"I am here under arrest because I won against the notion of 'Whoever wins Istanbul, wins Turkey'," said the leader of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party, CHP) opposition party and mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, during a court hearing on one of the numerous criminal charges that he faces. On 23 March, the CHP was poised to elect İmamoğlu as its presidential candidate for the April 2028 election. Days prior, however, the government revoked İmamoğlu’s university degree – a requirement for presidential candidacy in Turkey – and arrested him along with other CHP members on accusations of corruption, extortion and money laundering. This move came straight out of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s electoral playbook; a leader who has held a position of power for more than 22 years, with a history of using populist policy, media manipulation, and legal avenues to sideline political opponents.

İmamoğlu’s detention sparked mass unrest in Istanbul that quickly spread to other cities across the country, and soon grew to encompass wider issues of electoral freedoms, Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian policies, and a years-long cost of living crisis. Other political parties, labour unions, and student activist groups joined the movement, which, in response to the government’s crackdown, morphed into mass boycotts of prominent Turkish brands and retailers. The police clamped down swiftly, arresting nearly 2,000 activists during the demonstrations, detaining journalists in their homes, and even 11 others, including one well-known actor, for supporting the boycott on social media.

Erdoğan’s popularity decline

Erdoğan has faced three successive presidential elections, and won them all by a convincing margin, including the latest in May 2023. However, over the two years since, public support for the president has eroded over the country’s longstanding economic crisis, triggered by Erdoğan’s unconventional economic policies. During Turkey’s most recent March 2024 municipal election – a useful indicator of public sentiment – Erdoğan’s declining popularity was more evident, with the CHP emerging as the first-time leader in terms of vote share over Erdoğan’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP), and securing considerable majorities in both major cities of Istanbul and Ankara. An opinion poll held seven months later showed that more than half (55 percent) of Turkey’s adults view Erdoğan unfavourably.

It comes as no surprise, then, that Erdoğan is seeking to strengthen his electoral chances, even this far out from the election. İmamoğlu’s popularity has long represented one of Erdoğan’s greatest challenges, evidenced by the latter’s repeated efforts to cut him out of the race. In 2019, the AKP attempted to annul İmamoğlu’s mayoral victory in Istanbul, leading to a re-run election, and ultimately an even greater victory for İmamoğlu. In late 2022, five months ahead of the 2023 presidential election, a court sentenced the opposition leader to more than two years in prison for insulting public officials, disqualifying him from running in the race. In 2025, the government’s efforts have been carefully planned to first, disrupt the CHP’s primary; second, prevent İmamoğlu from running in the 2028 election; and third, possibly disqualify İmamoğlu from holding any public office, should the courts rule to convict.

Turkey’s next election

“Isn't it a natural and correct choice for our President Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to be elected once again?,” asked the leader of the right-wing Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party, MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, in December 2024. Turkey’s constitution, however, limits its presidents to two five-year terms, and Erdoğan has already served three; justifying his last electoral candidacy on the basis that his first administration began before the implementation of the two-term system, only passed in 2017. With this latest clampdown on key opposition figures, and talks circulating on amending the constitution to allow for a third term (or fourth, as the case may be) – a prospect bolstered by recent efforts to extend an olive branch to the country’s Kurdish political leadership – the signs that Erdoğan plans to extend his presidency beyond the two-term constitutional limit are plain. The months and years ahead, therefore, promise to be filled with controversial and suppressive political developments, and likely unrest in response, while investor confidence will continue to ebb and flow with the government’s controversial policies on one hand, and instability on the other.