French Faultlines: Examining the Terrorist Threat

As French citizens were toasting liberty, equality and fraternity across the country on 14 July to mark Bastille Day, France was shaken by yet another terrorist attack. Eighty-four people were killed and 303 others were injured in the lorry ramming attack Nice. A Tunisian national with French residency perpetrated the attack, although several other arrests have been subsequently made. In the immediate aftermath of the attack, President François Hollande has mandated a further six-month extension of the countrywide state of emergency which had been due to end on 26 July. This decision is supported by the public. Recent studies have shown that out of all Western countries, France has been the victim of the largest number of successful Islamist-inspired attacks in recent years. 

According to West Point’s Combatting Terrorism Centre (CTC), 239 people have been killed in 17 Islamist attacks in France between 2012 and June 2016, while the US has been successfully targeted 10 times during the same period, resulting in a cumulative death toll of 73. Commentators have differing opinions on France’s vulnerability to terrorism, emphasising one factor over another. These include France’s colonial history, its current external relations, as well as domestic political and socioeconomic conditions that cultivate discontent among sections of France’s large Muslim minority. No one of these variables is sufficient on its own in explaining France’s vulnerability to Islamist attacks: it is the cumulative effect of these external and internal conditions which places France at particular risk.
 

Aside from its involvement in the US-led military intervention against Islamic State (IS) strongholds in Syria and Iraq, France’s continued economic and military involvement abroad increases France’s terrorism risk.  Particularly in former colonies in Africa and the Middle East, France continues to have a significant military presence which, opens it up to jihadist condemnation as a foreign occupier. Over 10,000 French troops are currently deployed abroad, with over 3,000 in West Africa, 2,000 in Central Africa, and 3,200 in Iraq.  Most recently, France acknowledged that it has a military presence in Libya after three of its soldiers were killed in the country in July. The revelation sparked angry protests in Tripoli over France’s involvement in supporting General Khalifa Haftar, an opponent of Libya’s UN-backed government. Similar protests have been staged in Mali and the Central African Republic in recent months over French military operations.
 

While resentment is growing towards France from afar, it has struggled to curb radicalisation from within. Compared to other Western countries, France has the largest number of nationals who have travelled to fight alongside militant groups in Syria and Iraq. It is estimated that 1,700 French nationals have travelled to the conflict zone, as opposed to 800 Britons and 200 Americans.  A recent study by the Brookings Institute indicates that Islamist radicalisation is also a Francophone problem: four out of the top five countries with the highest rates of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq are Francophone, including Belgium (with the most foreign fighters per capita) and Tunisia (with the highest number of foreign fighters overall). Nevertheless, according to the study, France remains at highest risk.

This suggests that there is something particular about French society that drives radicalism. Cultural alienation is a key issue. France has one of the largest Muslim populations in Western Europe, comprising approximately 10 percent of the country’s total population. However, some French Muslims are alienated as a result of “laïcité”, or the stringent separation of church and state. Arguably, France has the strictest enforcement of secularism in Western Europe, where the practice of Islam appears to be singled out. In 2004, in a highly controversial law, France outlawed students from displaying any form of religious symbols – including veils, crosses or Jewish skullcaps – in state-run schools. In 2011, France passed a law forbidding concealment of people’s face in public, including prohibiting burqas and niqabs. The penalty for this offense is EUR 180 and offenders can be forced to take a class on French values. In 2015, courts ruled that some public schools may eliminate halaal options in cafeterias. These policies have the potential to breed resentment from those who may feel that their freedom of religious expression is being actively curtailed by the French state. 

Aside from these cultural issues, many Muslims in France face socioeconomic discrimination. A 2014 experiment by French think tank, Institut Montaigne, showed that practicing Christians were four times more likely to get a call back from a job application than a Muslim candidate with the same basic qualifications. While France struggles with a national unemployment rate of over 10 percent, the rate amongst populations of immigrant origin is roughly twice that of the overall population, and reportedly even higher among youths of North African origin. Large numbers of first and second generation Muslim immigrants from France’s former colonies live in banlieues, impoverished suburbs dogged by high crime rates. These areas are on the peripheries of cities and are prone to marginalisation from mainstream society. It is in this milieu where resentment has boiled over in the past, most notably during the 2005 riots. France’s prison demographics are also worrying, given that prisons are widely considered to be incubators for radicalism: approximately 60 percent of the country’s 68,000-strong prison population is Muslim. There is a concern that this social and economic isolation from formal French society provides fertile ground for radicalisation.

The French Interior Ministry recently announced that over 4,200 cases of radicalisation were reported between April 2015 and January 2016, bringing the total number of radicalized individuals identified by authorities to over 8,000. This statistic underscores a mammoth challenge for France’s overstretched counterterrorism apparatus, which comprises six intelligence units answering variously to the interior, defence and economy ministries. Recent successful attacks in France have underscored intelligence failures. For example, one of the perpetrators of the IS-inspired knife attack at a Catholic church in the Normandy region on 26 July was known to counterterrorism authorities and was wearing a court-imposed electronic tag at the time of the attack. 

A parliamentary report released in July on French counterterrorism capabilities revealed these significant gaps. Major intelligence failures, as well as overly bureaucratic protocols and rivalries between security force agencies were identified as major obstacles to detecting and preventing attacks. Recommendations include the amalgamation of all six counterterrorism agencies; however, it remains to be seen whether existing agencies will have the organisational flexibility to fully embrace extensive structural changes. Although French authorities are in the process of introducing further enhancements to counterterrorism policies and institutions, reforms are likely to take time to have a significant mitigating effect. 

As the IS caliphate shrinks due to successes by the international military intervention in Syria and Iraq, the militant group is likely to intensify its terrorism campaign as a means of asserting itself in the face of major losses. Western states will continue to be enticing targets for IS; however, France is likely to be prioritised, because it has significant socio-cultural fault lines that can be exploited and deepened through terrorism.  IS hopes to make gains by maximising distrust and intolerance within France to further alienate Muslims. This in turn provides further grievances and sympathisers for its cause.
 

The Nice attack – the third major attack in France within 18 months – is likely to result in increasingly unfavourable French public opinion towards diversity and Islam. Marine Le Pen, the far-right leader of the Front National (FN), is enjoying increasing public support. Recent surveys show Le Pen is expected to reach the second round run-off of the presidential election, scheduled between April and May 2017, although the polls have predicted she will not win. This suggests that politically moderate members of France’s electorate are looking to more radical solutions to address concerns regarding national security. Robust intelligence and security are required to counter the threat. However, France will also have to reconsider and address several domestic issues, and its international role, in order to dramatically reduce its vulnerability to further attacks. These are likely to be long-term projects, meaning that further attacks are expected in France over the short-to medium-term.