TIC Tock: The Threat of a Chemical Weapons Attack in Europe

In the aftermath of the November 2015 Paris attacks, the Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the events, issuing a statement in which the attacks were named as “the first of the storm”. French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, subsequently issued a statement warning against future attacks on France and Europe by IS, and highlighted the potential use of chemical and biological weapons by the group. As evidence of the group’s pursuit of chemical warfare continues to grow, experts from a number of international security and research organisations have remained divided over the realistic threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attacks by IS. While many organisations have urged Europe to prepare for the possibility of a chemical attack, others have indicated that such unconventional attacks are unlikely due to logistical and financial hurdles.

Those downplaying the likelihood of a CBRN attack by IS have cited previous failed attempts at developing chemical weapons by non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda. They typically argue that the CBRN material seized by IS in Iraq, Syria and Libya is far more likely to be used in the ongoing war in these regions than in a large-scale terrorist attack in Europe. These assertions are not without merit: any chemical weapons seized by IS are unlikely to still be viable enough for an effective attack, and that which remains could not be easily transported across borders into Europe without drawing attention.

Since June 2015, reports of IS fighters employing makeshift chemical weapons during warfare in Syria and Iraq have continued. However, to date, the chemical warfare employed by IS has comprised explosives filled with widely-available materials, such as chlorine and the agricultural fumigant phosphine. Mustard gas, likely seized from former Syrian and Iraqi stockpiles, has also been used. Iraqi intelligence reports have indicated that IS is actively pursuing its own chemical and biological weapons development program: in December 2015, Syrian special forces reportedly destroyed a newly-discovered chemical weapons workshop built by IS fighters, and multiple reports have asserted that IS has recruited a number of scientists and physicists. Any real progress regarding these efforts has not yet materialised. However, observers should also consider the far more realistic threat of IS and other extremist groups exploiting commonly-available materials within Europe’s borders for smaller, but nonetheless potentially lethal attacks.

Frequently ignored in the debate on IS’s or any extremist group’s ability to conduct a CBRN attack within Europe’s boundaries is the abundant availability of materials that, while not classified as chemical weapons or precursors, are nonetheless extremely volatile. Such materials, known as toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) constitute compounds that are widely produced and used in routine industrial procedures. The hazards posed by TICs vary significantly depending on the chemical in question, but many can cause severe injuries upon exposure and can even be lethal in high concentrations. Although EU legislation and programmes have attempted to regulate the export and security of these substances, the responsibility to implement these measures is down to individual member states and has been uneven. Further, information sharing between member states continues to remain limited, creating a gap in the continent’s security that may be exploited by extremist groups, as was the case in the Paris attacks.

Frequently cited TICs that would be suitable for extremist groups include chloramines and chlorine gas (easily created by mixing ammonia with bleach or acids), formaldehyde (highly corrosive), methyl isocyanate (extremely toxic if inhaled or ingested) as well as a range of other commonly-available compounds. Because of their use in industrial processes, TICs are often stored in large quantities at facilities that may have little security in place, and may even be purchased online from reputable laboratory suppliers. Further, a December 2015 European Parliament report stated that the smuggling and disappearance of TIC shipments, as well as personal protection equipment such as gas masks and hazmat suits, occurs relatively frequently.

Even if extremist groups could not gain access to large amounts of TICs, even relatively small amounts of these materials, which could be acquired with relative ease, could be used in small-scale attacks to great effect. Such attacks could include use of these materials in confined spaces, such as public transport networks, or their deployment in gaseous form in building ventilation systems. While small-scale TIC-based attacks may not injure or kill a large number of victims, the psychological repercussions of such an attack would be significant; a CBRN attack by IS in particular would fit with the group’s demonstrated psychological warfare strategy and cause widespread panic across Europe. With the continent already tense in the wake of the Paris attacks and the rise of anti-refugee sentiments, the fear induced by a chemical attack in Europe, however small, would suit undoubtedly IS’s agenda.

Legislation

EU legislation so far has been predominantly focused on the control of chemicals that serve as explosives precursors, as well as regulating the export of materials with dual military and commercial applications. In 2011, the EU Commission adopted the CBRN Action Plan, a five-year plan intended to strengthen the security of CBRN materials in member states. Under the CBRN Action Plan, EU member states were required to establish lists of high-risk CBRN materials and develop guidelines and good practices to ensure the security of these substances. However, each EU member state is responsible for drawing up their own lists and implementing their own security practices around these materials within the framework of the Action Plan’s suggestions. This has led to the uneven implementation of security at locations where CBRN materials are stored, as well as differing lists of high risk materials between member states, many of which omit TICs. In 2016, the CBRN Action Plan expired and as at January 2016 is being reviewed by the EU Commission in order to establish a new framework.