New Inroads into Africa: Turkey's soft power approach

In the last decade, PRC state-owned and private enterprises have poured into African countries in search of natural resources and new markets, making the country Africa’s single largest trading partner. However, the PRC’s slowing GDP growth, coupled with its gradual transition to a consumer-driven economy, have resulted in declining demand for raw materials and, correspondingly, a two-year downturn in trade with, and investment in, Africa. Whilst the first quarter of 2017 has seen the first rebound in bilateral trade between the PRC and Africa since 2015, the dip has provided new openings for other countries, including Japan, South Korea and Malaysia, to fill the gap. Turkey, in particular, has seized this opportunity to intensify its own engagement with Africa, exploiting some of the shortcomings of the PRC’s approach to the continent.

Like the PRC, Africa’s resources support Turkish industry, but, more importantly, African countries offer large and fast-growing markets for Turkish products. It was with these needs in mind that Turkey’s engagement with Africa gained momentum following its Opening to Africa Action Plan in 1998. At this time, the most visible aspects of Turkey’s relations with the continent were trade, aid and investment, which were further emphasised in 2005 when Turkey obtained observer status with the African Union (AU). In 2008, the AU recognised Turkey as a strategic partner, by which time trade and investment between Turkey and the Horn of Africa in particular had rapidly expanded. Turkish entrepreneurs had also begun to cater to niche markets, distinct from those dominated by the PRC’s state-owned entities.

However, with investment, trade and aid figures still modest, it was in 2011 that Turkey and Africa’s relationship really began to develop following Turkey’s adoption of a problem-solving approach in Somalia. Reycep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Turkish president and then prime minister, became the first non-African leader to visit Somalia in almost two decades; he brought with him a wave of humanitarian aid and private sector money at a time when few other governments were willing to confront the country’s intractable structural and security issues. Erdoğan’s decision to engage collaboratively with Somalia added a new dimension to Turkey’s relationship with Africa, one that distinguished it sharply from the PRC. It is this dimension that, in recent years, Erdoğan has sought to develop.

Turkey’s growing political engagement in Africa has enabled an unprecedented diplomatic expansion too. Turkey now has 39 embassies across the continent, more than many countries with larger economies, including India. Crucial to this diplomatic reach has been Turkey’s use of its Muslim identity to generate relationships built on trust with African countries with their own large Muslim populations. Unlike Turkey’s embassies in other parts of the world, prominent religious symbols are boldly displayed outside its embassies in Africa. Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs, a state institution that was once committed to promoting Islam domestically, is now also frequently hosting meetings between African religious leaders in Istanbul. Most notable, however, is Turkey’s collaboration with African countries to promote religious education. Turkey’s Imam-Hatip schools have been growing in popularity throughout Africa, responding to the demand for Islam-focused education in Muslim-dominated countries.

Turkey’s emphasis on building cultural ties through religion has deepened the nature of its relationships with several African allies in ways that the PRC struggled to achieve. The PRC’s foreign policy is heavily based on intergovernmental relations, and while there are seldom misgivings at state-level, the PRC’s intentions in Africa are frequently questioned in local media. The PRC’s trade-centred approach to Africa, described by commentators as a ‘corporatist development model’, has also attracted criticism from civil society organisations in such countries as Tanzania and Senegal. The PRC’s business operations have been stymied by cultural obstacles, including differing social habits and workplace cultures, as well as a problematic language barrier. Turkey has been able to play off these growing pains in the PRC and Africa’s relationship by building connections both at state-level, and at the grassroots through prominent civil society organisations, such as the Hüdayi Foundation, which engages with family, society and education through its offices in nine Central and West African countries.

The strength of Turkey’s soft power in Africa is legitimising its commercial interests, allowing Turkish businesses to punch well above their weight. Turkish businesses are winning more government contracts in Africa than ever before, including the lucrative construction of government buildings and infrastructure projects, such as a 300 kilometre railway construction tender worth $1.2 billion awarded in Tanzania earlier this year. Although still most evident across the Sahel, West Africa and the Horn of Africa, Turkey is leveraging this reputation to win over new parts of the continent. In January, Erdoğan visited Tanzania, Mozambique and Madagascar, laying the foundation for further regional expansion. Turkey’s national carrier, Turkish Airlines, is also in step with the country’s diplomatic ambitions; it now serves more destinations in Africa than any other carrier.

However, Turkey’s cultural diplomacy is undermined by domestic priorities and politics. In 2013, Erdoğan’s public fallout with Fethullah Gülen, a Turkish cleric and founder of the Gülen movement, a transnational Islamic religious and social movement, saw Erdoğan lobbying African states to sever ties with Gülen and the schools founded by his movement. Initially established as an instrument of Turkey’s soft power, Erdoğan’s attempts to curb his one-time ally’s influence in Africa are threatening to undermine his foreign policy objectives. Some African governments are resisting Erdoğan’s urgings to close down the schools, indicating that they are not interested in becoming pawns in Turkey’s domestic politics.

Whether Turkey’s growing cultural rapport with Africa can continue to translate into deepening economic relations remains to be seen. Trade and investment figures are still modest, which has elicited lukewarm responses from countries on whom Turkey’s soft power approach is still lost. However, Turkey’s success at strengthening and deepening its relationships with some African countries using the currency of culture will not go unnoticed by Africa’s other partners.