Coup’d up in Gabon: Challenges in central Africa’s stable state
On 7 January, at approximately 04h00 local time, junior members of the Republic Guard attacked the national radio headquarters, Radio Télévision Gabonaise (RTG) in an attempted coup d’état. During a subsequent broadcast, a Republican Guard lieutenant, who was reportedly tasked with protecting the president, instead announced his plans to oust Ali Bongo Ondimba. Lieutenant Kelly Ondo Obiang and his self-declared Patriotic Movement of the Defence and Security Forces of Gabon, proclaimed they aimed to restore democracy, while also calling on the rest of the military and the youth to support their “Operation Dignity.” The call did not galvanise much support and the attempted coup was over within nine hours. In the end, police arrested seven accomplices and killed two others. However, it is likely to have lingering effects for the country.
Coups have become less frequent around the world and especially in Africa. In the 20th century, there was a 99 percent chance of a coup within a given year. By 2018, this had dropped to 88 percent. The downward trend continues, although Africa still carries the highest threat of a coup occurring. Although it remains difficult to predict when coups will take place, the existence and augmentation of specific social political and socio-economic conditions present inherent vulnerabilities to future coups. Gabon is no exception. Unstable centres of power, worsening economic conditions and absent democratic avenues for change are likely to create an environment for further political violence.
Coups have become less frequent around the world and especially in Africa. In the 20th century, there was a 99 percent chance of a coup within a given year. By 2018, this had dropped to 88 percent.
Lieutenant Obiang’s broadcast specifically pointed out the soldiers’ displeasure with President Ali Bongo Ondimba, particularly following his October 2018 stroke. The president held a New Year’s Day address to prove that he was still able to govern the country. Yet, if anything, this only created more doubts over his ability to do so.
President Bongo has had a seemingly fragile hold on the government since the most recent presidential elections in August 2016. In the controversial poll, President Bongo defeated opposition leader Jean Ping by only 6,000 votes. In President Bongo’s home province of Haut-Ogooue, the voter turnout was 99.93 percent, with 95.46 voting for Presidential Bongo, an important bump in his overall victory. This was a suspicious turnout result, given that the national average was only 59 percent. Unsurprisingly, his victory prompted violent protests, resulting in multiple casualties and at least 1,100 arrests. Since then, his hold had stabilised. However, his recent incapacitation has added uncertainty to Gabon’s political environment. Vague government statements have served to worsen this uncertainty.
It is equally unclear who will succeed him. Unconfirmed reports of President Bongo’s intent to have his 25-year-old son succeed him have allegedly not been widely supported among other stakeholders in the ruling Parti Démocratique Gabonais (PDG). With other hopefuls including President Bongo’s brother, Frederic, and his half-sister, Pascaline, it remains unclear who will take over the reins of the PDG if President Bongo were to step down.
Although discontent with the 50-year-ruling Bongo family has existed since the country’s independence from France in 1960, it has not been widespread. However, given the current country’s poor economic performance, tensions have increased between the government and citizens. International Monitory Fund (IMF) funding has provided a valuable lifeline to Gabon during its economic hardships but recent statements indicated the organisation was not happy with Gabon’s financial position. Gabon responded swiftly, announcing the introduction of austerity measures targeting workers in the public sector. Gabon’s largest labour union has since then held multiple protests against the move. It believes the government is solely responsible for the economic problems that have seen the price of some basic goods double. The union has vowed to continue to protest the measures, and anger towards the government is likely to increase alongside rising prices.
International Monitory Fund (IMF) funding has provided a valuable lifeline to Gabon during its economic hardships but recent statements indicated the organisation was not happy with Gabon’s financial position.
Traditionally, such frustrations can be voiced through the ballot box. Yet, the controversial 2016 poll likely dampened the already low confidence citizens had in the power of their vote. Now, it is likely that citizens will voice their concerns through other more direct means.
Although such discontent with the government is initially more likely to manifest in anti-government protests in the short term, a continuation of poor economic performance, poor democratic avenues for change and unstable power centres will increase the likelihood that citizens, the military, or both will attempt to enact governmental change through other more radical channels.
Critically, the coup failed this time. Lieutenant Obiang and his co-conspirators simply did not have the military and public support they needed to overthrow President Bongo. However, the major factors likely prompting the soldiers to act in the first place remain. Should they persist, or worsen, the 7 January coup is likely to be the first of many incidents of political unrest in Gabon’s immediate future.