Kidnappings Return to the Sahel

In the first month of 2016, there were three high-profile kidnappings in the Sahel. On 8 January, Swiss national, Beatrice Stockly was abducted from her residence in the northern Malian city of Timbuktu by militants aligned with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This was the second time the Christian missionary had been kidnapped, having been seized by the Islamist militant group, Ansar Eddine in 2012. A week later, Ansar Eddine claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of two Australian doctors in Baraboule, in northern Burkina Faso on 15 January. While kidnapping has long been a security concern in the region, there had been a lull in the number of reported incidents since 2013. Yet, 2015 saw a significant increase in Islamist militancy in northern Mali, marked by the stark comeback of AQIM and its affiliates. Now, with Ansar Eddine behind the latest attack and AQIM ally, Al Mourabitoun claiming responsibility for the abduction of a Romanian national in Tambao, Burkina Faso in April 2015, it appears that kidnapping for ransom has reemerged as a more prominent threat. 

At the height of its kidnapping activity in 2011/2012, it was estimated that AQIM generated upwards of USD 5.4 million per kidnapping, culminating in approximately USD 200 million between 2003 and 2013. The activity was one of the primary sources of revenue for the group, together with the control of key smuggling routes in largely ungoverned areas of the Sahel. While the reduced presence of high-profile targets in the group’s primary areas of operation, coupled with the French-led Operation Serval counterinsurgency campaign in Mali between January 2013 and July 2014, led to a decrease in the number of attacks, the threat was not eliminated. In light of the failed implementation of the June 2015 Algiers Accord, which sought to bring peace to Mali’s northern Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu regions, protracted insecurity in the north has allowed Islamist groups, including AQIM, Al Mourabitoun and Ansar Eddine to return to their prior operations. 

Beyond the Sahel, with reports of AQIM, Al Mourabitoun and Ansar Eddine increasingly coordinating their efforts, the threat of Islamist militancy is also likely to extend into wider West Africa. Certain commentators argue this southward trajectory has been facilitated by the advance of smuggling networks, with intermediary groups eager to sell on trafficked goods. Looking forward, the nexus between Islamist militancy, smuggling networks and insecurity in peripheries is likely to increase the threat of kidnappings by these groups.