Victories and the Vulnerable: Assad's Next Advance and the Implications for Aid Workers in Syria

Following nearly eight years of fighting, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad is poised for victory as soldiers and militias loyal to him have recaptured the strategic cities of Homs, Aleppo and not least, Daraa - the birthplace of the 2011 uprising. Despite ongoing international efforts to curb President Al Assad’s authoritarian regime through political redress, humanitarian organisations will be optimistic that at least some reduction in fighting will facilitate greater humanitarian engagement in the country. The conflict has become the largest active humanitarian crisis in the world; almost half a million people have been killed, and half the country’s population has been displaced. Up until now, few international aid agencies have been allowed to deliver relief supplies or work within the country without facing significant security threats. Although the extension of government control over previously opposition-held territories creates the impression of an improving security environment, and the pending success of Al Assad’s forces’ advance on Idlib Governorate, the final rebel stronghold, will establish a degree of stability, non-government organisations (NGOs) should remain cautious as they seek to re-enter Syria.

While calm has largely returned to recaptured areas, latent security threats still exist across Syria, and are likely to hinder operations for returning NGOs. According to 2017 statistics, Syria ranked as the third country with the highest number of security incidents involving aid workers, following South Sudan and Afghanistan. In 2017, 158 major incidents of violence against humanitarian operations occurred in 22 countries, affecting 313 aid workers. Of these 158 incidents, 31 attacks took place in Syria. Although Syria had fewer incidents recorded than either South Sudan or Afghanistan, more aid workers were killed per incident.

Kidnapping remains a prominent security concern for NGO personnel in the country. Specifically, Islamic State (IS) aligned militants maintain the intent, presence and capabilities to orchestrated kidnappings, particularly in the recently Kurdish-captured territories, such as Raqqa, Al Hasaka and Ain Issa, and Dier Ez Zor. IS’s capabilities have decreased considerably since losing the majority of territories it once controlled, particularly its stronghold in Raqqa in October 2017. However, IS pockets remain operational in north-eastern Syria, and along the eastern border with Iraq. According to US military sources, these cells are preparing to launch a guerrilla war campaign in recently liberated areas, similar to IS in Iraq. To this end, NGO operations are likely to offer attractive targets for future attacks, including kidnappings and terrorist assaults.

Yet, it is not only in contested areas where NGO operations face security challenges. In Syrian government-controlled regions, such as Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Daraa, NGO staff face an elevated threat of kidnapping and extortion. Syrian government forces are made-up from a coalition of military and pro-government armed militias, which include Iranian and Hezbollah-backed groups, that often act with autonomy and impunity. There have been increased reports over the past year of these armed militias extorting funds from peoples and businesses operating in these regions. Furthermore, considering the local economies in these areas have been significantly affected by armed conflict, NGOs should be wary of armed criminal groups, who have a financial motivation to engage in kidnap for ransom and other violent crimes. Kidnapping for ransom will remain a lucrative source of revenue for various militant and criminal groups in Syria, and authorities have little capability to intervene in kidnappings. Furthermore, the government’s Syrian Arab Army and the rebel Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, as well as groups affiliated to them, have been implicated in the kidnapping and transfer or sale of foreign nationals to radical Islamist groups. For example, the Shabiha militia groups loyal to President Assad and the Baath Party, were implicated in the kidnapping of James Foley, an American journalist, who was later executed by IS in August 2014. Although the vast majority of recent incidents targeting NGOs have involved local nationals, often employed by international NGOs, foreign nationals will be perceived as particularly valuable hostages, with some European governments having paid millions of dollars in ransoms in the past. Citizens of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, which are supporting the US led air strikes against IS, are also of high political value. However, armed groups, and IS in particular, are likely to target foreign nationals regardless of nationality for ransom and propaganda purposes.

Beyond kidnapping, the highest threats to humanitarian operations remain concentrated in areas proximate to the frontlines, including in rebel-held Idlib and western Aleppo, and Kurdishheld Hasakah, Qamishi and eastern Deir ez Zour. Tactics in the Syrian war mostly constitute the use of direct and indirect fire, such as airstrikes, barrel bombs, artillery and mortars, all fairly non-precision weapons which present the threat of collateral damage to NGO operations and personnel. The bulk of security incidents affecting NGOs to date have resulted in damage to infrastructure, such as hospitals, ambulances, and other assets. Aid workers have also been killed in airstrikes against relief convoys and medical facilities. In some cases, direct targeting has also been suspected. In early 2017, for example, an UN/Red Crescent relief convoy was targeted by an unidentified military aircraft, believed to be Syrian or Russian, outside of Aleppo despite the organisation providing all necessary fighting forces with their operational coordinates. These incidents are likely to continue despite expectations regarding a degree of improved security under Al Assad’s military victories as armed groups continue to contest for control of the remaining disputed territory.

Meanwhile, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) present a major impediment to humanitarian operations, and will be a significant hindrance to NGOs’ ability to respond to conflict-affected regions, particularly in areas that underwent shelling and airstrikes. In recaptured areas, such as parts of eastern Ghouta, Rif Damascus and Deraa, UXO’s are scattered in residential and rural areas. Additionally, armed groups have capitalised on the ease of sourcing IED component parts and their rudimentary assembly, deploying them with great effect in asymmetric warfare. While the majority of IED attacks typically target pro-government forces, there is a residual threat of collateral damage or misidentification to NGO staff, particularly in frontline areas.

As such, despite Al Assad’s apparent impending success, the security situation is likely to remain volatile over the next six to 12 months at least. President Al Assad is expected to consolidate his control over most of Syria, which could renew tensions between the Al Assad regime and Kurdish groups in north-eastern governorates. Meanwhile, IS and other Islamist militant groups will maintain the ability to stage opportunistic and complex attacks. Lastly, considering this volatility as well as slow economic recovery, violent criminality, including kidnappings, will continue pose a threat across the country. In this regard, despite renewed will to step up humanitarian efforts in Syria, NGOs wishing to operate in the country will need to exercise maximum security precautions.