Pipeline Politics: Threats to Colombia's energy infrastructure
ELN AT LARGE
So far in 2019, at least 20 bombings have targeted oil pipelines belonging to Colombia’s stateowned oil company, Ecopetrol. In 2018, there were over 100 attacks against Ecopetrol pipelines. Ecopetrol’s press releases often do not name the perpetrators, although the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army, or ELN), a left-wing militant group, is well known for targeting state-owned energy infrastructure, employees, and military personnel guarding pipelines and facilities.
Aside from causing environmental damage, which has included water contamination and forest fires, these attacks have disrupted oil transportation networks, with a knock-on effect for commercial operators reliant on the resource. The ELN also notably engages in kidnappings for ransom, targeting employees of multinational companies operating in the oil sector. With peace talks between the ELN and successive Colombian governments at a seemingly perpetual impasse, the threat of ELN attacks on energy personnel and assets remains significant.
FEWER NUMBERS, HIGH IMPACT
The ELN operates countrywide but its strongest foothold is in northern Colombia. Many of its attacks against state energy infrastructure and security personnel take place in the Chocó and Arauca Departments where the group is particularly prevalent. Due to ongoing security operations since the 2000s — when the first round of negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government failed — the group’s numbers have decreased from around 5,000 members to an estimated 1,800 to 2,500 fighters. However, the ELN is still able to carry out frequent attacks on pipelines and personnel. Militants often use improvised explosives and antipersonnel mines in these attacks and, since the early 2000s, at least 2,590 land mine explosions have targeted oil workers repairing pipelines.
The commercial impact of pipeline attacks is also significant. Ecopetrol revealed a loss of 893,000 barrels due to ELN attacks on the Caño Limón– Coveñas (CLC) pipeline, one of the country’s two main oil transportation lines, in 2017. Pipelines have periodically been shut down as a result of bombings. In many cases, attacks require simply shutting off the pipeline and waiting for security personnel to reinforce the area, before maintenance can take place. However, shutdowns can also extend for prolonged periods:
- In March 2017, Ecopetrol suspended production at the CLC pipeline for almost two months.
- The pipeline was also offline for most of 2018.
In March 2019, the group bombed at least three nonoperational pipelines, which caused environmental harm but no disruptions to oil transportation.
TARGETS BEYOND THE STATE
Although the ELN’s primary targets remain state infrastructure and military personnel, it claims to also oppose foreign companies due to the perception that they exploit oil resources at the expense of the local population. This is likely a partial motivation for the group’s frequent attacks on the CLC pipeline, jointly operated by Ecopetrol and a US multinational oil firm. In fact, in June 2014, ELN militants threw explosives into an oil camp operated by the US multinational in Arauca. Multinationals operating in the energy sector — particularly in areas where ELN maintains a presence — will likely remain high-value targets for the group’s attacks and kidnapping efforts
So far in 2019, at least 20 bombings have targeted oil pipelines belonging to Colombia’s state-owned oil company, Ecopetrol.
RANSOM AND RETALIATION
Although ELN kidnappings for ransom have mostly been financially motivated, some militant abductions have served to put political pressure on the government. For example, in January 2018, an oil engineer at a local firm subcontracted by Ecopetrol was kidnapped from his office in Saravena in alleged retaliation for a failed ceasefire agreement between the ELN and the government.
OBSTACLES TO PEACE
Peace talks between the government and ELN leadership are largely stagnant, and obstacles to progress are numerous. The ELN is unwilling to meet President Duque’s demands for a peace settlement, while the president refuses to negotiate until attacks are halted and all hostages are released. Should peace talks take place, these will be complicated by the ELN’s decentralised leadership structure and internal factionalism. The intersection of the group’s political and financial motivations will also reduce their incentive to pursue peace. As long as this stalemate continues, Colombia’s oil infrastructure and personnel will continue to be high-value targets for ELN operations.