The Pen and the Sword: Europe after Charlie Hebdo

The series of shootings in Paris and the wider Île-de-France region between 7 and 9 January, in which 17 people were killed and a further 22 injured, has sparked outrage and concern in equal measure. The first attack against the Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical magazine, was perpetrated by two brothers, Chérif and Saïd Kouachi. The brothers managed to evade security forces for three days before being killed following a brief stand-off in Dammartin-en-Goële, an industrial area in the north-west of Paris. At the same time, three other shootings took place around Paris, perpetrated by Amedy Coulibaly, an affiliate of the Kouachi brothers. The attacks have raised questions regarding the nature of the terrorist threat in Europe, and whether the continent should be braced for similar incidents over the coming months.

The attacker’s choice of Charlie Hebdo as a target prompted mass gatherings across Europe in support of both the magazine and importance of freedom of expression. However, from a security perspective, the attacks have raised several issues of concern for European governments. In recent years, terror attacks in Europe have typically been attributed to individuals or small groups inspired by transnational organisations, notably the 2005 London underground bombings and the 2004 Madrid train bombings; these attacks did not involve direct assistance from transnational terrorist groups. However, responsibility for the Paris shootings was directly claimed by two prominent transnational terrorist organisations. In an official video, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based affiliate of Al Qaeda, claimed that it instructed and funded the Kouachi brothers’ attack against Charlie Hebdo. Meanwhile Coulibaly featured in a separate video pledging his allegiance to Islamic State (IS) with the group later claiming that it coordinated the attacks. As such, the Paris attacks seem to represent a divergence from previous incidents in the region.

The AQAP and IS claims prompted the media to suggest that both groups have developed the capability to project force far beyond their core territories. However, the extent to which either AQAP or IS were actually directly involved in the planning or execution of the attacks is unclear. Although the Kouachi brothers reportedly received three days of combat training from AQAP in Yemen’s Marib desert in 2011, there is little indication that the siblings were in contact with any AQAP members during the intervening years. The tactics employed by the Kouachi brothers were also atypical of AQAP patterns. AQAP usually uses small explosives and typically targets key infrastructure, as opposed to attacking softer targets, such as business offices. Moreover, AQAP initially released a video applauding the attack without claiming any involvement; the group only claimed that they had orchestrated the attacks after the Kouachi brothers were killed. AQAP’s claim that they provided funding has also been called into question, particularly as Coulibaly reportedly took out a bank loan to purchase weapons on behalf of the Kouachi brothers, rather than receiving money from overseas. Although in his own video Coulibaly pledged allegiance to IS, there is no evidence to suggest he had any direct contact with IS militants, and IS themselves similarly only claimed their involvement in the shootings after Coulibaly’s death.

Although the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly were clearly connected, their loyalty to competing terrorist organisations discredits the notion that the attacks were centrally planned. AQAP has previously rebuked IS for its tactics and has strongly rejected the legitimacy of IS’s self-declared Islamic caliphate. That the Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly’s pledged their allegiance to rival jihadi organisations suggests they were indifferent to the ideological distinctions and competition between AQAP and IS. Instead, it is likely that the Paris attackers were disaffected Muslims who viewed jihadism as a monolithic ideology, rather than being core members of an IS or AQAP sleeper cell. Despite the attempts by AQAP and IS to claim responsibility, it is more likely that Coulibaly and the Kouachi brothers were self-radicalised individuals with only weak links to the organisations they claimed to support.

The motive for the attacks also remains unclear. Were all the attacks solely motivated by Charlie Hebdo’s depiction of the Prophet Mohammed? While the satirical newspaper’s content was a major motivating factor, several other grievances relating to France’s foreign and domestic policy are important too. French military interventions abroad in Syria and Iraq, for example, as well as several parts of North Africa and the Sahel, are currently targeting Islamist extremist groups. In addition, France’s own societal tensions may have shaped the motivation behind the attacks. High youth unemployment, the mainstreaming of far-right ideology, and bureaucratic obstacles for immigrants seeking naturalisation are local issues that could be considered as influential factors. Cultural alienation among sections of France’s Muslim population is another issue. Researchers have posited that Muslim immigrants to France are culturally distinct from French society in ways that are perceived to undermine their French national identity.

This creates anti-Muslim sentiment among particular groups in France, which in turn may prompt some groups of Muslims to withdraw from mainstream society. Given the aforementioned factors and dynamics, should the attacks be viewed as an anomaly, unlikely to occur again, or do they suggest an evolution in the terror threat facing Europe? Although a blanket assessment for the entire region is impractical, there are several important points to be made.

Public outrage and European government responses to this latest incident have impacted the likelihood of further attacks occurring. Significant media coverage and protests across the world denouncing the attacks have demonstrated that would-be terrorists do not need to be part of an established jihadist network to capture global attention. Given the attention and impact surrounding Paris, foreign Islamist extremist groups may be encouraged to call on other sympathisers around the world to conduct attacks in their name. IS has been particularly successful in using social media and videos to spread its propaganda and reach disaffected Muslims across Europe, even enticing many to fight in Iraq and Syria. Fighting abroad provides individuals with training, further extremist indoctrination and combat experience. These developments have increased concerns that European countries may be targets for attacks by returning jihadists. Soft targets, including businesses or media outlets such as Charlie Hebdo, are more attractive options for staging such attacks.

In the coming months, European states are likely to enact policies that increase their capability to detain, arrest and monitor individuals attempting to enter Europe from conflict zones, such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Although governments may introduce rehabilitative initiatives, including psychiatric treatment and work placement programmes, to contain the threat from returning jihadists in the medium-term, most European states’ focus is currently on strengthening national security protocols.

Indeed, several European governments, including Belgium, the UK, Greece and Spain, have arrested several suspects in counter-terrorism raids since the Paris attacks. Nonetheless, lone-wolf activities are typically erratic and not easily detected by local authorities, and as such are particularly difficult to pre-empt.

Ultimately, while the Paris attacks do not represent a significant shift in the nature of terrorism in Europe, they do underscore the complexity of the threat. Although directly planned and funded attacks by transnational groups remains a concern, most attacks in Europe are likely to stem from individuals heeding calls from foreign extremist groups. Perpetrators of attacks have varying degrees of affiliation to terrorist organisations, with lone-wolves and returnee jihadists being the most concerning assailants. Furthermore, there are multiple factors influencing radicalisation of these individuals and their motives for attacks. As the nature of the threat is multifaceted and involves different types of actors that are difficult to monitor, predicting and preventing terrorist strikes is likely to remain a significant challenge in Europe.