#PrayforParis: European Security after the attacks in France

The 13 November attacks in Paris, which killed 130 people and wounded more than 360 others, marked the largest terrorist act in Western Europe since the 2004 Madrid train bombings. The Islamic State (IS) has claimed responsibility for the attacks, which took place less than a year after the shootings at the Paris offices of the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ magazine in January 2015. Consequently, concerns over the capability of France’s security apparatus to thwart future plots have been raised. Details are still emerging regarding how the attacks were planned and the degree to which IS was involved in orchestrating them. Nevertheless, the latest events in Paris have shown that attacks by IS affiliates are evolving, a development that is likely to prompt a shift in Europe counterterrorism strategy.

The most recent attacks in Paris differ significantly to those which targeted the Charlie Hebdo offices in January. The victims of the January attack were selected because of their involvement in producing material perceived as offensive to Muslims. On the other hand however, the latest attacks in November appear to have been indiscriminate, as the attackers targeted a sports stadium, a music concert and several restaurants. The intention therefore appears to have been to inflict mass casualties, as opposed to targeting specific groups. Furthermore, the latest attacks required significant coordination and planning between three separate cells, including at least one roving unit. In contrast, there is little evidence that the attacks against Charlie Hebdo were closely coordinated with a subsequent shooting targeting a kosher market. The methods employed during the most recent attacks further underscores increased sophistication in terms of training and logistical support. While previous IS-inspired attacks in the West have involved firearms and knives, the perpetrators of the November Paris attacks employed a wider range of weaponry, including assault rifles, hand grenades and suicide vests. 

This shift in targeting, execution and method of attack has highlighted shortcomings in European, particularly French, intelligence. According to reports, France has between 500 and 600 intelligence officials available to monitor over 11,000 individuals deemed to be potential threats to national security. In the week following the attack, it emerged that at least three of the attackers were known to intelligence agencies, suggesting that French authorities lacked the capacity to monitor the assailants effectively. Intelligence officials have also acknowledged that they failed to intercept important communications prior to the attack, pointing to an encrypted mobile phone discovered during the subsequent investigations.

The November Paris attacks have also underscored the lack of cooperation between regional counterterrorism agencies. Investigations have shown that the attacks were planned in a low-income suburb of Brussels, suggesting a lack of information sharing between the French and Belgian authorities. Moreover, the French government also reportedly failed to address two warnings from Turkey regarding one of the attackers, as well as a dispatch from Iraqi intelligence on 12 November that warned of an imminent terrorist threat. 

In light of these deficiencies, European governments are considering various measures to prevent further attacks. President Hollande has called for amendments to the French constitution, for example, in addition to an extension of a countrywide state of emergency for another three months. The French government has also announced that it will provide funding for an additional 5,000 police officers, strip dual nationals of French citizenship if convicted of terrorism, introduce higher penalties for the trafficking of weapons, and streamline deportation processes for suspected terrorists. Similarly, other European governments such as Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Sweden, have raised their domestic terrorism alert levels. Security raids against suspected militants are therefore likely to increase throughout the region. 

The attacks have also impacted European sentiment regarding cross-border movement, particularly in light of the current refugee crisis. French investigators reportedly found a Syrian passport at one of the attack sites, indicating that one of the attackers entered Europe as an alleged refugee. In light of this discovery, the European narrative over the influx of migrants and refugees has become security rather than humanitarian-focused. Within 24 hours of the attack, the Polish government announced that it would not honour its agreement to accept 7,000 asylum-seekers, citing security concerns. Centre-right parties in the region are also hardening their position, suggesting that Europe’s frontier states – particularly Italy and Greece – need to be protected. 

Furthermore, evidence that the assailants crossed internal European borders to get to Paris has resulted in increased pressure to tighten control over state boundaries. Eurosceptics have already called upon governments to abolish the Schengen Accord, an agreement that provides for passport-free travel across 26 signatory states. On 20 November, European Union member states agreed to toughen checks on all travellers, including European nationals, at external borders of the Schengen zone. Although the controls are currently a temporary measure, it is likely that the terms of the Schengen Accord will come under increasing scrutiny over the coming months, particularly if another attack is staged. 

Internationally, the Paris attacks have strengthened France’s position that the only way to address the IS threat is to combat the group in Syria and Iraq. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, President Hollande ordered airstrikes against IS strongholds in the Syrian city of Raqqa. France will continue to increase its role in the ongoing US-led coalition fighting IS in the Middle East, but its military does not have the capacity to act unilaterally. The country has therefore lobbied the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to invoke Article V, which would warrant military assistance in Syria and Iraq from all 28 member states. France is also likely to leverage the Paris attacks to gain consensus from other non-Western intervening governments, including Russia, to divert their military efforts towards fighting IS. 

A comprehensive European security solution is contingent upon numerous factors, including regional intelligence coordination, a focused effort at preventing alienation within Muslim communities, resolving the refugee crisis and defeating IS abroad. However, continued gains by Western militaries against IS in Syria and Iraq are likely to inspire the militant group to plot further reprisal attacks.

As IS loses territorial control, the group will be more likely to devote resources to targeting its enemies abroad in acts of terrorism in an effort to erode intervening powers’ will to continue the international military intervention. The threat of an IS-inspired attack in Europe is therefore likely to persist for at least the medium-term.