Brothers in Arms: Regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram

In mid-October 2015, the revamped Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) officially launched its counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin. The 8,700 strong force has set itself a three month deadline to eradicate the Nigeria-based Islamist militant group, Boko Haram. However, the latest iteration of the MNJTF, which comprises troops from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin, is operating in a new context which brings with it different challenges in the fight against Boko Haram. 

In response to Boko Haram’s regional advance, Cameroon, Chad and Niger commenced multinational operations against the group in January 2015. Throughout the latter half of 2014 and in light of an independent Nigerian offensive against Boko Haram, the Islamist militant group had become increasingly strategic in its attacks and seized territory in Nigeria’s northern and more remote Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. These territorial gains threatened the sovereignty of Nigeria’s neighbours, as Boko Haram projected force beyond Nigeria’s northern borders. By November 2014, Boko Haram had begun to carry out mass casualty attacks in Cameroon’s Far North Region, Niger’s Diffa region as well as throughout the Lake Chad Basin. 

Although regional governments committed to establishing a joint task force, then-Nigerian president, Goodluck Jonathan, pushed back against foreign intervention in his country. As a result, the proposed MNJTF involving Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and a reluctant Nigeria battled to get off the ground. Nigeria’s neighbours pushed ahead however, making use of bilateral military agreements to engage Boko Haram. These interventions were not without their consequences, as Boko Haram continued to carry out retaliatory attacks. By July 2015, the group had carried out three reprisal suicide bombings in Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. 

In sharp contrast to his predecessor, newly elected Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari called for the formation of an enhanced MNJTF in July 2015. Whereas the previous administration had opposed foreign military intervention, the current president has sought to reinvigorate regional cooperation. Buhari has supported situating the MNJTF’s headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad and has appointed Nigerian Major General Iliya Abbah as the operation’s commander. Nigeria has also committed 3,750 troops to the initiative whilst Chad has committed 3,000, Cameroon 2,650, and Niger 1,000. Benin has also committed 750 troops despite being unaffected by Boko Haram activity thus far. Furthermore, the MNJTF has been authorised the right to pursue Boko Haram on Nigerian soil, even though this has been a contentious issue since the MNJTF’s original formation in January.

Despite these changes, the revamped MNJTF is currently operating in a changing environment as Boko Haram’s intent and capability has shifted considerably over the past 11 months. Indeed, regional participation against the group has motivated Boko Haram to conduct reprisal attacks, which are likely to continue for the near future. Furthermore, Boko Haram has demonstrated keen strategic adaptability of late, reverting to hit and run tactics following territorial losses in early 2015. Such tactics are difficult to combat through conventional military operations. Moreover, while increased cooperation across the region is promising, Chad has recently committed troops to a separate counterterrorism initiative in the Sahel suggesting that the capacity of regional militaries is likely to become overstretched in the short to medium term. Although international players, including the US, have offered surveillance aircraft and counterinsurgency training to Niger, Cameroon and Nigeria to bridge this gap, these measures are unlikely to be effective within the three month deadline.

The MNJTF’s approach further fails to target Boko Haram’s revenue and recruiting channels. This strategy has proved effective in the African Union-led operations against Al Shabaab in Somalia. While the Nigerian House of Representatives has called on Buhari to establish a North East Development Commission tasked with rebuilding regions devastated by the Boko Haram insurgency, these plans are unlikely to deliver the progress needed to combat the group this year. 

Eradicating Boko Haram within the three-month deadline is therefore an unattainable goal. Although renewed regional cooperation may well help to contain Boko Haram, a more broad-based response aimed at the development of north eastern Nigeria is unlikely to materialise in the short term. With both Nigerian and regional forces vulnerable to battle fatigue, Boko Haram is likely to carry out further destructive attacks before the group’s capabilities are significantly degraded.