“Yankee Go Home”: Misguided US diplomacy in Latin America
In December 2014, US President Barack Obama announced unprecedented diplomatic negotiations with Cuba, following more than 50 years of diplomatic and economic isolation. Despite considerable US political opposition, the rapprochement between the US and Cuba was hailed in Latin America, including leftist Argentinean, Brazilian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan governments. However, deteriorating relations between the US and Venezuela now threaten to undermine US-Cuba negotiations, and there are already signs that talks may have hit a dead end. By simultaneously courting Cuba and isolating Venezuela, Obama has sought to draw Havana away from the latter’s economic and political orbit. However, the US’ strategy seems to have double-backfired. Not only has the latest round of US sanctions played right into Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s hands, by granting him political power to isolate and dismantle his domestic opponents, but Obama has seemingly underestimated the region’s appetite for targeting Venezuela. Notably, Cuba has come out in strong support of Venezuela and against alleged US imperialism. It now remains to be seen whether Cuba substantiates its fiery political rhetoric by stalling negotiations with the US.
In Venezuela, the focus has now shifted from chronic shortages of basic goods and soaring inflation to a growing “Yankee” imperialist threat.
Since Raúl Castro assumed power in 2006, the Cuban government has undertaken significant political and economic reforms, including the release of dozens of political prisoners as well as the adoption of comprehensive tax and investment measures. These reforms underpinned Obama’s decision to break from the isolationist policies of previous US governments and initiate unprecedented diplomatic talks with Havana in 2014. In doing so, Obama acknowledged the failure of unilateral economic sanctions as a means of achieving political change in Cuba. The first two rounds of talks in December 2014 and February 2015 were met with optimism by both countries, as well as by Latin American governments. US-Cuba talks also accelerated the EU’s own negotiations with Havana, as countries such as France and Spain feared losing out on Cuba’s largely untapped market. However, this air of optimism was absent at the end of the third round of US-Cuba talks in mid-March 2015. Negotiations ended abruptly, and both parties were noticeably guarded, downplaying previous suggestions that embassies would be opened before the Summit of the Americas in mid-April. This sudden change in mood has been driven by the significant deterioration in US-Venezuela relations between the second and third round of Cuban talks, during which time the US designated Venezuela a national security threat.
US-Venezuela relations have been strained since the late 1990s when Hugo Chávez took power. Yet, relations fell to a new low after the Venezuelan government violently cracked down on opposition protesters in 2014. This latest low point further follows ongoing tit-for-tat diplomatic attacks by both sides, which have included travel sanctions against US and Venezuelan politicians. Obama’s critics have argued that his decision to declare Venezuela a national security threat in March 2015 is likely only to strengthen Maduro’s grip on power in the run up to municipal and legislative elections later this year. Maduro, in turn, has responded to Obama’s attacks with considerable political guile, staging numerous anti-imperialist protests, whilst the Venezuelan National Assembly has passed legislation granting him another 12 months to rule by decree. In Venezuela, the focus has now shifted from chronic shortages of basic goods and soaring inflation to a growing “Yankee” imperialist threat. Almost predictably, leftist Latin American governments, including Cuba, have banded together to defend Venezuela.
Various regional and political blocs, including Mercosur and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), have each condemned the US’ alleged interventionist policy in the region. From these responses, it would seem that Obama’s administration has fundamentally overestimated regional opposition to Venezuela. Even the US’ most important regional ally, Colombia, has refrained from openly criticising the political and economic policies of its neighbour. However, the biggest failure has come in relation to its rapprochement with Cuba, as the US mistakenly believed that it could seize upon Venezuela’s economic weakness to draw Havana into Washington’s sphere of influence. Raúl Castro himself recently rebuffed such plans, warning that the US could “neither buy Cuba nor intimidate Venezuela.” This attachment to Venezuela is rooted not only in a shared socialist ideology, but also in an economic arrangement through which Venezuelan provides Cuba with vast oil subsidies and cash handouts, estimated at between USD 5 to 15 billion a year.
What has become clear over the past month is that Cuba is not seeking to replace Venezuelan economic aid with US foreign direct investment. Rather, the Castro government wants to benefit from both US and Venezuelan interests in Cuba. Despite the recent lukewarm round of negotiations, both Obama and Raúl Castro are undeniably still keen to see this happen. However, much will depend on how Obama approaches the sensitive Venezuela issue at the upcoming Summit of the Americas in Panama in April, which Cuba is expected to attend for the first time. Facing growing regional opposition, Obama is likely to downplay the US-Venezuela rift. More sanctions against Venezuela would only hurt Venezuela’s political opposition, further isolate the US, and could risk clearing the path for European businesses into the Cuban market at the expense of US corporations.