Putin, Policy & the Presidency: Inertia and Uncertainty in the Fourth Term
Despite a series of large anti-government protests in 2017, President Vladimir Putin’s victory in the Russian presidential election on 18 March was virtually guaranteed. Putin’s approval rating rarely fell below 70 percent during his first two terms in office; however, as his popularity waned—a result of the global financial crisis and low oil prices—the annexation of Crimea became a critical juncture in restoring, and increasing, his popularity.
With victory in the presidential election confirmed, the focus has shifted toward expectations for Putin's fourth term.
This increased popularity, coupled with the absence of viable alternatives, virtually assured Putin a landslide victory. Figures released by Russia’s electoral commission confirmed he received 77 percent of the vote, the largest margin of victory for Putin in four presidential elections. The closest challenger, Communist Party candidate Pavel Grudinin, claimed only 11.7 percent.
Despite the assurance of re-election, Putin sought large voter turnout to legitimise the largely uncompetitive elections, and therefore, his regime. Putin’s electoral strategists had promised an overwhelming ‘70:70’ victory to legitimise his fourth term, with a target to receive more than 70 percent of the vote and achieve a turnout of 70 percent. To ensure this target was achieved, the regime employed a variety of strategies. The forced mobilisation of employees of state-owned corporations, ballot-stuffing, and votes registered to deceased citizens were all initiatives designed to increase voter turnout. However, despite electoral fraud, the final turnout was 67 percent, indicative of public apathy for Putin’s last term.
In spite of clear electoral fraud, only minor anti-government protests occurred in St. Petersburg and Moscow on 19 and 20 March. The demonstrations failed to replicate the hundreds of thousands of participants in protests during the 2011 parliamentary and 2012 presidential elections. The decline in support for protests is not indicative of Putin’s increased popularity, but increasing apathy among the public. While people are no longer engaged enough to participate in anti-government protests, neither is the populace convinced by the status quo.
With victory in the presidential election confirmed, the focus has shifted toward expectations for Putin’s fourth term. The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, on 1 March, provided his supporters with a vision for the fourth term.
Domestically, Putin’s primary ambition is to achieve rapid economic growth. With economic growth at just 1.8 percent, the economy is increasingly compared to Brezhnev’s era of economic stagnation. Putin spoke of a need to boost growth in gross domestic product and productivity, diversify beyond oil revenue, reduce the role of the state in the economy and encourage small and medium businesses. A shift toward the global information space, digital platforms, and reducing the state’s role in the economy are in stark contrast to the focus on traditional values, nationalism and religious piety during Putin’s third term.
Yet despite reformist rhetoric, the most likely outcome of Putin’s fourth term is domestic inertia. Since the election protests in 2011 and 2012, the political system has crystallised, with little space for change and few actors with the ability to change it. While Putin has the capacity to enact the economic change outlined in his address to the assembly, he has increasingly distanced himself and his closest associates from decision-making, increasingly entrusting domestic politics to a class of technocrats.
Many of Putin’s closest allies and powerful associates have been removed from key positions, including Yevgeny Murov, the former head of the Federal Protective Service; Vladimir Dmitriyev, the former Chair of Vnesheconombank; Sergei Ivanov, the former Head of the Presidential Administration, and Alexander Bastrykin, former Deputy Prosecutor General and Putin’s former classmate. Putin has transferred these important roles to young technocratic executives. They have been presented as part of the vision of a modernised Russia; however, in reality they act as liaison officers, providing the public with a veneer of reform while managing the administration for a disengaged Putin. Without the experience or gravitas to defy Putin, and little likelihood that Putin will initiate meaningful reform, domestically at least, his fourth term is likely to be characterised by inertia.
Whereas Putin emphasised change domestically, his external vision deviated little from the interventionist foreign policy that has characterised Russia under Putin. This theme permeated his second and third terms, justifying intervention in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and support for pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine. Three days after the presidential address, Britain rebuked Russia over the chemical weapon attack on former Russian spy, Sergei Skripal, at a pizzeria in Salisbury. The poisoning of Skripal represents the latest in a series of incidents that have increased tensions between Russia and the international community.
However, while Russia is increasingly seen as a hostile actor by the international community, the reality of Russia’s foreign policy trajectory is more nuanced. Many of Russia’s foreign policy decisions are seen by Putin as legitimate manoeuvres to prevent territorial encroachment by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), protection of ethnic Russians in its sphere of influence, and the re-assertion of Russia’s importance on the international stage. However, a coalition of economic technocrats and foreign policy makers increasingly assert that Russia must stabilise the situation in eastern Ukraine to normalise relations with the West. Alexei Kudrin, former Finance Minister and an influential reformer, argues that “if we want our economy to grow, and grow smartly, we need to improve relations with the West”.
Yet Putin, and many of his closest supporters, are sceptical of this trajectory. From this perspective, a change in Russian foreign policy will be seen as a concession, a sign of weakness both to the West and to Russia’s allies. Both sides agree that Russian foreign policy requires change, but there is a high level of uncertainty about which trajectory to follow.
Yet it is unclear whether a regime characterised by inertia domestically, and uncertainty in foreign policy, will effectively manage the plethora of challenges faced in Putin’s fourth term. Firstly, without a clear succession plan, Putin’s patronage network will increasingly attempt to secure their fortunes in anticipation of regime change, which will increase intra-elite competition. Secondly, continued low oil prices and Western economic sanctions hampers the ability of the regime to secure the loyalty of the population with an increased standard of living. Tensions with the West continue to deteriorate over military involvement in Ukraine and Syria, alleged disinformation campaigns during the US election and the poisoning of Sergei Skripal. Domestic inertia and foreign policy uncertainty pose a substantial challenge to the system Putin has created. The current iteration of the regime appears rudderless in providing the structural transformation required to successfully manage the surfeit of domestic and foreign policy hurdles it faces.