Rallying for Ransoms:A new era for kidnappings in the Sahel

The South African government announced on 3 August 2017 that a South African national held hostage by Islamist militants in Mali since 2011 had been freed. Stephen McGowan’s release came just over one month after Swedish national, Johan Gustafsson, kidnapped with McGowan in 2011, was freed. The somewhat unexpected release of the two hostages has raised numerous questions regarding the strategic role of kidnap for ransom for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) latest mutation, the Mali-based group, Jamaat Nasr al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM). Although it has not been disclosed whether ransom payments were made to secure the victims’ release, holding foreign nationals hostage is certainly proving lucrative for the new group.

JNIM was formed in March 2017 and represents a merger of AQIM’s southern battalion and Malibased affiliates, Ansar Eddine, Katiba Maccina, and the infamous Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s Al Mourabitoun. These affiliates have conducted a spate of kidnappings in the Sahel, with at least five new kidnappings claimed by these groups in the last three years. With this merger, the intent to orchestrate high-profile kidnappings in the Sahel is likely to have been transferred to JNIM. This was confirmed in the June 2017 video released by JNIM via its media outlet, Az Zallaga, depicting the six hostages captured by AQIM and its affiliates between 2011 and 2017. 

The video ends with a warning to the families of the remaining hostages not to negotiate through third parties but rather to communicate directly with the group. This comes despite the hostages calling on their respective governments to assist in their release earlier in the video. Nevertheless, the closing appears to indicate a greater desire to solicit ransoms directly from victims’ families, rather than using negotiations with state actors as a means to achieve a political end. As such, the fact that Gustafsson had been freed one week prior to the circulation of the video, and McGowan one month later, points to the likelihood that a ransom may have been paid to secure their respective releases. Speculation regarding ransoms payments varies, with conflicting reports that ransoms of USD 5 million and USD 5.9 million were paid for Gustafsson and McGowan respectively. While these reports have not been verified, estimates of this size demonstrate that JNIM still holds earning capacity among at least some of its remaining five hostages.

Ransom payments will offer JNIM useful cash injections to facilitate its ongoing insurgency in northern and central parts of Mali. This model was utilised effectively by AQIM, and JNIM will do well to mimic its predecessor, who received approximately USD 40.4 million in ransom payments between 2010 and 2014. Nevertheless, while JNIM has stockpiled potential ransoms, the group will remain on the hunt for new targets. Although kidnappings in JNIM’s stronghold in northern Mali are highly likely, the group’s transnational activity and ability to leverage support networks mean the kidnapping threat will again transcend borders in the Sahel. Foreign personnel operating in northern Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, where we have already witnessed JNIM activity, will thus remain vulnerable to attack.