The Scattered State: What Next for Islamic State in North Africa?

The leader of Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr Al Bagdadi, first declared an official IS presence in Libya in November 2014, after a group of Libyans returning from Syria briefly took control of key areas in the eastern city of Derna. From Derna, IS successfully absorbed militants from the multitude of other jihadist militia groups that had developed in Libya and expanded westward along the coast. By July 2015, IS’ footprint of territorial control included a presence in Benghazi, Al Bayda, Derna, Tripoli, Sabratha and most notably, in the central port city of Sirte, where it controlled a coastal strip of over 120km on either side of the city.

This rapid expansion created the impression that IS had successfully capitalised on Libya’s power vacuum to become a dominant player outside of its primary areas of operation. Propaganda material reinforced this message, as the group broadcasted frequent images of its governance of Sirte.

However, IS lost territory in Libya almost as quickly as it gained. IS’ foreign leaders underestimated the challenges of operating in Libya’s vast desert terrain, an area almost three times as large as Syria and Iraq combined. Its complex tribal and city alliances, which are notoriously opaque to outsiders, made it difficult for the group to exploit wider social grievances and sectarian divisions, as it had achieved so successfully in Iraq. In addition, the presence of multiple rival militias in each district made expansion in key areas difficult and frustrated IS’ efforts to capture any of Libya’s oil facilities, crucially preventing them from gaining a local source of oil revenue. It was only around Sirte where IS was able to consolidate support, as Sirte had been shunned by the country’s other more powerful militias because of its lasting association with Libya’s vilified former leader, Muammar Gaddafi.

These factors will not change following the imminent loss of Sirte and will severely limit IS’s ability to salvage credibility as a force capable of capturing and holding territory. Estimates of fighter numbers left in Libya vary from 300 to 1,000. With little prospect for central assistance from Iraq and Syria, the ability of such a limited force to return to governance-like administration and expansion is highly doubtful.

However, IS has already demonstrated its willingness to revert to roaming insurgent-style tactics under pressure. It is this ability to adapt that poses a threat to other North African countries. Fleeing foreign militants may see a return to their respective home countries as their best option, which potentially creates an opportunity for the group to plan and inspire its high-profile brand of terrorist attacks in new territories, despite the losses of its governing areas. This shift in tactics was most evident in the opportunistic attack on Ben Guerdane across the Tunisian border in March 2016, after US airstrikes in February destroyed IS camps in Sabratha.

Tunisia in particular has been identified as the most vulnerable of Libya’s neighbours to a scattered IS. This is driven primarily by its close proximity to Libya and the high numbers of Tunisian nationals who make up the majority of IS foreign fighters in the country. In 2015, these were estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000, although updated figures vary. However, Tunisia’s military capabilities have improved substantially since March as a result of international support and increased border patrols. As such, while some Tunisian IS fighters may see a home return as their best option, their capabilities of staging co-ordinated crossborder attacks, similar to Ben Guerdane, have been significantly diminished.

Media reports have also referenced an increased risk to Algeria, which shares a 700km long and porous border with Libya. While Algeria’s foreign commercial assets would offer attractive targets, particularly for attempted vehicle-based suicide or opportunistic rocket attacks, there is no indication that IS is better placed to conduct such attacks than before coming under siege in Sirte. Fleeing militants would need to traverse the almost 600km from Sirte to the nearest Algerian border crossing, and evade the considerable military surveillance presence along the border. Crossing this region would also require the co-operation of the militia groups operating in the southern desert, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), with whom IS is unlikely to partner.

The risk of attacks in the short term is therefore likely to remain concentrated within Libya. As airstrikes continue to target fleeing militants attempting to leave Sirte, retaliatory attacks on members of enemy groups are particularly likely, as well as opportunistic attacks on the southern and central oil fields. However, without Sirte, IS is effectively without territory in Libya, rendering it increasingly unable to live up to its goal of ‘remaining and expanding’ and thus making it harder to distinguish from the constellation of other armed militant groups vying for dominance in the country and wider region.

The leader of Islamic State (IS), Abu Bakr Al Bagdadi, first declared an official IS presence in Libya in November 2014, after a group of Libyans returning from Syria briefly took control of key areas in the eastern city of Derna. From Derna, IS successfully absorbed militants from the multitude of other jihadist militia groups that had developed in Libya and expanded westward along the coast. By July 2015, IS’ footprint of territorial control included a presence in Benghazi, Al Bayda, Derna, Tripoli, Sabratha and most notably, in the central port city of Sirte, where it controlled a coastal strip of over 120km on either side of the city.

This rapid expansion created the impression that IS had successfully capitalised on Libya’s power vacuum to become a dominant player outside of its primary areas of operation. Propaganda material reinforced this message, as the group broadcasted frequent images of its governance of Sirte.

However, IS lost territory in Libya almost as quickly as it gained. IS’ foreign leaders underestimated the challenges of operating in Libya’s vast desert terrain, an area almost three times as large as Syria and Iraq combined. Its complex tribal and city alliances, which are notoriously opaque to outsiders, made it difficult for the group to exploit wider social grievances and sectarian divisions, as it had achieved so successfully in Iraq. In addition, the presence of multiple rival militias in each district made expansion in key areas difficult and frustrated IS’ efforts to capture any of Libya’s oil facilities, crucially preventing them from gaining a local source of oil revenue. It was only around Sirte where IS was able to consolidate support, as Sirte had been shunned by the country’s other more powerful militias because of its lasting association with Libya’s vilified former leader, Muammar Gaddafi.

These factors will not change following the imminent loss of Sirte and will severely limit IS’s ability to salvage credibility as a force capable of capturing and holding territory. Estimates of fighter numbers left in Libya vary from 300 to 1,000. With little prospect for central assistance from Iraq and Syria, the ability of such a limited force to return to governance-like administration and expansion is highly doubtful.

However, IS has already demonstrated its willingness to revert to roaming insurgent-style tactics under pressure. It is this ability to adapt that poses a threat to other North African countries. Fleeing foreign militants may see a return to their respective home countries as their best option, which potentially creates an opportunity for the group to plan and inspire its high-profile brand of terrorist attacks in new territories, despite the losses of its governing areas. This shift in tactics was most evident in the opportunistic attack on Ben Guerdane across the Tunisian border in March 2016, after US airstrikes in February destroyed IS camps in Sabratha.

Tunisia in particular has been identified as the most vulnerable of Libya’s neighbours to a scattered IS. This is driven primarily by its close proximity to Libya and the high numbers of Tunisian nationals who make up the majority of IS foreign fighters in the country. In 2015, these were estimated at between 2,000 and 3,000, although updated figures vary. However, Tunisia’s military capabilities have improved substantially since March as a result of international support and increased border patrols. As such, while some Tunisian IS fighters may see a home return as their best option, their capabilities of staging co-ordinated crossborder attacks, similar to Ben Guerdane, have been significantly diminished.

Media reports have also referenced an increased risk to Algeria, which shares a 700km long and porous border with Libya. While Algeria’s foreign commercial assets would offer attractive targets, particularly for attempted vehicle-based suicide or opportunistic rocket attacks, there is no indication that IS is better placed to conduct such attacks than before coming under siege in Sirte. Fleeing militants would need to traverse the almost 600km from Sirte to the nearest Algerian border crossing, and evade the considerable military surveillance presence along the border. Crossing this region would also require the co-operation of the militia groups operating in the southern desert, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), with whom IS is unlikely to partner.

The risk of attacks in the short term is therefore likely to remain concentrated within Libya. As airstrikes continue to target fleeing militants attempting to leave Sirte, retaliatory attacks on members of enemy groups are particularly likely, as well as opportunistic attacks on the southern and central oil fields. However, without Sirte, IS is effectively without territory in Libya, rendering it increasingly unable to live up to its goal of ‘remaining and expanding’ and thus making it harder to distinguish from the constellation of other armed militant groups vying for dominance in the country and wider region.