The Growing Gulf: Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have become a recurrent and pronounced theme in Middle Eastern affairs as both countries continue to compete with one another for regional influence. At the start of 2016, after a few months of relative calm in the long-running rivalry, relations between the two countries once again sharply deteriorated. In a region characterised by widespread conflict where both countries exercise a significant amount of influence, the resurgence of Iran-Saudi tensions is unlikely to improve the Middle East’s crisis zones. Alongside an ongoing commitment to opposing sides in the conflicts in Syria and Yemen, the rivalry has been marked by sectarian narratives which only serve to exacerbate and entrench divisions across the region. 

The latest bout of heated exchanges between the two countries was set off by the execution of Sheikh Nimr Al Nimr, a prominent Shi’a Muslim cleric and outspoken critic of the Saudi royal family, on 2 January in Saudi Arabia. Nimr had been arrested in 2012 after calling for the removal of the Saudi monarchy and was convicted on charges of terrorism. Following Nimr’s execution, Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran, throwing Molotov cocktails and destroying furniture inside the facility before police intervened. The incident has resulted in the immediate cessation of diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries, with Saudi Arabia requesting the departure of Iranian diplomats from the country. 

This development is the latest in a long-standing rivalry between the two countries, and comes at a time when both Saudi Arabia and Iran remain committed to supporting opposing sides in a number of the region’s civil conflicts. Moreover, over the past five years, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have built up their stockpiles of conventional armaments, including missile defence systems and advanced aircraft. In light of this, the recent tensions have led to concerns that a direct Saudi-Iran military conflict is in the making. Indeed, in early 2015, a naval engagement between the two countries appeared to be impending as Iranian ships approached the coast of Yemen, where Saudi Arabia leads ongoing military operations against the Iran-supported Houthi rebels. 

Nonetheless, despite the arms build-up, the onset of open warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran remains a low-likelihood scenario. Both countries recognise the severe global impact that an inter-state conflict would have, and are unlikely to readily commit to this path. However, this does not imply that tensions between the two states are without consequence for the broader region. Most problematically, diplomatic tensions between the two states have regularly spilled over into regional conflicts, effectively creating proxy wars out of local political contests. For instance, in early 2015, Iran’s perceived influence over the Houthi rebels in Yemen prompted Saudi Arabia and its allies to launch a military intervention in support of ousted Yemeni President, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The cost to Yemen has been high: according to the United Nations over 8,000 civilians have been killed since the start of the conflict, with almost 2,800 of those deaths attributed to Saudi-led coalition air-strikes. 

Both Iranian and Saudi influence also weighs especially heavily on the civil conflict in Syria, which has been ongoing since 2011. Iran supports the besieged government of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad against a range of rebel groups, a number of which have financial backing from Saudi Arabia. As such, international efforts to resolve the Syrian conflict have sought to pressure both countries to assume a major role in peace talks. However, while Saudi Arabia and Iran have recently agreed to join the negotiating table, there have been few concrete results as both states remain firm in their opposition to one another. 

With many of the region’s conflicts being split along sectarian lines, the sectarian dimension to the Iran-Saudi rivalry has become one of its most problematic aspects. The association between Saudi Arabia and Iran with Sunni and Shi’a Islam respectively has exacerbated sectarian tensions across the region. Both countries have long accused the other of harbouring sectarian biases, with Nimr’s execution as a particularly overt instance thereof. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s foreign policy ambitions have led to this narrative becoming more pronounced in many of the region’s conflicts, most noticeably in Syria and Iraq. In addition, the division has also become increasingly apparent at the state-level. For instance, in the wake of the most recent spat, a number of Sunni-led states, notably the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Sudan, sided with Saudi Arabia in downgrading or cutting diplomatic ties with Iran. As a result, the recurrent mobilisation of sectarian identity by either state serves to deeply entrench these divisions across the region, impeding attempts at dialogue.

Despite the efforts of international actors to mediate a dialogue between the two states, a resolution to the Iran- Saudi dispute appears far off. The latest developments have come amidst growing Saudi scepticism of the rising level of international engagement with Iran following successful nuclear negotiations in July 2015. Since the signing of a deal between Iran and the P5+1 states, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has certified that Iran has restricted its sensitive nuclear activities. As a result, on 16 January 2016, the United Nations dropped economic sanctions on Iran, allowing the Iranian economy to become integrated into the global marketplace for the first time in almost five years. 

For Saudi Arabia, one of the key drivers for its foreign military campaigns remains its perception of Iranian expansionism. With the recent fall of economic sanctions and as Iran becomes able to increase national revenues and widen its access to funds, Saudi Arabia is likely to become ever more convinced of the threat posed by encroaching Iranian influence in the region. Correspondingly, Iranian political hardliners are unlikely to abandon their country’s involvement in regional conflicts as long as they perceive aggressive intent from Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies.

These mutual suspicions are likely to further harden each country’s position and continue to derail attempts at a Saudi-Iran direct dialogue. For its part, Saudi Arabia remains unwilling to engage in direct diplomacy with Iran until the Iranians withdraw their support for Assad and supporting militias, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is currently fighting alongside government forces in Syria. From the Iranian perspective, the Saudis are guilty of providing support to regional Sunni Islamist militant groups, such as the Al Qaeda affiliated Jabhat Al Nusra, and therefore of stoking extremism and sectarian violence throughout the region.

In this light, the latest spike in tensions between the two countries can be viewed as a further contribution to the prolonging of the region’s conflicts. As long as both Saudi Arabia and Iran remain unwilling to engage in a direct dialogue with one another and are firmly committed to opposing positions, their support is unlikely to waver for the various warring factions. Consequently, as long as these factions feel assured of external support, they are themselves less likely to commit to meaningful peace talks. Moreover, the sectarian aspect of these conflicts is likely to become ever more entrenched, and consequently more difficult to overcome through negotiation efforts.