Special Delivery: Russia Brings S-300s to Syrian Soil

At approximately 22h02 local time on 17 September, Syrian Arab Army (SAA) anti-aircraft batteries in Latakia fired several surface-to-air missiles in response to an Israeli air raid which had targeted a joint Iranian-Syrian weapons facility in the region. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the S-200 anti-aircraft missiles inadvertently engaged a Russian Ilyushin Il-20 electronic surveillance plane flying off the coast of Syria, due to the aircraft’s larger radar signature and lower travel speed. The incident resulted in the death of all 15 crew on-board the aircraft, and subsequently triggered a diplomatic dispute between Russia, Israel and other participants engaged in proxy conflicts in Syria. Yet while Israel, Syria and Russia have exchanged tit-for-tat accusations over who is ultimately culpable for the attack, the incident is unlikely to disrupt Syrian president Bashar Al Assad’s consolidation of power, and the resulting improved security environment in Syria. Rather, Russia has likely entered into a blame-game with Israel to facilitate a strengthening of Assad’s regime, as well as Russia’s own strategic footprint in the country.

THE FALLOUT

Following the missile attack, Russia was quick to redirect blame away from the SAA, and onto Israel, resulting in a diplomatic scramble between the two countries to allay tensions.  President Vladimir Putin initially dialled down accusatory rhetoric, describing the incident as a “chain of tragic accidental circumstances”. In a phone conversation between Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 18 September, both leaders reaffirmed the importance of Israeli-Russian military cooperation to avoid similar tragedies in the future. This reconciliatory atmosphere was extended on 20 September, when Russia received a military delegation from Israel, including the Commander of Israel’s Air Force, to explain the precise timeline of events and defuse tensions between the two countries.

However, on 23 September, the fallout escalated. Russia’s spokesperson for the Ministry of Defence, Major General Igor Konashenkov, doubled-down on accusations against Israel, claiming that Israeli fighter pilots “lacked professionalism” and deeming the incident an act of “criminal negligence”. Adding fuel to the fire, Konashenkov accused Israeli pilots of deliberately using the Russian plane as a “shield” by retreating in a direction that positioned the Russian plane directly between Israel’s jets and Syria’s anti-aircraft batteries, allegedly to protect Israeli pilots from retaliatory fire.

TRIGGER HAPPY

While the Israeli military was indeed conducting operations in the area, no party is disputing the fact that the Russian plane was shot down by Syria’s armed forces. The blunder can largely be explained by the use of out-dated technology and poorly trained military personnel. Many of Syria’s S-200 anti-aircraft batteries, provided by Russia in the 1980s, lack modern identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) systems, while others have no IFF systems at all. Additionally, SAA anti-aircraft battery crews generally receive little training, likely resulting in the oversight which saw the SAA launch its missiles without identifying their target.

The timing of the missile attack also suggests incompetence played a major role in the explosion. During the meeting in Moscow, the Israeli delegation provided evidence indicating that its fighter jets had returned to Israeli airspace 40 minutes before Syria launched a barrage of missiles off the coast of Latakia province. The delay in timing suggests that the launch was likely a display of strength, aimed at demonstrating to the local population, and to foreign elements, that the SAA can, and does, respond to attacks by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). This notion is supported by US military reports suggesting that, in response to US airstrikes on 14 April 2018, the SAA indiscriminately fired at least forty S-200 anti-aircraft missiles into the air more than 30 minutes after the strikes took place.

AN (IN)CONVENIENT OPPORTUNITY

Russia’s emphasis on Israel’s culpability, however, and the change in tone following initial reconciliatory rhetoric, likely reflects its strategic interests as much as it does its displeasure with the turn of events. The fallout with Israel provides Russia with the opportunity to reinforce and upgrade Syria’s military capabilities, and cement its own strategic position in the country. Thus, in response to the incident, on 3 October, Russia announced that it had delivered superior S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to the Assad regime, a move which Israel has stridently objected to since it was first proposed in 2013. The specific type of anti-aircraft missile promised to Assad – the S-300 PMU-2 – has improved computer systems for recognising friendly aircraft, can hit enemy aircraft or ballistic missiles from up to 200km away, and has the capability to engage multiple targets simultaneously. Additionally, Russia plans to train the SAA’s air-defence personnel. While the S-300 systems are unlikely to prevent further Israeli Air Force operations in Syria, on 19 October, Israel’s Deputy Minister of Diplomacy, Michael Oren, confirmed the IDF will have to operate with greater caution and maintain a lower profile when conducting in-country operations.

Furthermore, by equipping the SAA with the S-300 air defence system, Russia has strengthened Assad’s position at a critical point in the Syrian conflict. At the same time, the move likely serves to progress Russia’s own interests in Syria. Although Putin suggested in late September that all foreign forces should ultimately leave Syria, the Russian president is unlikely to risk leaving a political vacuum in the country, even once Assad’s power has been fully consolidated. There remain a number of international powers using Syria as a proxy playing field to further their own political, security and territorial interests. Beyond the proxy war between Israel and Iran, Turkey and US maintain forces on the ground, while other western countries continue to participate in airstrikes as part of the coalition against Islamic State (IS). Russia’s move to upgrade SAA capability therefore likely speaks to a longer-term intention to maintain its strategic footprint in the region.

BACK TO BUSINESS?

Russia’s entrenchment in Syria has tipped the scales in favour of Assad’s regime, and continues to bolster the SAA’s efforts to quash any remaining pockets of resistance. In line with this consolidation, at the end of August, Russia’s defence minister stated that, with the help of Moscow-backed reconstruction initiatives, Syria would be ready to receive one million of its refugees currently residing abroad. However, the country is likely far from returning to ‘business as usual’. The power moves and proxy conflicts permeating Syria continue to be of concern to international non-governmental actors, including corporates, news agencies and not-for-profit organisations, looking to operate in the region. This would require an ongoing and robust understanding of the various territorial claims and interests of both Syrian and foreign political stakeholders as these vie to cement their positions within a more secure Syria.