Back to the Future: The Increased Kidnapping Threat in the Niger Delta

The NDA first emerged in February 2016, taking up arms against the Nigerian government as part of the group’s ‘Operation Red Economy’. This campaign aims to disrupt Nigeria’s oil-dependent economy in order to pressure the federal government into addressing alleged political and socio-economic marginalisation in the region, and to distribute a fairer share of Nigeria’s oil revenues to the Delta. The NDA’s attacks against pipelines and other key facilities have proven potent in bolstering the group’s profile and has increased uncertainty across Nigeria’s already troubled oil sector. 

However, recent developments suggest that the NDA is adopting new tactics to meet its political objectives. In a 5 July statement, President Muhammadu Buhari’s aide, Garba Shehu, claimed that the group was behind the recent spike in the targeted killing of local security forces while simultaneously alleging that the NDA had orchestrated the kidnapping of soldiers and local and foreign oil workers. Notably, the 23 June 2016 kidnapping of seven foreign nationals from an Australian mining operation in Cross River state points to increased insecurity in the region as a result of the NDA’s campaign. The group dismissed claims that it was involved in recent kidnappings, pushing the blame onto other criminal groups operating in the region. Nevertheless, the 2 September 2016 seizure of 15 local oil workers from a prominent Nigerian oil company again raised concerns that the militant group is seeking to adopt kidnapping as a tactic. The 15 workers were subsequently freed 16 days later following a police-led operation, although it was not disclosed whether the USD 320,000 ransom demand was paid to secure their release. While it is unclear who was behind the attack, the kidnapping coincided with growing frustrations among the NDA, who having declared a unilateral ceasefire in mid-August 2016, are still awaiting a plan for concrete negotiations with the federal government. 

This emerging kidnapping threat is reminiscent of cases seen in the early 2000s, as kidnappings became a key tactic of MEND during the group’s Niger Delta insurgency. The group launched itself onto the international stage by claiming the kidnapping of four foreign oil workers from an offshore oil platform in January 2006. Following this, MEND was linked to the abduction of over 150 foreign nationals between 2006 and 2008 alone. The group specifically targeted foreign-owned oil companies, entering into negotiations with Nigerian authorities, the victims’ employers and families to secure their release. Although MEND’s leadership dismissed claims of ransom demands, emphasising that the kidnappings were part of a political agenda to bring their grievances to the forefront of the federal government’s attention, it is widely accepted that the group benefited financially from these exchanges. In a seemingly equally fruitful arrangement, kidnappings of this nature dropped significantly after MEND militants were offered controversial monthly financial stipends to lay down their arms as part of a government amnesty programme launched in 2009. It is therefore unsurprising that the planned December 2015 end to this lucrative amnesty deal sparked renewed tensions in the Niger Delta. 

Facing mounting pressure from both former militants and local communities, in January 2016, President Buhari extended these stipend payments until December 2017, but cut the budget allocated to the amnesty programme by 70 percent. With former militants now largely out of pocket, amid a worsening economic outlook for Nigeria, a revitalised armed campaign in the region was largely expected. However, the collective memory of MEND’s campaign has resulted in a nervous oil sector in the Delta. This has inadvertently increased the effectiveness of the NDA’s campaign, with three major international oil companies temporarily suspending operations, and evacuating key personnel, from the region amid concerns over renewed violence. 

The government has sought to adopt a two-pronged approach to securing the strategic region, launching two consecutive military operations against the group alongside calls for peace talks. While ‘Operation Crocodile Smile’, and its predecessor ‘Operation Delta Safe’, have had short-term successes against the group, the operations have been largely ridiculed by the group on social media, and government efforts to engage in talks have been repeatedly dismissed. 

However, August marked a turning point in the insurgency. On 21 August 2016, the NDA announced a unilateral 60-day ceasefire in a statement on its website in which it also detailed the group’s readiness to engage in talks with the federal government. Yet, the ceasefire was not without the group’s own demands, with the NDA calling on the government to cease its alleged harassment of Niger Delta communities, and calling for a troop withdrawal. While the government has expressed its willingness to meet the NDA around the negotiating table, it has yet to abandon its two-tiered approach, with the start of September marked by increased troop deployments in the Niger Delta. This has not been well-received by the NDA, which on 26 September 2016, claimed responsibility for an attack on a foreign-owned oil pipeline near Bonny Island in Rivers State, nullifying the August ceasefire. The group has claimed that constant government delays in commencing the promised talks demonstrated a lack of commitment to reaching a resolution. Although the NDA were quick to leave the negotiations, demonstrating their own lack of goodwill in the talks, the group is unlikely to be easily coaxed to the table for a second time. 

With troops already gathered in the Niger Delta, and militant counterparts such as MEND capitalising on renewed government concern over security in the region, the NDA will need to increase pressure to retain government engagement. The group has centred its campaign to date on oil infrastructure, but this is unlikely to be guaranteed in an escalated offensive. Kidnap for ransom is therefore still a viable option for the NDA. Furthermore, it is increasingly evident that the NDA is not the only militant group operating in the region. The June emergence of the Asawana Deadly Force of Niger Delta and subsequent attacks claimed by the Reformed Egbesu Boys of the Niger Delta, the Adaka Boro Avengers, and the Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force, among others, demonstrates that the NDA no longer enjoys a monopoly on the current Niger Delta insurgency. As these groups vie to boost their own political positions, the insurgency has the potential to become increasingly violent in a pattern similar to the early 2000s crisis. 

Although talks with the NDA have already failed, the federal government is financially constrained in what it can offer the group in return for disarmament. Meanwhile, a military solution is equally flawed, requiring a strategically sound offensive by already overstretched Nigerian security forces. The NDA is therefore unlikely to secure what it wants around the negotiating table in the short term, nor is it likely to be militarily defeated. This leaves a previously-tested and lucrative avenue for the group to step up its guerrilla campaign to retain its relevance and reputation in the region, one where militant-backed kidnappings offer both financial return, and a fearsome reputation, among the foreign oil industry.