Fear and Loathing in Lusaka: Will the growth of political violence and repression derail Zambia's image abroad?

Ahead of Zambia’s presidential and general election on 11 August, sporadic violent confrontations and incidents of intimidation threaten to tarnish the country’s recent record of peaceful democratic engagement and stability. On 9 July the Electoral Commission of Zambia implemented a 10-day temporary ban on campaigning in Lusaka, the capital, after fatal confrontations between members of both major political contenders: the Patriotic Front (PF), headed by incumbent president Edgar Lungu, and the United Party for National Development (UPND), led by millionaire cattle rancher Hakainde Hichilema, known as HH. Electoral tension is dampening investor confidence just when taxpayers and commercial interests are looking for coherent policies to address years of confusion surrounding the government’s position on taxation, economic diversification and low employment rates.

Zambia’s political establishment has been in disarray since former President Michael Sata’s death in October 2014. Sata’s 2011 ascent to the presidency oversaw the stunning implosion of the former governing party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), which had led Zambia for 20 years. The January 2015 poll to replace Sata was tightly-contested, with both the PF and UPND vying to win over the MMD’s support base. Despite internal PF concerns over Lungu’s ability to steer his divided party to victory, he narrowly won the election with a 1.66 percent lead over HH.

Yet internal strife in the PF has continued; Lungu’s former allies are critical of his management of a stagnant economy during the global commodities slowdown, and several high-profile members have since publicly demonstrated support for the UPND. Most notably, in March former Vice-President Guy Scott endorsed the UPND. For many in the PF, Lungu’s acceptance of former MMD politicians – some of whom were appointed to Lungu’s cabinet – represented a non-negotiable departure from the party’s principles.

PF divisions have shone a light on growing political violence and intolerance in Zambia. In January a delegation including former Deputy Minister of Commerce Miles Sampa was attacked by PF supporters as it arrived at Ndola airport for the launch of his new political party, the Democratic Front. This followed a public schism between Lungu and Sampa, who has publicly lambasted Lungu’s leadership style. Despite Lungu’s attempts to be a consultative, ‘listening’ President, several senior party allies feel betrayed and overlooked by his administration.

The upcoming election – a contest between Lungu’s populist platform and the self-styled ‘CEO politician’ HH – is also suffering from the escalating culture of political hostility. Incidents of violence between opposing members of the PF and UPND are often sporadic and initiated by local supporters, although some of Lungu’s detractors say that these attacks form part of a carefully coordinated attempt to “brutalise” the opposition and hold onto power in August.

A recent exposé published by Open Zambia, an online newspaper which is often critical of the government, reports that the PF intends to derail the UPND’s campaign by jailing their election observers, disrupting political rallies, preventing the party’s activists from travelling, and repressing independent media coverage of the election. There is also a growing fear that Lungu’s regime may engage in electoral fraud to secure a majority for the PF in August, thereby avoiding a direct run-off between HH and Lungu. In May, the UPND claimed that the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation had prevented the broadcasting of its election adverts, and thus contravened national election law. Shortly thereafter, Zambia’s only mainstream privately-owned independent newspaper, The Post, was shut down by the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA), claiming that the publication owes it back taxes amounting to USD 6.2 million. Despite Lungu continuing to shrug off any allegations regarding attempts by the governing party to “rig” the election, some journalists at The Post have been charged with publishing classified information and printing libellous statements. Both the US and the EU have delivered mild rebukes, concerned that the ZRA’s decision could adversely impact on the fairness of the August elections due to the limited, and often biased, media landscape in Zambia.

Foreign observers are stressing the importance of a peaceful outcome to the polls in light of Zambia’s September negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure a critical support package designed to plug its large budget deficit. An economy heavily reliant on the extractive industries, with copper mining alone responsible for up to half of government revenue, has been battered by the prolonged global commodities slump, an energy crisis and low rainfall. Fluctuations in foreign exchange rates have already impacted on Zambia’s economic outlook, and yields on the country’s foreign debts have fallen since the start of the year. However, following the UK’s June vote to leave the EU, Zambia’s foreign debts are showing signs of renewed attraction for foreign investors, with the yields on developed nations’ debts expected to remain lower during this period of uncertainty in Europe. These extraneous conditions may assist whoever wins Zambia’s August election in negotiating a new deal with the IMF.

Yet the first responsibility of the victor in the 11 August presidential poll will be to restore calm after a turbulent election season. Building new alliances in Zambia’s divided legislative house must do more than paper over party cracks. A new president will need a strong electoral mandate, rather than challenges to the result, if he is to negotiate and implement an IMF support package which is expected to include austerity policies in a country where unofficial unemployment is stubbornly high and the social safety net virtually absent.

Zambia’s Referendum on Human Rights

On 11 August Zambia will also vote in a referendum to enact a new Bill of Rights, thus amending the country’s constitution and codifying human rights as part of national law. Although the Bill, which is being spearheaded by the PF, would ban abortion in Zambia, it has also been labelled “progressive” by Transparency International due to provisions guaranteeing basic rights to citizens. The Bill of Rights also controversially includes an anti-discrimination clause, which may inadvertently compel a hitherto conservative country to move towards some legal protections for LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) individuals. Zambia’s new Bill of Rights would include socio-economic provisions as well as civil and political rights, compelling the state to pursue the progressive realisation of access to education, healthcare, housing, food, water, adequate sanitation, and social security for all persons living in Zambia. These standards may alter the very configuration of the Zambian state, and could see the country follow South Africa’s example in pursuing large-scale state-centred investment and intervention in the economy in order to meet the high standards required by changes to the country’s constitutional law. How the Zambian government will pursue these almost impossible objectives in light of its conflicting reliance on a potential future IMF support package, which may require the state to pursue fiscal prudence, has not yet been addressed by Zambia’s political class. Zambia’s political unrest and disarray may have concealed the referendum from public debate, but questions surrounding its outcome will affect the next government. Zambians, many of whom are not aware of the forthcoming referendum, may emerge from this destructive election season, wondering whether the Bill of Rights is feasible – economically, and practically, in a politically-divided country.