The Eastern Frontier: Islamic State's Advance in East Africa

The capture of Qandala is significant, as it demonstrates that IS affiliates are becoming increasingly adaptable within Somalia’s conflict environment. The Qandala success shows that IS militants have the ability to leverage Somalia’s illustrious clan system. In this regard, Qandala is home to Mumin’s Majerteen Ali Saleban clan and its seizure demonstrates the strategic use of clan ties and local knowledge to advance, a skill that will serve IS well in navigating Somalia. Furthermore, the attack demonstrates an eagerness to take advantage of wider insecurity in Somalia. Al Shabaab, for example, has long exploited the absence of government authority in the country. With the administrations of Puntland and neighbouring Galmudug embroiled in a protracted dispute in the town of Galkayo at the time of the advance, Mumin has clearly migrated such tactics to his new  agenda. The move will also likely be wellreceived by central IS; Qandala offers a strategic location on Somalia’s north coast, situated 300km across the Gulf of Aden from emerging IS fronts in Yemen.

 Mumin’s defection from Al Shabaab followed several appeals by central IS calling on its “Somali brothers” to switch allegiance from their long-time backer, Al Qaeda. However, inroads by IS into Somalia in this regard had thus far been limited, with Al Shabaab leadership clamping down on any potential converts. Former leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, for example, led a leadership purge in 2013, ousting prominent commander Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, while current Al Shabaab leader, and Godane’s former right-hand man, Ahmed Omar has also sought to increase centralised control. Yet, Al Shabaab’s push back on IS defectors extends beyond the clampdown on younger blood enraptured by the group’s international appeal. Al Shabaab has led an independent insurgency in the country for over ten years that has benefitted greatly from personal relationships between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda’s key leadership. Furthermore, Al Shabaab remains entrenched in the social and security fabric of the country. Being the dominant militant group in Somalia, Al Shabaab will therefore require greater enticement from IS to see any benefit in switching sides. While Al Shabaab’s headstrong approach has thus far been effective in curbing IS encroachment, it is increasingly clear that the latter is gaining successes in winning converts among Al Shabaab’s weaker bases in the north. 

Although the presence of IS affiliates in Somalia, and wider East Africa, pales in comparison to Al Shabaab, the group is making gains in the region. A two-pronged approach, waging a territorial advance in northern Somalia while securing ideological converts elsewhere, has the potential to breed success. In Somalia, should Mumin’s group be successful in leveraging local support networks and securing strategic victories in the north, it could offer an enticing alternative to Al Shabaab among potential defectors. If attractive enough, the group is likely to present a threat to the unity of Al Shabaab. However, a single territorial victory should not be interpreted as the imminent rise of IS in East Africa. At present, the group will likely have more success in boosting its international profile through low-impact attacks orchestrated by self-radicalised individuals. Such attacks will allow IS to more easily transcend borders within East Africa and inflate perceptions of its regional presence. While an IS caliphate is not imminent, IS has made inroads in the east through an enduring and relentless propaganda campaign. Now that the group has boots on the ground in Somalia, IS’s East African agenda may well begin to accelerate.