(Un)known Quantities: Terrorism in the UK After Westminster

There are at least three reasons why the UK has not been a frequent target for attacks. Firstly, it is riskier for would-be jihadists to try to enter Britain compared with the relative ease of movement on continental Europe, and strict gun control legislation makes acquiring firearms difficult. Secondly, the MI5 domestic security service is experienced in dealing with terrorist threats as a result of having to deal with the Irish Republican Army’s bombing campaigns between the 1970s and 1990s. Perhaps most importantly, police and intelligence services underwent intensive recalibration following the 2005 London bombings. After the bomb attacks, intelligence officials were deployed throughout the country, networks of contacts and informants were developed and inter-agency cooperation has significantly improved. UK intelligence institutions, such as the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), also work closely with the US’ National Security Agency and benefit from data acquired about extremist groups. 

These factors reduce the likelihood of a successful sophisticated, high-impact attack directed by IS. However, these conditions fall short of preventing attacks by individuals with no meaningful connection to Islamist militant groups. Based on the facts available at present, it appears that the perpetrator of the Westminster attack, 53-year-old British-Born Khalid Masood, operated without direct instruction or assistance from the Islamic State (IS), despite the group claiming that a “soldier of IS” carried out the attack. 

This speaks to a trend in Europe where relatively small fry operatives or sympathisers are conducting rudimentary attacks in public places, with disproportionately high impact. This latest attack is not exceptional in terms of weaponry or tactics: Islamist-inspired plots in Europe have frequently involved everyday items as weapons, like vehicles or knives. Attacks involving these types of weapons and tactics are particularly hard to pre-empt, as there are minimal precursor actions or signs for intelligence agencies to detect, thus increasing assailants’ likelihood of success. Lone actors clearly recognise the effectiveness of ‘low-tech’ weapons: four vehicle ramming attacks occurred in Europe in just the nine months between July 2016 and March 2017. And although we have witnessed Islamist-inspired attacks in the UK since the 2005 London bombings, such as a knife rampage targeting off-duty soldiers in Woolwich in 2013, the Westminster attack was more lethal. The latest attack also took place over a period of just 82 seconds, which underscores the pace at which these incidents can develop and the rapid response required from authorities to contain casualties and damage. 

Whilst Masood had reportedly featured in previous MI5 investigations, he was identified as a “peripheral figure”, and was not maintained on police watchlists as a person of interest at the time of the attack. This underscores a key challenge for security forces - certain low-priority individuals who were at one point on their radar could later – undetected - become more active. MI5 and GCHQ currently sift through thousands of persons of interest to identify the much smaller pool of individuals who they believe warrant more intensive investigation. Although these agencies are continuously working to expand their capacity, comprehensive monitoring is an impossible task. 

Although initial statements called for calm, it is evident that the British authorities remain concerned about future plots. In the week following the Westminster attack, Home Secretary Amber Rudd has suggested that UK police and intelligence officials should be given a backdoor into encrypted messaging services like Whatsapp, which would allow them to monitor messages of suspects. This raises familiar concerns about the balance between privacy and protection, but, in any case, such a move would not have prevented an attack like the one at Westminster, where the assailant was not prominent enough to hold authorities’ attention. 

The fact that Masood was able to enter the parliamentary estate – bursting through the gates of the Palace of Westminster to fatally stab a police officer – is also likely to prompt a review of security measures in the area. Authorities have already responded by installing additional anti-terror barriers outside Buckingham Palace, but it is impossible to secure all public spaces and symbolic targets in the country. Increasing security around democratic institutions like UK’s parliament is likely to raise questions around the tension between security and maintaining an open society. 

The attack was only contained after Masood was shot by an armed close protection officer who formed part of the Defence Minister’s retinue, but such officers are rare. Britain’s police do not routinely carry firearms; instead, trained firearms officers are dispatched to incidents where a threat is reported. However, the 2015 Paris attacks had already reignited a debate on the requirement for more armed patrols around key sites, particularly in the capital, and the events of 22 March are likely to support considerations of increasing the number of armed police officers on the ground. 

Authorities are likely to devote significant resources to sifting through Masood’s history and actions in the weeks and months before the attack in an effort to develop a better understanding of what processes drove his actions. Although these investigations may give some insight into this particular attack, it is less clear that they will assist in preventing future incidents. Lone actor attacks of varying impact will undoubtedly continue in Europe, and the UK – a country with advanced counterterrorism capabilities – is not immune from this threat. 

A level-headed response could be key to mitigating the long-term trend. Britain’s politicians have been measured in their reaction to the attacks, but lurid media coverage feeds the terrorist propaganda machine and gives unwarranted publicity to the attackers’ political or ideological goals. Pictures of Masood’s face in news headlines are more likely to incentivise other would-be Jihadists to devise their own plots. Avoiding speculation and sensationalism around lone actor attacks could be one of the most powerful deterrents against future attacks.