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Political games: Kenya's shortsighted approach to insecurity
Kenya faces terrorist attacks and persistent ethnic tensions in parts of the country. Yet it remains politically stable, and recent nationwide rallies – often flashpoints for ethnic violence –passed peacefully. Nevertheless, the country's security is undermined by its political leadership, which remains focused on domestic politicking, writes Sharon Cheramboss.
Monday 7 July marked the 24th anniversary of the first Saba Saba rally in 1990, a milestone in Kenyan political history that helped bring an end to the oppressive regime of President Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi. This year’s rally – like many before – was an important bellwether for the state of Kenyan politics at a time of increasing insecurity. President Uhuru Kenyatta’s grip on the security situation, which is badly affected by increased terrorism, is possibly at its lowest since his election, which was seized on by opposition groups at the recent rallies.
Kenya’s most prominent security problem remains transnational terrorism by Harakat al-Shabaab al- Mujahideen (Shabaab), an Islamist militant group based in Somalia. The first half of 2014 saw the highest number of attacks in Kenya by Shabaab and associated militant groups since it first began targeting Kenya - after Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2011. According to our estimates, the frequency of attacks has doubled for this period compared to 2012 and 2013. There has also been a steady increase in the impact of attacks following Shabaab’s attack on the Westgate shopping centre in 2013. The group’s strategy has shifted towards large-scale terrorist attacks against civilian targets in Nairobi, Mombasa, and other Kenyan cities and towns.
The response of Joseph Ole Lenku, the Minister of Interior Security, and President Kenyatta has been to increase military operations in northern Kenya and introduce a heavy-handed set of domestic counterterrorism initiatives. These initiatives have marginalised Muslim and ethnic Somali communities in Nairobi and coastal Kenya. This has facilitated the emergence of increasingly violent domestic Islamist groups. For example, the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), a Nairobi-based Islamist militant group, has claimed responsibility for several attacks conducted in the Somali-dominated Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh.
In 2012, the UN Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia designated MYC as Shabaab’s recruiting, fundraising and training arm in Kenya. However, recent intelligence reports indicate that MYC is a separate entity from Shabaab which sometimes claims responsibility for Shabaab-conducted attacks in Kenya in order to elevate its status. Regardless of its organisational structure, it is evident that Shabaab’s influence in Kenya has become more established. The ongoing crackdown on Kenyan Somalis and Muslims by the government (such as the arbitrary arrests of Somalis and the killing of Muslim clerics) will likely foster further Islamic radicalisation in Kenya and result in further attacks by both Shabaab and local militant groups.
Insecurity caused by terrorism has begun to affect Kenya’s economic prospects. In late June this year, the World Bank revised down its growth projections for Kenya to reflect increased insecurity. Tourism, which contributes 12 percent of Kenya’s GDP, has been severely affected by the recent insecurity, as several key markets, such as the UK and US, have issued travel warnings against travel to certain parts of Kenya. In light of the June and July attacks, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office extended its travel warnings against all but essential travel to Lamu and Tana River counties in coastal Kenya. In late July, the US suspended its Peace Corp operations in Kenya and evacuated over 50 volunteers.
Recent domestic political developments in the run-up to the Saba Saba rallies raise further concerns around Kenyatta’s approach to security and the blurring of lines between domestic politics and transnational security threats. Prior to Saba Saba, Raila Odinga, the leader of the Coalition for Democratic Reforms (CORD), organised an aggressive political campaign following his return from a three-month hiatus in the US. Part of his agenda included ‘national dialogue’ with Kenyatta to address rising insecurity, tribalism and the allocation of natural resources. Failing to receive an audience with Kenyatta, Odinga announced plans to hold a mass Saba Saba rally, as well as a series of nationwide anti-government rallies which were attended by CORD supporters mainly from the Luo and Luhya ethnic communities.
According to his critics, Odinga’s popularity and his antigovernment agenda have distracted Kenyatta and shifted his focus back to domestic ethnic politics. On 17 June, with less than a month before the Saba Saba rallies, Kenyatta blamed two attacks in Lamu County, which killed at least 60 people in ethnic Kikuyu settlements in Mpeketoni and Mporomoko, on the opposition. He made his comments in spite of credible sources, including Shabaab itself, confirming Shabaab’s involvement in the attacks.
In addition, Ole Lenku claimed that the opposition had conducted the attacks with the help of the militant wing of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), a predominantly Muslim political group seeking the secession of Mombasa from Kenya. Kenyatta’s and Ole Lenku’s decision to use the attacks in Lamu County for domestic political purposes has raised concerns about relations between the Kikuyu and the Luo following several years of improving ethnic relations. This has further marginalised the Muslim community in coastal Kenya.
Over the past six years, ethnic violence has been increasingly confined to a minority of remote, rural counties such as Wajir in the North East, oil-producing Turkana in the North West, Tana River in the South East and, most recently, Lamu in the South East. The ethnic and tribal tensions in affected counties result from local disputes over food and natural resources and have been worsened by disagreements over the control of natural resources between newly inaugurated county governments. Oil and gas and infrastructure projects, most notably the Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, have also exacerbated existing tribal and ethnic tensions in some cases.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) implication of Kenyatta, an ethnic Kikuyu, and his Vice President, William Ruto, an ethnic Kalenjin, in the 2007 postelection violence, acted as a unifying factor and played a significant role in their victory in the 2013 general elections. Their alliance reduced ethnic tensions between their respective communities.
However, the outcomes of the ongoing ICC trials threaten to aggravate the relationship between these groups and result in ethnic violence, particularly in the scenario that Ruto is found guilty and the charges against Kenyatta are dropped.
Kenyatta has so far given international observers and many Kenyans little confidence and progress in Kenya is likely to occur in spite of rather than due to his policies. However, despite the recent stoking of ethnic tensions by Kenyatta and Odinga, the Saba Saba rallies were largely peaceful. This is indicative in part of maturing relations between ethnic groups across Kenya. At the same time, CORD has raised important political and security issues which need to be addressed by President Kenyatta. Most notably, the government’s failure to develop a coherent counter-terrorism strategy that can stem the increase in terrorist attacks – and the knock-on effects on the country’s economy. As an accountant attending one of the Saba Saba rallies said: “It’s going to be a hard five years [under Kenyatta]”.