The Ides of March: US military strategy in Somalia

In March 2016, the US military revitalised its air campaign against Al Shabaab positions in Somalia. The five airstrikes between 05 March and 02 April resulted in the highest casualty rates inflicted on Al Shabaab by US forces in almost a decade and followed a two month lull in US strikes. Whilst the latest strikes demonstrate a continued US resolve to assist in the elimination of East Africa’s most prominent militant group, these strategic successes serve to highlight Somalia’s reliance on foreign military assistance in light of poorly equipped Somali forces and an African Union (AU) mission facing increasing challenges.  

The latest intensification in US airstrikes has coincided with significant setbacks for the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). The African peacekeeping force has been increasingly viewed as vulnerable to attack, with Al Shabaab militants overrunning three AMISOM bases in the past year – in Leego, Janale and El Adde – killing over 300 AU soldiers.  In response, the US has since targeted a number of Al Shabaab interests, including a strike on the group’s Raso training camp on 05 March 2016, killing over 150 militants, as well as the killing of senior Al Shabaab commander Hassan Ali Dhoore on 31 March 2016. The successes enjoyed by the US forces, coupled with the recent losses faced by AMISOM, have raised concerns over Somalia and AMISOM’s capacity to combat Al Shabaab without this international support. 

The US first carried out drone strikes in Somalia in 2011, a decade after it began covert military operations as part of the US’ ‘global war on terror’. Such continued focus on air support and intelligence gathering has proven strategically valuable to the overstretched and under-resourced ground forces.  Yet, with the highest annual number of recorded US strikes in Somalia tallying just 12 in 2015, Somalia remains a secondary battlefield in the US fight against terror. Rather, with US airstrikes over Yemen targeting Al Qaeda affiliate, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, numbering more than double those in Somalia, it is clear that the military superpower has concentrated its attention across the Gulf of Aden. 

While the impending US election in November 2016 is likely to revitalise the debate over the US’ ongoing war against global terrorism, and by corollary, its involvement in Somalia, the ground forces are in no position to combat Al Shabaab alone. Unsurprisingly there has been no substantive discussion over US foreign policy in Somalia during the US presidential campaigns so far.  However, it is widely presumed that US will continue its operations against the world’s two most prominent militant groups; Islamic state and Al Qaeda, including affiliates in Somalia. Furthermore, with Somalia’s own elections set to take place in 2016, the US will be eager to defend the international community’s investment in Somalia’s political progress. It appears, in the short term at least, US strategy in Somalia will remain unchanged.