The Splintering of South Sudan

Unrest in Juba in July that resulted in nearly 300 fatalities and yet more Internally Displaced People highlighted the growing divisions within the governing Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Machar’s SPLMIn-Opposition (SPLM-IO). Since then, Machar’s support base has waned, leaving the rebel leader needing to cement relations in the Upper Nile state and other remote regions. With Machar in exile, his ability to maintain the support of SPLM-IO commanders facing government troops on the ground has been constrained, and he is struggling to capture the support of SPLM defectors. The latest spat has parallels with July 2013, when Machar was first removed from the office of Vice President; with the rebel leader unwilling to give up the powerful portfolio. This time round, however, Machar is not the only one seeking greater influence.

The SPLM-IO is suffering worsening party divides, which President Kiir’s administration has capitalised on. Following the violence in July and Machar’s withdrawal from the capital, Taban Deng Gai appointed himself the new leader of the SPLM-IO. To quickly secure Taban’s support and his circle of influence within the rebel force, President Kiir appointed Taban to Machar’s former position in the Vice Presidency, although there is uncertainty over Taban’s support base outside Juba.

President Kiir’s eagerness to use Taban’s SPLM-IO to appease international mediators is alienating his own right - hand man, General Paul Malong, causing increasing tension within his governing administration. As head of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), Malong is believed to be the driving force behind the July violence. President Kiir can ill afford to displease the powerful figure, who commands the respect of, and influence over, the armed forces. Yet local sources agree that the ousting of Machar as Vice President was likely the consequence of prior discussions between Taban and the President, and Taban will be increasingly reliant on President Kiir to maintain his new influence, a relationship unlikely to be widely supported in the SPLM-IO.

Internationally, President Kiir and Machar are also losing favour. President Kiir’s administration, specifically the role of Malong, has faced international scrutiny in the wake of a recent report released by a US—based investigative group, the Sentry, alleging the misuse of state funds, among other abuses. Closer to home, Machar has also faced challenges. Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir’s administration is less eager to back the rebel leader, with Taban’s recent visits to Khartoum easing Al Bashir’s concerns over Sudanese rebels receiving support within South Sudan. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya are similarly concerned that backing a weakened Machar is likely to delay potential stability, and are unlikely to prop up the divided SPLM-IO.

It is clear that any future talks will need to do more than placate President Kiir and Machar, with Taban, Malong and several other elite figures eager to secure their own seat at any future negotiating table. Taban has already gained legitimacy, participating in discussions with a UN Security Council delegation as First Vice President in September. The splintering of interest groups will make a revised peace deal increasingly difficult and prolonged talks will do little to ease tensions on the ground.

It is increasingly evident that peace efforts in South Sudan will not be easily salvaged. The appointment of Taban as First Vice President largely nullified the August 2015 peace agreement signed between President Kiir and Machar, intended to end South Sudan’s civil war, ongoing since December 2013. With Machar’s supporters having fled Juba, the previously proposed joint demilitarisation of Juba is unlikely, and the superior capabilities of the SPLA are likely to deter an SPLM-IO advance on the city. The status quo in the capital has shifted significantly, with Machar no longer enjoying the backing of the August 2015 agreement to inflate his military strength. A return to the conditions of the agreement therefore appear mismatched with the situation on the ground. In the interim, forces loyal to Machar are reportedly recruiting in the Greater Equatoria region, which could be the preferred site of a renewed insurgency by Machar’s forces. However, there has also been a significant increase in violence attributed to unidentified militias operating with relative autonomy. With the polarisation between Machar and President Kiir largely off the cards given Machar’s waning support base, the current situation presents an opportunity for other key actors, beyond Taban and Malong, to contest for greater influence in the increasingly splintered country, reducing the prospects for stabilisation.