South Sudan: Little Peace to Keep

Successes in South Sudan’s peace process have been fleeting. With President Salva Kiir and opposition leader and former vice president, Riek Machar, having failed to form a Transnational Government of National Unity (TGoNU) in January 2016, many were hopeful that the February appointment of Machar as ‘First Vice President’ would mark the relaunch of peace efforts in the war-torn country facing mounting allegations of human rights abuses. Yet, Machar, who is the leader of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-In Opposition), has yet to return to the capital, Juba, citing that his security in the capital cannot be guaranteed, delaying the formation of the TGoNU. UN officials have further warned that the country is on the brink of fragmentation, with renewed fighting between local militias reported in the Equatoria region. 

The August 2015 peace deal, which aimed to bring an end to South Sudan’s civil war has failed to improve trust between the two leaders. Kiir has continued to act unilaterally since the formation of the agreement, devolving South Sudan’s 10 states into 28 new territorial divisions in an alleged violation of the August deal. Further flouting pressure from the international community, particularly the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) regional bloc and the US, UK and Norway, Kiir ratified controversial legislation in February. The legislation restricts the operations of non-governmental organisations in the country, requiring 80 percent of NGO employees to be South Sudanese. Amid these developments, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has since been mandated to be more proactive in deterring violence, specifically in and around Juba. Yet, the mission is still reeling from the 18 February attack against the UN refugee camp in Malakal  in which at least 25 people were killed by unidentified gunmen that has since been attributed to growing tensions between Dinak and Shilluk communities. However, local reports indicate perpetrators were wearing military uniforms, further highlighting the overlap between Kiir’s predominantly Dinka forces and emerging local tensions.

The emergence of local militias in Equatoria is also concerning given that there is little capacity for localised agendas to be incorporated into the current peace process. These ground-level tensions are likely to be aggravated by Kiir’s 28-state arrangement, which remains a sticking point between Kiir and Machar.  Machar views the devolution process as a move by Kiir to weaken the opposition’s support base as the new states will likely be headed by unilaterally-appointed Kiir loyalists.

Adding fuel to the fire, relations with neighbouring Sudan are also in decline. Although January pledges to renegotiate oil deals as well as the coinciding opening of the shared border were promising, protracted tensions between the two countries have again come to the fore. Indicative of this, on 29 March, Sudan closed borders with its neighbour following several weeks of anti-South Sudanese rhetoric from Khartoum, stating South Sudan had been supporting rebels within Sudan’s territory. 

The outlook for South Sudan remains negative. The country is facing a number of developing crises. Not only is the peace process faltering but new ground-level tensions are likely to prove divisive. This, coupled with a worsening economic crunch given the low oil price and with the World Bank and IMF withholding funds as a means to enforce the formation of the TGoNU, the country is in a weakened position to face a hostile Sudan. Kiir and Machar appear unaffected by growing international pressure to secure peace in the country and may be losing their respective authority to enforce disarmament outside of Juba.