Going it alone: President’s Trump’s divergent approaches to nuclear proliferation in Iran and North Korea

US President Donald Trump has exhibited an inconsistent attitude towards issues of denuclearisation. In May 2018, he withdrew US support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark multilateral nuclear deal negotiated with Iran to curtail its nuclear capabilities, on the grounds that the deal required more extensive concessions from Iran. Conversely, President Trump appeared willing to accept vague concessions from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in a one-on-one meeting in Singapore in June 2018.

Trump Goes Solo

President Trump’s tenure has thus far been characterised by a go-it-alone approach, particularly on the issue of regimes typically considered deviant. In May 2018, President Trump withdrew from a nuclear deal with Iran, painstakingly negotiated between Iran and the UN Security Council’s five permanent members, plus Germany, in July 2015, to roll back Iran’s nuclear capabilities. The deal was largely considered a ‘win’ for global non-proliferation efforts, and a significant achievement in US foreign policy. President Trump’s withdrawal suggests that efforts to bolster his domestic profile, and make good on campaign promises, have taken priority over multilateral security cooperation. 

Confusion surrounding the US approach deepened when President Trump entered unilateral negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore in June 2018. Despite initial skepticism, most reactions to the meeting - the first in history - have been cautiously optimistic. On the one hand, the one-on-one, or “man-to-man”, summit marked a significant improvement in bilateral relations. Throughout 2017, relations were marred by dozens of North Korean ballistic missile tests, the harshest round of economic sanctions to date, reciprocal threats of mutually assured destruction, and the exchange of personal insults between the countries’ leaders. Efforts to bolster President Trump’s profile contributed to the decision to meet Kim. South Korean President Moon Jae In’s  proposal that President Trump be nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize, if the summit leads to a formal end to the 1950-1953 Korean War, was particularly popular with him, as well as his electoral base.   

President Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Deal, and summit with Kim in Singapore, illustrate his preference for unilateral action. The JCPOA withdrawal signals his distrust of multilateral solutions to pressing global issues. Meanwhile, a one-on-one, or “man-to-man”, meeting with Kim conversely illustrates a preference for unilateralism. Nuclear proliferation, however, is an issue which requires engagement with multiple stakeholders, and President Trump’s unilateral impulses will likely strain relations with allies and foes alike for the remainder of his tenure.

Shifting The Goalposts

Trump critics have seized on the apparent hypocrisy of his diverging approaches to Iran and North Korea. Despite Iran’s confirmed compliance – according to UN non-proliferation agencies - with the JCPOA, President Trump viewed the deal as conceding too much in exchange for too little from Iran, including a relinquishment of its ballistic missile capabilities. 

Furthermore, the issue of North Korea’s denuclearisation remains contentious. Neither side has clearly defined the term, nor set a verifiable timetable. This suggests that the US president does not possess a clear strategy for negotiations, and treats the issue of nuclear security on a country-by-country, leader-by-leader basis. 

Nuclear Weapons as a Bargaining Chip

Under the Trump administration, the possession of a nuclear arsenal appears to be a prerequisite for sanctions relief. The North Korea case clearly differs from that of Iran, which has an ICBM programme, but lacks the nuclear capabilities to directly threaten the US. Given that Iran has consistently complied with its obligations under the nuclear deal to gain sanctions relief, President Trump’s decision to withdraw US support seems arbitrary, and premised on historical US animosity towards Iran – or efforts to undo his predecessor’s achievement - rather than valid concerns related to US or international security.

However, while President Trump appeared to have little incentive to maintain the JCPOA, North Korea quickly achieved significant concessions, including sanctions relief and security guarantees, following the acquisition of nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). After successfully testing the Hwasong-15 ICBM in November 2017, which is reportedly capable of reaching the entire US mainland, North Korea legitimised itself internationally through the Trump-Kim summit. The fact that President Trump met Kim only after these tests were successful seemingly indicated that the possession of a nuclear arsenal is essential for winning concessions from the US.

Outlook: Towards a Nuclear Future? 

The US withdrawal from the JCPOA prompts renewed anxiety surrounding the potential for Iran to pursue heightened enrichment, and undo a 12-year long negotiation process. The forecast for US-Iran nuclear relations is unfavourable, and the window of opportunity for rapprochement is fading. President Hassan Rouhani, elected for a second term in May 2017 based on his ability to negotiate the JCPOA with the US and rid Iran of a 38-year sanctions regime, has been significantly undermined by the US withdrawal. EU states may temporarily bolster the shortfall from renewed sanctions, but protests in Iran since December 2017 have demonstrated the public’s dissatisfaction with the JCPOA’s failure to deliver on promised socio-economic relief. Although the next US president may be willing to renew the deal, it is unlikely that Iran’s next administration will be as favourable towards the US.

Given uncertainty surrounding terms like ‘denuclearisation’, the most likely outcome of the Trump-Kim summit is that North Korea will leverage the issue of denuclearisation in exchange for economic concessions from the US and undermine international support for continued sanctions. This is a strategy Pyongyang has employed in negotiations with previous US administrations. Additionally, President Trump was criticised for agreeing to cancel joint military drills with South Korea, something both South Korea and Japan, another US regional ally, were reportedly unaware of. As such, the president’s go-it-alone attitude will likely make US allies question Washington’s continued commitment to the region, thereby strengthening the position of its rivals, such as North Korea and China.