Putin, Protests & the Presidency

On 2 March, prominent opposition leader Alexei Navalny’s anti-corruption foundation posted a documentary on YouTube that highlighted Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev’s alleged corrupt acquisition of luxury properties. Three weeks and 25 million views later, 60,000 people protested against government corruption in more than 80 locations. In June, Navalny organised a second demonstration, with gatherings in more than 100 cities and towns. On 7 October, the third major anti-government protest, which marked President Vladimir Putin’s 65th birthday, occurred in 125 locations. These demonstrations are notable for their geographic and demographic breadth, and are expected to increase in frequency ahead of the 2018 presidential elections. However, similar to the 2011-12 anti-government protests, they are unlikely to pose any genuine challenge to regime stability.

The geographic and demographic diversity in the recent rallies has surprised the Kremlin. While opposition groups typically protest in major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, demonstrations this year have also taken place in smaller cities and towns, previously considered the heartland of Putin’s support base. For example, in the industrial town of Nizhny Tagil, in the Ural Mountains, approximately 300 people participated in the March protest. It is the same town where, six years ago, factory workers volunteered to travel to Moscow and use force to disperse anti-Putin protesters. Previous protests primarily drew middle-class, educated professionals in their 30s and 40s. However, a key characteristic of Navalny’s demonstrations this year is the presence of a large number of high school and college students: a generation that grew up during Putin’s presidency but appear alienated by the country’s economic downturn and government corruption.

While Navalny and his supporters have used corruption as the primary driver to mobilise protesters, corruption accusations against Russian government officials and politicians are not novel. During Putin’s first two terms, from 2000 to 2008, oil and gas windfalls improved living standards and limited public scrutiny of corruption. Nevertheless, since 2014, Russia has been undergoing an economic crisis caused by low oil prices and Western sanctions over its involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. GDP per capita has plummeted from USD 15,500 in 2014 to USD 8,700 in 2017. These factors have brought corruption sharply back into public focus. Navalny has also used social media - particularly his YouTube channel, NavalnyLive - to inspire tens of thousands of young Russians. 

The Kremlin is now faced with the challenge of retaining the loyalty of industrial regions outside Moscow and St. Petersburg without the buffer of a burgeoning economy, as well as ensuring state control of the political narrative in the age of widespread social media usage. The Kremlin’s surprise at the protests has been reflected in its handling of them. In Russia’s outlying regions, government response was inconsistent. In some areas, local authorities allowed unsanctioned protests to proceed without disruption, while law enforcement dispersed and arrested protesters in other places. The Kremlin has also attempted to subdue young people by encouraging teachers to denounce Navalny as a provocateur, and warn parents that their jobs are at risk if their children participate. Further protests are expected in the run-up to the March 2018 presidential elections, especially since Navalny has been barred from participating due to an embezzlement conviction that his supporters decry as politically motivated.

However, even if he participated in a free and fair election, there is no indication he would have challenged Putin’s national level of popularity. In April this year, Levada Centre, an independent non-governmental polling organisation, conducted a survey on potential presidential candidates, and 83 percent of respondents said they were willing to vote for Putin, and merely two percent for Navalny. In another poll ran in March 2017, 64 percent respondents said they would like Putin to be re-elected, and 22 percent said they would like Putin to be replaced by someone else.

The Kremlin might attempt to split the opposition vote further by introducing a ‘spoiler’ candidate. These rumours have been fuelled by the announcement that Ksenia Sobchak - daughter of Putin’s former mentor, Anatoly Sobchak – will run as a candidate. The news is reminiscent of billionaire-turned-politician Mikhail Prokhorov’s candidacy in the 2012 presidential elections, who was widely seen as a candidate positioned to give the election a veneer of legitimacy.

Although the economic crisis and high-level corruption accusations have tarnished the government’s reputation, many Russians still distinguish between the performance of Putin – who built his reputation on guaranteeing political and economic stability – and that of the government. Even if there are major demonstrations surrounding the March 2018 elections, similar to the 2011-12 protests, security forces will most likely contain them. The Kremlin has invested significant effort into weakening legitimate political opposition, and Navalny’s movement is unlikely to overcome these barriers. The real test for Putin is not the 2018 election, but how he maintains political stability in the face of continued economic uncertainty after his near certain victory.