an alert warning of a terrorist threat against US interests in South Africa. A US embassy spokesperson stated that the information had been ”specific“, although no details were provided on who issued the threat or the intended target. The alert was rebuffed by South Africa’s intelligence services; State Security Minister David Maholobo claimed that there was no immediate danger, and that the country’s security agencies had been watching the unnamed individuals identified by the US government for some time. Despite repudiating the alert, the warning has encouraged a reflection on the various terrorism threats in South Africa and whether the country’s counter-terrorism units are robust enough to respond to such threats.

There is little evidence of a home-grown threat in South Africa. However, lax security measures, porous borders and limited domestic counter-terrorism capabilities make the country an attractive destination for transnational terrorist groups. 

Al Shabaab, the Somalia-based militant group, poses the principal terrorism threat in this regard, as it has been linked to South Africa on several occasions. Samantha Lewthwaite, a suspected Al Shabaab operative dubbed ‘the white widow’ by international media, reportedly resided in South Africa between 2009 and 2011, for example. Lewthwaite is thought to have been involved in Al Shabaab’s 2013 attack against the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in which 67 people were killed. She reportedly used a South African passport to enter Kenya prior to the attack. Other evidence of an Al Shabaab presence in South Africa is less concrete, however. While leaked US intelligence reports from 2009 point to an intercepted telephone call between Al Shabaab operatives in Mogadishu and counterparts in the township of Khayelitsha, Cape Town, little is known about the nature of these interactions or whether further exchanges took place. Similarly, although a 2013 investigation by the Institute for Security Studies reported that Al Shabaab militants claimed to have received training in South Africa, the nature of this training, as well as the location, remains unclear. For now, Al Shabaab appears to be focused on combatting its adversaries closer to home and is unlikely to jeopardise any support networks in the country by carrying out an attack on South African soil.

Besides Al Shabaab, there is little to suggest that other transnational groups have the capability to carry out attacks in South Africa. While reports that South African citizens are travelling to Syria to join the ranks of Islamic State (IS) are concerning, little suggests that IS is attempting to establish an operational cell within South Africa. Many other countries have seen greater numbers travel to join IS; but the nature and extent of the threat posed by returning jihadists remain unclear, as many returning IS fighters appear to be disillusioned with the group. It is also unlikely that IS would allow its most capable fighters to return home amid intense fighting in Iraq and Syria. On the contrary, most of the high profile attacks linked to IS to date, such as the Charlie Hebdo shootings in France, have been carried out by militants who did not travel to Iraq and Syria. Instead, domestic lone wolves, individual sympathisers of the militant group, carried out these attacks. This latter group of IS-affiliates pose a more immediate terrorism threat in South Africa.

In light of these threats, the South Africa’s State Security Agency (SSA) claimed to already be monitoring the individuals identified in the intelligence underpinning the US Embassy warning. This knee-jerk rebuff indicates, at the very least, a lack of coordination between the two intelligence agencies in the face of an identified threat. Indeed, the US State Department has previously criticised SSA for its reluctance to engage with its US counterparts on counterterrorism issues, raising serious questions around the effectiveness of South Africa’s internal intelligence capabilities. These concerns have been exacerbated by the numerous reports of South African intelligence services being embroiled in major political battles, which have resulted in senior intelligence officials resigning or being dismissed. Coupled with the continued restructuring of the SSA since 2009, which has combined the previously standalone National Intelligence Agency (NIA) with the South African Secret Service (SASS) into the SSA, the capability of the SSA to unilaterally counter external terrorism threats remain in doubt.

While an imminent terrorism threat in South Africa seems unlikely, the country cannot afford to be complacent. The clear contradictory views held by the US and SSA over this latest alert are worrisome. Either these agencies have different intelligence on the nature of the threat in the country or they are failing to share this intelligence effectively. This has troubling implications for the South African government’s ability to counter any future threat.