Evening strolls with PEGIDA: The mainstreaming of far-right ideology

Having emerged on social media in October 2014, within two months the far-right group had become a fully-fledged organisation with popular support. Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA) now serves as a tangible indicator of rising support for far-right ideology in Germany. Through weekly abendspaziergang (evening stroll) protest marches on Mondays in several German cities, PEGIDA supporters denounce what they see as the growing influence of Islam in the country and lax immigration policies. The demonstrations have attracted significant support; in several cities in the east, including Dresden and Leipzig, as many as 25,000 people have marched under the PEGIDA banner, though support has not been as forthcoming in the western region. Most gatherings have been peaceful, apart from minor scuffles involving rival demonstrators. However, for moderate policymakers, these demonstrations signal a broader desire for change in Germany.

Recent surveys and police reports corroborate concerns over the mainstreaming of right-wing ideas. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation, a German think tank, over 61 percent of Germans believe that Islam does not belong in the West. Moreover, approximately 40 percent of respondents in a 2014 German Migration Council survey noted that people must speak German without an accent to be considered a citizen of the country. Such rhetoric has not just remained public opinion but has also manifested into action, as assaults on refugees and asylum seekers have increased year-on-year since 2012.

These developments may be explained in terms of the emergence of a ‘populist gap’ in Germany – an environment that provides an opportunity for populist or extreme ideals to thrive, given public discontent over cultural, economic and political conditions. Within Germany, there is growing anxiety among its citizens over cultural alienation, as Germany received more than 200,000 applications from asylum seekers in 2014, making it the country accepting the largest number of refugees in the world. This fear of the ‘other’ is galvanised by sensationalised media depictions of the war in Syria and Iraq and the global threat of Islamist terrorism.

Economic insecurity among the middle class is another factor that drives PEGIDA support. The 2008 global economic crisis and subsequent cuts in public spending has increased apprehension about declines in income in the country.

This may explain higher turnouts for PEGIDA demonstrations in eastern cities like Dresden, which have higher unemployment rates and a more precarious middle-class labour market.

PEGIDA supporters also cite political disenfranchisement as a grievance, evident in the strong anti-establishment overtone to the protests. Dissatisfied with Germany’s political system, PEGIDA protesters have taken to chanting “We are the people” during demonstrations; the same slogan used against the Communist government in East Germany in 1989. The confluence of policy proposals within the political spectrum may also drive voters to more extreme options, as moderate centre-left and centre-right parties’ policies in Germany appear to be very similar. As all mainstream political brands begin to look more alike, dissatisfied political consumers are increasingly likely to support radical parties as a result of feeling that there are no viable alternatives that speak to their interests. This has already materialised in Germany, as the ruling centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has suffered losses to more radical parties in regional elections over the last year amid complaints that the CDU is moving too close to the centre. 

Although German Chancellor Angela Merkel has criticised the movement and several scandals involving PEGIDA leaders emerged in February, the grievances underpinning the movement seem to have drawn significant support from sections of the German population. Recent electoral gains in 2014 and 2015 state elections by far-right parties - the National Democratic Party (NDP) and newcomer, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) - have raised alarm among moderates, as this shift in voting is seen as evidence of the growing popularity of far-right politics in Germany. Given the apparent increase in support for the populist far right agenda, it seems as if the German government will have to engage with far right demands as credible policy points. PEGIDA ideas have already appeared on the government’s agenda, for example, as the Bundestag pledged in April 2015 to reform immigration policy before its tenure expires in 2017. The proposed reform includes previously couched terms that suggest Germany will look to attract skilled migrants, as opposed to refugees and asylum-seekers. 

Despite the above concerns, PEGIDA’s demonstrations are likely to lose momentum in the coming months, barring another Islamist-inspired terrorist attack in Europe. Nevertheless, the CDU needs to acknowledge that there are other political and economic conditions driving support for populist far-right ideals, as the initial flurry of support for PEGIDA is indicative of broader desire for change, as well as a shift in political values in Germany, which have the potential to influence policy.