Defence and security in a still United Kingdom

On 18 September 2014, Scotland voted to remain part of the United Kingdom. Along with the economy, the currency and Scotland’s place in the European Union, the impact of a ‘Yes’ vote on the security and armed forces of the UK and an independent Scotland was one of many unanswered questions. 

Under the proposals put forward by the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) in ‘Scotland’s Future’, its white paper on independence, Scotland would have a budget of £2.5 million for defence and security. This is less than the £3.3 billion which the SNP estimates that Scotland currently contributes towards the UK’s defence budget, and is comparable with Scandinavian countries such as Denmark. The white paper stated that an independent Scotland would have a defence force (SDF) of 15,000 regular and 5,000 reserve personnel, take over control the existing naval, army and air force bases within Scotland, and acquire a portion of the UK’s defence equipment. The SNP’s defence proposals were widely criticised by pro-Union politicians and senior military figures. A former senior NATO commander condemned the proposals as “amateurish, unrealistic and lacking any clear strategic purpose”, while five former First Sea Lords called the SNP’s defence proposals “unachievable within their planned funding and timescale” and said they would “leave Scotland very poorly defended in an increasingly dangerous world”. The SNP consistently dismissed such concerns as “scaremongering”, asserting that their plans would provide more appropriate defence and security for Scotland.

An independent Scotland is likely to have adopted a less expeditionary foreign and defence policy than previously embraced by the UK. The SNP’s vision is of a nuclear-free Scotland with a Scandinavian-style foreign policy, leveraging soft power, and focussed on combatting climate change and co-operation with European partners. In the absence of direct security threats from other states, there is likely to have been instead greater attention to threats from non-state actors, such as terrorism, cyber security and organised crime. However, what is less clear from the white paper is how Scotland would have sought to mitigate these threats. The white paper sets out proposals for the creation of a new Scottish security and intelligence agency. However, without the extensive, and expensive, capabilities of the UK’s intelligence agencies such as GCHQ, it is unclear what facilities would have been available to the new Scottish intelligence agency. The SNP has made much of the cooperation agreements which would have been negotiated with the rest of the UK to provide such services, announcing that “an independent Scottish domestic intelligence machinery would work closely with UK counterparts.” However, there was no guarantee that the UK would consent to such measures. It is unlikely that Westminster would have deliberately acted to the detriment of an independent Scotland, especially if Scotland came to be regarded by terrorists and organised criminal groups as a weak border, which could be exploited to gain easy entry to the UK. However, as a separate nation, Scotland would not have been guaranteed access to the extensive information provided to the UK by US agencies, or automatic entry to the Five Eyes intelligence alliance between the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 

In the short term at least, Scotland’s succession would also have been detrimental to the UK’s forces and their capabilities, both due to the cost of rebasing assets from Scotland and the loss of personnel and equipment. In the event of Scottish secession, the GDP of the remaining UK would have fallen by approximately 8%, and it is likely that defence spending would fall by a similar amount. Participants at a working group on the impact of independence concluded that it is unlikely that the UK would have been able to maintain current levels of defence capabilities in the period after Scottish succession. This would have had serious implications for the UK’s future involvement in overseas operations, including international intervention in the current crisis in Iraq and Syria. 

In the event that the SNP had seen through its proposal to assume control of Scotland’s ‘share’ of the UK’s existing forces, the rebasing required to redistribute the force between the UK and Scotland would have created considerable additional cost, as would the removal of the UK’s nuclear deterrent, known as Trident, from the naval base at Faslane. The feasibility and cost of relocating Trident has been widely debated, although recent assessments by a defence think tank estimate the cost of relocating Trident to be between £2.5 and £3.5 billion. All this would have severely disrupted planning for the UK’s 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).

In addition to plans for the SDF, the white paper states that an independent Scotland would be “a committed and active participant in the global community of nations”, and would have sought to join the UN and NATO as an independent member “as swiftly as possible”. However, it is unclear how easy this would have been. The SNP’s limited defence capabilities, as set out in the white paper, raised concerns among pro-Union supporters that it was “far from certain that Scotland would be admitted to NATO.”

Whilst the SNP cited examples of non-nuclear NATO members, critics of independence stressed that an independent Scotland risked been seen to be seeking a “free ride” with NATO. Similarly, it was suggested that any change to Trident which was detrimental to the UK’s nuclear defence capabilities would likely damage relations between Edinburgh and Washington.

The security sector impact of a Yes vote would have gone beyond defence implications, as in addition to the serving members of the armed forces in Scotland, defence is an important employer in the country. According to the MoD, the Clyde naval base at Argyll and Bute is Scotland’s largest employment site.

In addition to those employed directly at the naval bases, the shipbuilding establishment along the Clyde is a key regional employer. The future of this industry in an independent Scotland was hotly debated in the run-up to the referendum. 

The SNP has widely asserted that following independence, Scottish shipyards would continue to supply ships to the SDF, as well as the Royal Navy and other international naval forces. However, these claims were rebuked by pro-Union supporters, who asserted that under current rules UK military ships can only be built in UK shipyards. Earlier this year the chief executive officer of BAE Systems, which runs the Clyde shipyards, indicated that in the event of a Yes vote, the company would close its Scottish shipyards and would relocate its operations to Portsmouth. Speculation regarding the outcome of the referendum focused on the announcement in August that BAE Systems had won a £348 million contract to build three Royal Navy warships at the Clyde shipyards. 

Scotland may have voted to reject independence, but questions about the future of the United Kingdom remain. In the wake of the ‘No’ vote, extensive discussions and negotiations will take place over the coming months to set out plans for further devolution of powers from Westminster to the Scottish Parliament. However, defence is unlikely to be among the topics of discussion.