Old enemies, new prospects: Reconciliation in the Horn of Africa

During August 2016, the Somaliland government and the self-declared autonomous Khaatumo State of Somalia (‘Khaatumo’) held a series of discussions in an attempt to improve regional relations. Despite previous failures, the latest round of talks appears to have a far higher probability of reconciling the two parties and laying the foundations for stability in the disputed Somaliland, Puntland and Khaatumo borderlands. Political milestones such as the upcoming 2017 Somaliland elections are directing the actions of the key leaders, with Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud Silanyo (‘President Silanyo’) seemingly succeeding in integrating recent reconciliation efforts into Somaliland politics. Furthermore, the recent talks have been quickly followed by several supportive developments. These include the surrender of 250 Khaatumo troops to Somaliland forces, an amnesty declaration for all Khaatumo politicians working for the government in Mogadishu, and the inclusion of a handful of Khaatumo politicians in Silanyo’s new cabinet. These have bolstered the legitimacy of the ongoing peace talks, demonstrating growing unity between the two administrations. Overall, the outlook for stability in the disputed borderlands has improved, with significant steps being taken towards reconciling relations in the region. 

Khaatumo remains a contested area, with Somaliland and Somalia’s semi-autonomous Puntland state both laying claim to the strategic region. Furthermore, in 2012, the sovereignty of the region was further disputed by the emergence of Khaatumo, a ‘state’ established by factions within the Dhulbahante clan eager to secure greater political representation and influence. These multiple and competing administrations have created localised instability and conflict. 

However, Silanyo’s latest actions point to a renewed commitment to resolving at least one of these disputes diplomatically. Silanyo, who has served two terms and who is suffering from ill-health, is facing elections that he will unlikely contest in March 2017.  President Silanyo has been left with little time to shape a worthy legacy and reconciliation with Khaatumo will offer the incumbent a much desired political milestone. President Silanyo has asserted his desire for “political reconciliation of [Somaliland’s] eastern regions” both this year and during his 2008 presidential campaign when he promised to initiate negotiations with militias operating in the contested Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) region. With limited time left in power, the recent change in attitude towards Khaatumo may be an attempt by incumbent President Silanyo to achieve a standalone place in Somaliland’s political history. 

President Silanyo’s recent amnesty to Khaatumo politicians serving under the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has demonstrated a growing alignment with Khaatumo. The deal, launched on 13 August, pardons several Khaatumo-affiliated politicians who faced charges of treason on conspiracies to destabilise Somaliland in their attempts to segregate Khaatumo. The move has been seen as an easing of previous concerns over Khaatumo’s desire for a unified Somalia and its attempts to stop the secession of Somaliland. In another significant step towards reconciliation, President Silanyo included seven previously disenfranchised Khaatumo politicians in his cabinet reshuffle on 15 August. The incorporation of Khaatumo politicians into Somaliland’s parliament is a strong political statement and shows the potential longstanding nature of the Khaatumo and Somaliland commitment to reconciliation.  The integration of the Khaatumo authorities will help ensure basic legitimacy in Somaliland’s society for the Dhulbahante people, as well as give them a democratic platform to voice grievances and the ability to build a case for further investment of time and resources in their region. Whilst the inclusion of Khaatumo officials into the Somaliland political structure comes into effect with five months to go until the 2017 elections and an impending inauguration of a new government, the reorganisation has been seen as a growing effort to increase government inclusivity. 

Furthermore, Somaliland’s current economic prospects indicate that reconciliation with Khaatumo may be economically as well as politically driven.  Despite still having a very low GDP, with latest available statistics showing USD1.4 billion GDP in 2012, Somaliland has growing economic potential. Its relative peace and stability as well as its strategic geopolitical location is proving to be increasingly attractive to foreign investors. In particular, the current expansion and development of Berbera port offers a key supply route for goods in and out of Ethiopia. Khaatumo, on the other hand, is hugely reliant on the infrastructure of neighbouring entities for trade and access, and as such, has suffered considerable economic and political marginalisation. In spite of the support of the diaspora, Khaatumo lacks a ready source of revenue with very limited economic resources. To date, neither the Somaliland nor Puntland administrations have invested significant resources in the region. Complications from the multiple political claims have also deterred the work of international development agencies in Khaatumo. As such, given the strong projected growth of development in Somaliland, Khaatumo may view Somaliland as a prosperous and stronger economic platform for its own development.

This, coupled with Somaliland’s relative stability and own autonomous ambitions have made it an attractive regional partner for Khaatumo and the latter’s administration has also been eager to demonstrate acts of goodwill during the peace talks. On 18 August, for example, 250 Khaatumo troops surrendered to Somaliland forces. The local troops, who surrendered in Cayn region, handed over weapons and ammunitions. Whilst Khaatumo troops have previously surrendered to Somaliland forces, the size of the latest contingent to surrender holds significant sway in demonstrating renewed commitment to resolution. Previously, the number of Khaatumo troops surrendering to Somaliland forces was closer to 30 service personnel.  

Despite Silanyo and his Khaatumo counterpart, President Ali Khalif Galaydh demonstrating a clear intent for reconciliation, much will depend on President Galaydh’s ability to secure the backing of his major clans and traditional leaders. Patrilineal descent and the clan structure are inherent in the region and it is highly unlikely that any steps towards regional cohesion will be achievable without clan endorsement. However, the political identity of the Dhulbahante clan - living on the periphery of both Somaliland and Puntland – has shown a tendency to realign politically as circumstances necessitate. Whilst politically Khaatumo may have more in common with Puntland, its expectations to join the FGS as a recognised state have been entangled in internal disputes. Now, clan leaders may be swayed with the outward and rapid efforts for reconciliation demonstrated by Silanyo’s government.

With the upcoming Somaliland general elections in 2017 there is a clear date by which Silanyo hopes to achieve reconciliation and this will put pressure on the Khaatumo leaders to make some fundamental decisions. However, the two administrations must now gain the long-term support of clan factions and their traditional leaders to ensure that the recent gains are not opposed by these political heavyweights. Nevertheless, the recent attempts to both legitimise and entrench changes into the region’s political landscape have greatly improved the potential for reconciliation in these disputed borderlands this time around.  The lasting question now is how much traction these efforts can gain before Silanyo’s term expires.