Eastern Africa: Mapping the Region's Growing Insecurity

From almost fortnightly terrorist attacks to prolonged periods of widespread ethnic violence, in the past six months, eastern Africa has seen a marked increase in insecurity. In Kenya and Somalia, weak governments and miscalculated counter-terrorism policies and strategies have contributed to an upsurge in terrorist attacks from Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al Shabaab), a transnational, jihadist militant group. In South Sudan, the escalation of ethnic tensions into a civil war scenario demonstrates the region’s vulnerability to politically-motivated ethnic violence.

Eastern Africa has a complex history of domestic and international terrorist attacks with the first major attack being the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya by Al Qaeda-affiliated militants. More recently, Al Shabaab poses the pre-eminent threat of terrorism in the region. Since emerging in Somalia during the early 2000s as a subversive Islamist group focussed on overthrowing the Somali government, Al Shabaab has transformed to become a transnational militant group. In 2010, it committed its first attack on foreign soil, with multiple bombings in Kampala, Uganda. It achieved truly global attention with the September 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi, Kenya, after which Al Qaeda recognised Al Shabaab as an affiliate group and part of a global anti-western terrorist front. Since then, other local Islamist militant groups such as Al Hijra in Kenya have claimed to be affiliates or part of the Al Shabaab network in eastern Africa. April and May of this year saw a record number of terrorist attacks conducted by Al Shabaab or affiliated militant groups in Kenya and Somalia. 

The greater incidence of attacks is a result of Al Shabaab’s transformation into an organisation with international ambitions. This is principally a result of the deployment of troops by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Set up in 2007 to promote peacekeeping operations and to support the Federal Government of Somalia, AMISOM has emerged to become the key military force in Somalia. It is now part of a global anti-terrorism offensive against Al Shabaab which has had some success in dislodging Al Shabaab from key strongholds such as Mogadishu. However, despite AMISOM’s territorial gains, the intervention force, which includes troops contributed by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Djibouti, added an international element to the conflict. This has resulted in Al Shabaab-directed retaliatory attacks against some of the contributing states, and has increased the threat of attacks in others. Kenya and Somalia have both experienced multiple terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab and Al Shabaab-affiliated militants in the past six months, most of which involved grenades and improvised explosive devices and took place in major cities. 

Notably, not all AMISOM contributing countries are equally at risk. Ethiopia’s sizeable army and a well-established US military presence in Djibouti act as a deterrent. Uganda and Burundi’s remoteness from the porous Somali border effectively reduce the number of attacks that occur within these states, although Uganda’s high-profile involvement in Somalia makes it a target. 

In addition to Al Shabaab’s adoption of a more international outlook, the increased number of attacks can be attributed to miscalculated counter-terrorism policies by eastern African governments. The Kenyan government’s domestic response to the Westgate attack and the April bombings in Nairobi has been heavy-handed and has contributed in part to further attacks by jihadist groups. Operation Fagia Eastleigh, which involved the repatriation of Somali refugees and other illegal immigrants mainly resident in the Somali-dominated suburb of Eastleigh, has been criticised by the international community as well as the Somali-Kenyan community and Kenyan Muslims. 

It was shortly followed by further attacks in Nairobi and Mombasa by militants thought to be linked to Al Shabaab. While the government has put in place policies such as Nyumba Kumi, a neighbourhood policing initiative, there has been no attempt by the government to seek a political solution to resolve any of these issues. Without such a political resolution, the situation is unlikely to improve, even in the long term.

Weak governments have also played a key role in facilitating terrorism in the region. Since the re-establishment of the Somali government in 2012, President Hassan Sheik Mohamoud’s government has been criticised for corruption, clan-based power struggles and failing to effectively combat Al Shabaab despite support from AMISOM. Moreover, the reach of Mohamoud’s government is limited, faced with breakaway territories such as Somaliland and Puntland. These factors reduce the Somali government’s efficiency in dealing with terrorism. 

In Somalia, Al Shabaab remains a formidable insurgent organisation which targets AMISOM troops and the Somali government. This was evidenced in March and April of this year, when Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for killing AMISOM troops, Somali soldiers and two Somali members of parliament.

In addition to terrorism, eastern Africa has seen some of the worst cases of politically-motivated ethnic violence in Africa this year. Politics in the region is often defined by religious, tribal, ethnic or clan-based biases. This regularly results in extensive politically-motivated ethnic violence, with a destabilising effect on security in the region. This was the case in Kenya during the 2007 post-election violence and is one of the primary causes of the current crisis in South Sudan. Following widespread conflict during early 2014, South Sudan continues to experience high-intensity ethnic conflict, centred on the country’s two largest communities, the Dinkas and the Nuers. 

South Sudan has a chequered past including a 22-year long civil war which caused ethnic divisions and the formation of secessionist rebel movements along ethnic lines. After its secession from Sudan in 2011, the South Sudanese government worked on establishing state institutions. However, little emphasis was placed on nation building and addressing ethnic issues. 

This continues to weaken state authority, as politicians and civil servants revert to guerrilla tactics instead of diplomatic means to resolve disputes. The signing of a peace deal in May by President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and former Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, follows an agreement by both sides to form an inclusive transitional government to put an end to the conflict. Nevertheless, the conflict is determined by long-standing issues and, in spite of international pressure, is unlikely to be resolved by the peace deal. 

Whilst state action has so far exacerbated regional problems, there is a possibility that the recent uptick in insecurity will trigger a change in government responses to terrorism and political violence. Reinforced international security relations, such as the striking of a maritime security partnership between Kenya and the European Union, and progress from international and regional counter-terrorism operations such as AMISOM, could result in better counter-terrorism policies and strategies. Further, the proposed creation of a regional army before the end of the year could see a reduction in insecurity in eastern Africa in the long term. However, an inward focus on local politics and the seemingly myopic strategies of some of the eastern African governments could hinder any progress in ameliorating security in the region.