The Crocodile Coup: Mnangagwa Snaps Back in Zimbabwe

“Do Not Insult the Crocodile Before You Cross the River” 

Mugabe’s recent troubles began on 6 November when he dismissed Mnangagwa as Zimbabwe’s Vice President and expelled him from the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party. The move was widely perceived as a move to allow Mugabe’s unpopular wife, Grace Mugabe, to succeed him. However, the former vice president enjoys the backing of Zimbabwe’s influential war veterans, who occupy key positions in ZANU-PF as well as security and state institutions. Fearing a loss of influence if Grace’s faction were to take power, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) acted to ensure the succession of one of their own: another former liberation fighter, President Mnangagwa. The highly personalised nature of Mugabe’s rule makes it easy to forget that the ZDF has always been the foundation of the Mugabe regime. Over the last 37 years, the ageing war veterans took part in numerous acts of state-sponsored violence in Mugabe’s name. This includes the massacre of 20,000 civilians in Matabeleland in the 1980s, the violent invasion of commercial farmland in 2000 and the bloody attacks on supporters of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change under Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) during the presidential elections in 2008. President Mnangagwa has been at Mugabe’s side since the liberation movement in the 1960s, has been a senior member of government during the last four decades, and has played a key role in much of the ZANU-PF’s controversial rule. 

“Let Bygones Be Bygones” 

Politically, all indications are that November’s coup was a realignment of ZANU-PF factions and that the party is unlikely to loosen its grip on power. President Mnangagwa has promised that the 2018 general elections will go ahead; however, he has said nothing about democratic reforms, instead asking Zimbabweans to “let bygones be bygones” when referring to past human and civil rights violations. Additionally, the military has repeatedly made it clear that it would only accept one of their own in the seat of power and would never serve the opposition. Its treatment of ZANU-PF officials perceived to have backed Grace illustrates this point: over 400 people have been detained following the coup and high-ranking Mugabe supporters have reportedly not only been arrested but severely assaulted. The new presidency is not a guaranteed break with the past. Nevertheless, President Mnangagwa will likely cut back on overt forms of political violence and electoral interference in order to appease donors. He is also likely to attempt to co-opt the opposition before resorting to violence. However, a historical infrastructure of violence will remain in place to ensure ZANU-PF’s power. 

Fortunately, violence is unlikely to be necessary in the short term. Zimbabwe’s opposition movements, including MDC-T, have in recent years been characterised by disunity, leadership disputes, cooption by ZANU-PF and a lack of political strategy. Having placed Mugabe’s removal at the centre of recent campaigns – and having failed to remove him themselves – opposition groups now have even less to offer disillusioned voters. The opposition has also exhibited an eagerness to work with the new leadership rather than oppose it, thereby legitimising the coup and the new administration. President Mnangagwa – who is currently riding the wave of post Mugabe jubilation in Zimbabwe – will likely approach the 2018 general elections with little fear of the opposition and little need for intimidation tactics.

“Jobs, Jobs, Jobs” 

In contrast to political reforms, President Mnangagwa has promised significant economic changes, in the form of “investment-led economic recovery that puts a premium on job-creation.” This is sorely needed in a country where over 90 percent of the population is unemployed and approximately 80 percent live below the poverty line. Despite significant uncertainty regarding the direction the new government will take, restoring confidence in the stagnating economy is likely to be President Mnangagwa’s top priority. International donors, the business community and the four-million-strong diaspora are eager to assist but will require political and economic concessions. President Mnangagwa will have to balance a number of factors, including the military’s expectations of continued patronage, the citizens’ need for economic advancement and the international community’s calls for democracy and improved human rights protections. President Mnangagwa is likely to use the continuation of a limited political environment to balance these conflicting demands. 

The President has indicated that he wants to re-engage with Western countries and has already nurtured ties with China. Zimbabwe, therefore, has no shortage of potential investment if the government can convince investors to reconsider Zimbabwean opportunities. However, President Mnangagwa’s need for political and military support reduces the likelihood of significant attempts to curb corruption and patronage among political elites. He is likely to focus on a mixture of statesponsored ventures – which will continue to provide elites with access to state resources - and free market elements, including the assurance that private investments are safe. This will ensure he can prop up his military backers while presenting the initial steps towards economic recovery. 

Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector will be a key indicator of what can be expected, due to its centrality to the economy (including its links to manufacturing) and its seasonal nature, which makes quick recoveries possible. Shortly after his inauguration, President Mnangagwa stated that the controversial land reforms of 2000, in which over 3,000 commercial farms were seized by the state, will not be reversed. He did, however, indicate that former landowners will be compensated, which is a step towards re-establishing the rule of law and boosting investor confidence. Additionally, President Mnangagwa was responsible for introducing Zimbabwe’s expensive Command Agriculture programme in 2016, which subsidises maize production at USD 390 per tonne (compared to USD 190 globally). It remains to be seen whether this unaffordable state intervention will remain in place or whether reforms will look to motivate private initiatives.

Other key economic sectors like tourism and mining are also likely to offer indications of Zimbabwe’s short and long-term futures respectively. Much like agriculture, tourism allows for quick recoveries. Political stability and investment in key infrastructure are likely to lead to significant improvements in the short term. Meanwhile reviving the mining industry will take much longer. The sector is in need of a new mining act that will potentially revise the corrupt indigenisation policy, which had promised to address the inequalities of the past but instead has facilitated the enrichment of a few political elite. Policy reforms as well as mine exploration, development and capitalisation are lengthy processes. Much will depend on key decisions taken in the coming months. However, even marginal liberalisation is likely to result in muchdesired economic improvements. This will further legitimise and consolidate the Mnangagwa-led government, which could guarantee greater political stability in the long term.