#PulwamaRevenge: Key considerations regarding the February 2019 attack in Kashmir

The Attack

On 14 February 2019, a suicide bomber drove an explosive-laden vehicle into an Indian troop convoy in Pulwama, Kashmir, killing over 40 soldiers and injuring 35 others. Local officials described the bombing as the worst attack in the region in 30 years, and senior Indian officials have promised violent retribution against Jaish-e-Mohamed (JeM), the group which claimed responsibility for the attack. Indian authorities have also promised to punish Pakistan, India’s long-standing regional rival, over suspicions that Pakistani intelligence agencies covertly supported JeM in the planning of the attack.

JeM, which is based in Pakistan and largely operates in Kashmir, is considered to be the deadliest of the region’s Islamist and Kashmiri separatist groups. Kashmir is subject to a long-standing and violent dispute linked to the 1947 partition of British India into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan. Both claimed Kashmir, a Muslim-majority area ruled by a Hindu maharaja, who ultimately pledged the region to India. Since then, India and Pakistan have gone to war over Kashmir on three separate occasions in 1947, 1965 and 1999. Indian authorities also accuse Pakistan of providing financial and operational support to multiple Kashmiri militant groups, which perpetrate frequent, almost daily, attacks.

India’s Response

In the wake of the Pulwama attack, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said his government will “give a befitting reply” to Pakistan’s alleged involvement in the incident. The exact nature of this reply is uncertain, but it will likely comprise a combination of the following approaches:

• Diplomatic isolation. India will leverage its international clout to isolate Pakistan from the broader international community, including foreign countries and international organisations, such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund. The US, for example, has voiced support for India. Contrastingly, China is supporting Pakistan, which remains Beijing’s main ally in South Asia. India’s intent is to thus pressure Pakistan into cracking down on militant groups operating inside its territory, including JeM.
• Economic sanctions. India has already withdrawn Pakistan’s Most-Favoured Nation status, which is expected to have a severe impact on the USD 2 billion in annual bilateral trade. To this end, India will push other countries to impose similar economic restrictions on Pakistan.
• Military action. Indian authorities are discussing potential “surgical strikes” targeting Pakistani positions beyond the Line of Control (LoC), which separates the Pakistani and Indian controlled parts of Kashmir. These will likely resemble the action taken in September 2016, after suspected JeM militants killed 19 soldiers in Uri, Kashmir. The Indian military claimed to have carried out a series of artillery barrages followed by targeted Special Forces’ strikes on Pakistani positions, resulting in at least 35 deaths. Pakistani authorities dispute these claims, saying that cross-border engagements only resulted in two deaths and nine injuries.

Domestic Pressure

It is highly likely that, given the scale of the Pulwama attack, the Indian government will have to resort to military action under domestic popular pressure to respond. Indeed, reports indicate that senior Pakistani military officials are assuming that an Indian attack on their positions beyond the LoC is imminent.

The Indian government has come under sustained domestic pressure from both the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s Hindu nationalist base and the wider public. Protesters in multiple Indian cities have demanded that the government “attack Pakistan”, and Kashmiris living in other parts of the country report being assaulted and evicted from their places of residence following the attack. Authorities are paying close attention to trending topics on social media, which includes #PulwamaRevenge and similar hashtags condemning Pakistan and demanding retaliation. With the next general election scheduled for May 2019 and nationalist sentiment running high, all political parties are likely to support some form of military action against Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Position

Pakistani authorities have denied the Indian government’s accusation that its intelligence service, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), was involved in the attack. Instead, they accuse Indian authorities of using the issue to cover up human rights abuses committed against Kashmir’s civilian population. Elected in August 2018, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan has reportedly prioritised improving relations with India. For example, as a gesture of good faith, he proposed making it easier for Indian Sikhs to visit holy sites in Pakistan. He has also said that Kashmir remains central to poor bilateral relations, and that both sides need to end the “tit-for-tat” violence and bellicose rhetoric surrounding the dispute.

However, with the Pulwama bombing inflaming bilateral tensions, an improved relationship seems unlikely in the short-to-medium term. Rather, the tit-for-tat violence and recrimination will remain the defining feature of India-Pakistan relations regarding Kashmir. And the number of fatalities from attacks by JeM or other militant groups, and Indian counter-insurgency operations, will continue to rise.