Should We Stay or Should We Go?A Look into Kenya's Operations in Somalia

The 15 January 2016 attack by Al Shabaab militants against a military base at El Adde in Somalia’s Gedo region marked one of the largest losses for the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) since its deployment to Somalia in 2011. Although the final death toll is disputed, reports indicate at least 100 KDF troops were killed when Al Shabaab militants attacked the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forward operating base (FOB). The militants reportedly detonated a car bomb outside the base before storming the facility, capturing weapons, vehicles and a number of KDF troops. The attack has sent ripples throughout Kenya and revitalised debate over Kenya’s continued involvement in Somalia. 

The KDF has been involved in counterinsurgency operations against Al Shabaab since the October 2011 launch of Operation Linda Nchi. The operation came in response to a series of kidnappings and local skirmishes in Kenya’s Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir counties. Since then, and as part of the AMISOM operation, the KDF has had a number of successes against the militant group, driving Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu, Kismayo and Barawa in 2011, 2012 and 2014 respectively. While it is largely recognised that these successes have not been without consequence on the domestic front, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and KDF Chief, General Samson Mwathethe have remained steadfast in their commitment to operations in Somalia. Yet, numerous Al Shabaab attacks within Kenya’s territory, including the well-documented September 2013 attack against the Westgate Shopping Complex in Nairobi and the April 2015 attack against Garissa University College, have drummed up popular calls to withdraw. While the issue is likely to become a key pillar in the impending election campaign ahead of the August 2017 Kenyan general elections, avenues for a KDF withdrawal are currently limited. 

Inside Somalia, the Somali Armed Forces (SAF) is far from ready to assume sole responsibility for security provision. Furthermore, as AMISOM has pushed Al Shabaab out of urban centres, the operation itself has become stretched over a larger geographical area, reducing AMISOM’s overall capacity. Indeed, the conflict has evolved from Mogadishu-based urban warfare in 2007 to a sprawling insurgency in the southern parts of the country seen today in which Al Shabaab has become increasingly mobile. The overstretched operation would be significantly hindered by the withdrawal of over 17 percent of its troops in light of a Kenyan exit. 

In addition, Al Shabaab’s renewed reliance on guerrilla tactics has made AMISOM’s outlying FOBs and supply routes increasingly susceptible to attack. In the last seven months, for example, three AMISOM FOBs, including El Adde, have been attacked, culminating in a death toll of 210 troops. On 26 June 2015, Al Shabaab militants attacked an AMISOM base at Leedo, while in September 2015, Al Shabaab attacked the AMISOM base at Janale, 90km south west of Mogadishu. All three attacks on FOBs reportedly took place immediately following troop rotations at the facilities. Amid overstretched resources, replacing one battalion for another has become a rushed process with near absent formal handover procedures. These attacks therefore serve to demonstrate that Al Shabaab is much more in tune with AMISOM’s protocols than previously realised. 

In this regard, it is becoming increasingly evident that AMISOM will need to reinforce its presence in Somalia, not only in troop numbers but also in equipment in order to continue to challenge Al Shabaab. While the KDF’s role is far from over, the military force will need greater support from the other troop contributing countries, including Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda. AMISOM as a whole will need to reassess its current approach and procedures to avoid falling one step behind Al Shabaab’s campaign in Somalia. As for Kenya, while the latest grievances over losses in Somalia may prove detrimental to the Jubilee administration’s 2017 ambitions, there is little room to manoeuvre out of Somalia. The KDF remains mandated to AMISOM and with Al Shabaab purportedly returning its focus to military targets, the conflict may yet escalate. The Somali government remains heavily dependent on foreign troops to defend its sovereignty and a premature withdrawal of Kenyan troops could worsen insecurity in the country, which is already a threat to Kenya’s border region. In the long term, more will need to be done to address the SAF’s deficiencies before a troop withdrawal becomes a viable option.