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A Tale of Two Fronts: Boko Haram's Impending Divide

The August 2016 announcement that Islamic State had replaced the leader of its West African affiliate, Boko Haram, has paved the way for a split in the Nigerian militant group. Now it appears Nigeria and its allies will be fighting militants on two fronts in the region, writes Gabrielle Reid
Boko Haram
The Nigeria-based Islamist group, Boko Haram, is headed for a split. In an unexpected move, on 4 August Islamic State (IS) appointed a new leader of the group’s Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), more commonly known as Boko Haram. In the August edition of the IS newsletter, Al Naba, Abu Musab Al Barnawi was named as Abubakar Shekau’s replacement to lead the IS affiliate. Al Barnawi, the purported son of Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf – killed by Nigerian authorities in 2009 – is expected to take control of Boko Haram’s campaign in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, in a move apparently unanticipated by Shekau. The former leader subsequently issued two video statements to denounce the move, marking Shekau’s first public appearance since March 2015, including a video statement released within hours of the Al Naba publication. The development has paved the way for a split into two largely autonomous camps, one in support of the group’s domestic agenda and a second backing a regional campaign through greater ties with IS.

Al Barnawi’s appointment is evidence of increased IS interest in its West Africa affiliate, likely prompted by recent losses in both Syria and Libya. However, Boko Haram too has faced significant territorial losses in recent months, specifically in its former Nigerian stronghold in Sambisa forest. Similar losses coincided with Boko Haram’s initial pledge of allegiance to IS in March 2015 and the move was attributed at the time to efforts to bolster Boko Haram’s international profile. While the latest development could form part of a similar strategy, the relationship between the two groups has proven challenging since its formation. Reports indicate that Shekau consistently rejected IS communiqués regarding Boko Haram tactics, specifically the use of female and child suicide bombers. Such sentiments were supported in Al Barnawi’s accompanying interview in Al Naba during which the new leader repeatedly backed adherence to IS tactics. In this regard, Al Barnawi’s appointment can be seen as a means of reigning in Shekau and reasserting IS as the parent organisation.

Yet, Shekau has stood his ground in Nigeria. In a 15 August statement, he declared himself leader of Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad (JAS), the original conception of Boko Haram, in an apparent split from Al Barnawi’s ISWAP. The move has reignited JAS’ Nigerian campaign, with Shekau issuing direct threats to Abuja as well as to Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Tukur Butatai and the spokesperson of the Nigeria Army, Sani Usman. The strategic placement of young girls in his latest video, and rumours of their origins from Chibok, is a deliberate reminder of the fear JAS has instilled in Nigeria in previous attacks. The threats have been interpreted as evidence of a renewed domestic agenda for JAS, which remains embedded in parts of Nigeria’s Borno state. While uncorroborated reports on 23 August that Shekau had been fatally wounded in a Nigeria-led airstrike could delay the JAS campaign, retaliatory attacks under a new leader – or by the death-defying Shekau, who has faced claims of his purported death several times since 2009 – are anticipated.
Al Barnawi’s appointment is evidence of increased IS interest in its West Africa affiliate, likely prompted by recent losses in both Syria and Libya.

Meanwhile, Al Barnawi’s ISWAP will be keen to maintain its regional campaign in the Lake Chad Basin. During Al Barnawi’s interview, he specifically identified Niger as the centre of regional counterinsurgency operations, which is likely to increase intent to target Nigerien interests among Al Barnawi’s supporters. In this regard, the standalone attack against the Nigerien town of Bosso on 4 June 2016, which marked the deadliest Boko Haram assault in Niger to date, has been retrospectively attributed to this Nigerien refocus. He further claimed humanitarian efforts in the area were a guise by Western forces operating against Boko Haram in the region and this too could motivate targeted attacks against these operations in the longer term.

Though Al Barnawi’s Nigerian credentials could serve him well in maintaining a Nigeria-based outfit, it is uncertain whether the majority of Boko Haram supporters will back him or Shekau. Nevertheless, it is clear that Boko Haram has undergone yet another transition, one to which ongoing regional counterinsurgency operations will need to adapt. JAS will be eager to resume its insurgency in Nigeria, while continued territorial losses in Sambisa will likely provoke deadly domestic terror attacks. ISWAP, on the other hand, will be keen to demonstrate successes in its expansionist agenda around Lake Chad. Although these areas of operation are not new for Boko Haram, the regional counterinsurgency force battling a single group on two fronts will now face a divided threat, the movements of which will be increasingly difficult to predict.

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