On 2 April, South Africa’s parliament passed the budget’s fiscal framework, following several weeks of political infighting over the contents of the budget. However, the legislation was passed with 194 votes for and 182 against, with the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second largest member of the coalition government, voting against it, and the largest, the African National Congress (ANC), securing the necessary support through various smaller opposition parties both inside and outside the coalition. The move highlighted the differences of opinions and infighting that have been so prevalent in the coalition since its inception in June 2024, and signals that such tension is likely to continue, with growing concerns over whether a larger fallout could see some parties exit the coalition, or create a gridlock in government that prevents effective governance and exacerbates instability.

Parties at odds

The issue at the centre of the debate was the ANC’s proposed two percent value-added tax (VAT) increase. The DA voted against this increase alongside the country’s most populist opposition parties, former President Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party and Julius Malema’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). The three parties argued that the increase would be felt most by South Africa’s poorest. Similar tax increases in other countries in the region, including Kenya, have prompted widespread and violent protests.

The ANC was able to pass the bill, with a VAT increase of 0.5 percent rather than the proposed two percent, although the National Treasury subsequently reversed this increase. However, the friction between the two largest parties and their inability to resolve it highlights another key issue in the structure of the coalition – the lack of a disputes resolution mechanism. The GNU comprises a range of parties, and while both the ANC and DA, the main players, are broadly centrist and align on various issues, ideological differences remain prevalent. All GNU members are party to a Statement of Intent (SOI), which outlines that decisions should be made by consensus or sufficient consensus (60 percent agreement among GNU members of parliament, which cannot be reached without the agreement of both the DA and ANC). However, it has become increasingly apparent that a more resolute and official body of rules is necessary to govern or mediate disputes within the coalition, particularly as tensions between and within parties threaten to further weaken the GNU and its ability to govern.

At present, the only structure in place to mitigate disputes is the clearing mechanism, established by President Cyril Ramaphosa in 2024 for the resolution of policy disagreements. However, there are concerns about the impartiality of the mechanism committee, which is chaired by Vice President Paul Mashatile of the ANC, who has been vocal in his dislike for the DA, as well as whether this is sufficient to navigate the wide-ranging policy positions of the 10-party coalition. Even prior to the June 2024 election, experts argued that the likelihood of a successful coalition would increase substantially if there was a binding coalition agreement in place with proper dispute resolution mechanisms.

The future of the coalition

While the ANC has berated the DA for acting more like an opposition party than a coalition member, these tensions are not an indication of either party’s leadership wanting to leave the GNU. According to a survey conducted in early April, the majority of South Africans continue to support the coalition government even in spite of the widely reported infighting. However, factionalism and internal divisions threaten to destabilise the fragile balance. DA members outside the executive have argued that the party’s involvement in the coalition is not sufficiently advantageous, while in the ANC, a small group led by Mashatile continue to lobby for a partnership with the EFF, to replace the DA. This alliance would require the ousting of Ramaphosa, as the EFF have made it clear they would not work with the ANC while Ramaphosa remains president. For now, the coalition seems secure with supportive politicians remaining in more powerful position than the would-be disruptors.

Outlook

While the implementation of a mechanism to mitigate disputes would aid in navigating differing policy positions, significant challenges remain for the coalition, particularly amid a DA elective conference scheduled for April 2026 and an ANC one in 2027. The coalition’s ability to adapt and establish more effective governance mechanisms will be crucial to navigating the next four years leading up to the 2029 elections. Without meaningful compromise and collaboration between coalition partners, South Africa risks further political instability – threatening efforts to revive the economy and drive much-needed socio-economic progress.