Articles
New Group, Old Woes: The Niger Delta Avengers
The emergence of a new group in the Niger Delta has raised concerns over renewed conflict in the region, writes Gabrielle Reid
Editor
The recent attacks by the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) militant group are the latest evidence that the Niger Delta remains unstable, aggrieved and susceptible to violence. Already, three major international oil companies have suspended operations and evacuated key personnel from the region amid concerns over renewed violence reminiscent of the conflict of the early 2000s.
The NDA has proclaimed ‘Operation Red Economy’, a campaign to disrupt Nigeria’s oil-dependent economy to pressurise the federal government into distributing a fairer share in oil revenues, and to addressing alleged marginalisation in the region. In reiterating this cause, the NDA has identified foreign-owned facilities as future targets – betting that the endangered dollars of foreign investors will bend the ears of government decision-makers. At this point, government efforts to engage in talks with the group have reportedly been dismissed.
The group has demonstrated the capacity to target pipelines and other key facilities in its emerging stronghold, Delta state. However, their potency lies as much in the vulnerability of the oil sector in Nigeria, both commercially and psychologically, as it does in their bombs. The NDA’s formation comes at a time when the oil sector can ill afford further instability in light of the low global oil price, and the sector remains scarred by memories of the Niger Delta conflict between 2003 and 2009.
The conflict, largely led by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), proved devastating for Nigeria’s oil sector, resulting in the temporary suspension of operations, revenue losses, sabotage of key facilities and personnel facing a worsening kidnapping threat. Although a government-led amnesty programme launched in 2009 served to appease the Niger Delta militants through the payment of controversial monthly stipends, it did little to address the grievances of Niger Delta communities. Further, these communities continue to assert that former militants used the programme for their own enrichment rather than to secure the development of the region that they had promised in their armed campaign.
In this regard, there was significant anticipation surrounding the December 2015 expiration of the amnesty programme. President Muhammadu Buhari, who had only come to office in March that year, was under pressure from local communities to discontinue it. Meanwhile, ex-militants warned of a renewed insurgency should the arrangement end.
In January 2016, Buhari extended the stipend payments until 2017 but cut the budget allocated to the amnesty programme by 70 percent. This, coupled with his decision not to renew lucrative pipeline security contracts with former militants, was a signal of intent from the government to regain some control of the politics and security of the Delta at the expense of a local elite. It should be noted that MEND continues to publicly back Buhari, as they did in the election, and it remains unclear whether any other disgruntled former militants have backed the Avengers. However, at the very least, the Avengers are a convenient spoiler for some local elements in dispute with the government. The NDA has also already called for the continuation of the corrupt amnesty program in its manifesto.
The NDA has also looked beyond the Delta for support, courting pro-Biafra movements in the region. Specifically, in early June, the NDA released a statement calling on governors in Imo and Anambra states to release detained members of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The NDA has also previously stated its support for the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). While there is uncertainty over the level of support and collaboration between these groups, if the NDA is successful in this regard, it will expand its geographical support base significantly across the former Biafra region.
Nevertheless, the NDA is far from securing a monopoly on the latest insurgency in the Niger Delta. The June emergence of the Asawana Deadly Force of Niger Delta (ADFND), calling for an autonomous Niger Delta, is the latest group to see an opportunity for power and influence. Meanwhile, MEND is unlikely to have abandoned its endeavour to seek restitution. While MEND has continued to distance itself from the NDA, this should not be seen as an effort to stay out of the conflict. Rather, the group will be eager to secure its own seat at the table at any government talks, particularly having secured political favour within the Buhari administration. In the short term, however, the Niger Delta conflict is likely to get worse before it gets better, particularly as both new and old players seek to gain a greater piece of the pie.
The NDA has proclaimed ‘Operation Red Economy’, a campaign to disrupt Nigeria’s oil-dependent economy to pressurise the federal government into distributing a fairer share in oil revenues, and to addressing alleged marginalisation in the region. In reiterating this cause, the NDA has identified foreign-owned facilities as future targets – betting that the endangered dollars of foreign investors will bend the ears of government decision-makers. At this point, government efforts to engage in talks with the group have reportedly been dismissed.
The group has demonstrated the capacity to target pipelines and other key facilities in its emerging stronghold, Delta state. However, their potency lies as much in the vulnerability of the oil sector in Nigeria, both commercially and psychologically, as it does in their bombs. The NDA’s formation comes at a time when the oil sector can ill afford further instability in light of the low global oil price, and the sector remains scarred by memories of the Niger Delta conflict between 2003 and 2009.
The conflict, largely led by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), proved devastating for Nigeria’s oil sector, resulting in the temporary suspension of operations, revenue losses, sabotage of key facilities and personnel facing a worsening kidnapping threat. Although a government-led amnesty programme launched in 2009 served to appease the Niger Delta militants through the payment of controversial monthly stipends, it did little to address the grievances of Niger Delta communities. Further, these communities continue to assert that former militants used the programme for their own enrichment rather than to secure the development of the region that they had promised in their armed campaign.
In this regard, there was significant anticipation surrounding the December 2015 expiration of the amnesty programme. President Muhammadu Buhari, who had only come to office in March that year, was under pressure from local communities to discontinue it. Meanwhile, ex-militants warned of a renewed insurgency should the arrangement end.
In January 2016, Buhari extended the stipend payments until 2017 but cut the budget allocated to the amnesty programme by 70 percent. This, coupled with his decision not to renew lucrative pipeline security contracts with former militants, was a signal of intent from the government to regain some control of the politics and security of the Delta at the expense of a local elite. It should be noted that MEND continues to publicly back Buhari, as they did in the election, and it remains unclear whether any other disgruntled former militants have backed the Avengers. However, at the very least, the Avengers are a convenient spoiler for some local elements in dispute with the government. The NDA has also already called for the continuation of the corrupt amnesty program in its manifesto.
The NDA has also looked beyond the Delta for support, courting pro-Biafra movements in the region. Specifically, in early June, the NDA released a statement calling on governors in Imo and Anambra states to release detained members of the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The NDA has also previously stated its support for the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). While there is uncertainty over the level of support and collaboration between these groups, if the NDA is successful in this regard, it will expand its geographical support base significantly across the former Biafra region.
Nevertheless, the NDA is far from securing a monopoly on the latest insurgency in the Niger Delta. The June emergence of the Asawana Deadly Force of Niger Delta (ADFND), calling for an autonomous Niger Delta, is the latest group to see an opportunity for power and influence. Meanwhile, MEND is unlikely to have abandoned its endeavour to seek restitution. While MEND has continued to distance itself from the NDA, this should not be seen as an effort to stay out of the conflict. Rather, the group will be eager to secure its own seat at the table at any government talks, particularly having secured political favour within the Buhari administration. In the short term, however, the Niger Delta conflict is likely to get worse before it gets better, particularly as both new and old players seek to gain a greater piece of the pie.