US-North Korea Relations: A War of Words and Tweets
Geopolitical tensions on the Korean Peninsula are running high, incited by successive North Korean ballistic missile tests throughout March and April 2017. While the majority of these tests have failed, reportedly due a combination of US cyber-attacks and North Korean design flaws, top US officials have announced that they have heralded the end of Washington’s ‘strategic patience’ towards North Korea. Strategic patience, a term used to describe relations under the Obama administration, rested on the assumption that North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons programme would cause regional powers, in particular China, to cut the country off from international support without the need for significant US intervention.
The apparent shift in policy under the Trump administration has raised concerns regarding a potential armed conflict between the US and North Korea. Indeed, the rhetoric emanating from both capitals seemingly justifies this. Reports emerged last month that the US would consider a preemptive conventional weapons strike should North Korea carry out another nuclear test and President Donald Trump declared that a “major, major conflict” was possible. Escalating tensions have been further highlighted by a US naval deployment to South Korea, and a North Korean propaganda video depicting a nuclear strike on the White House. While the deterioration of bilateral relations is concerning, current tensions are unlikely to result in a shift in US strategy towards North Korea nor a war between nuclear-armed militaries. Instead, the end of ‘strategic patience’ is likely to materialise in diplomatic form, with the US increasing pressure on China to cut ties with North Korea and renewing calls for economic sanctions among international institutions. This represents an intensification of courses of action previously pursued by the Obama administration, rather than a fundamental change in policy.
Hyperbolic rhetoric is a staple of North Korea-US relations. While current tensions are seemingly worse than usual—triggered by a record number of missile and nuclear tests over the past 18 months—bilateral relations are typically strained whenever a new US president takes office. In early 2009, then-ascendant US President Obama was similarly provoked by nuclear tests; he responded by informing North Korea on multiple occasions that the US was capable of destroying the country. Bilateral relations also deteriorated after former President Bush took office in 2001; prior to 9/11, he considered North Korea the primary threat to US security interests. Despite these regular, four-to-eight year spikes in hostilities, a war of words rather than bombs and bullets typically ensues.
While current tensions are seemingly worse than usual—triggered by a record number of missile and nuclear tests over the past 18 months—bilateral relations are typically strained whenever a new US president takes office.
Moreover, while media reports and North Korean rhetoric have raised the prospect of a nuclear war, it is the country’s conventional artillery that poses a greater threat. While North Korea has gradually improved its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities over the past decade, experts believe it remains five to ten years away from developing a nuclear warhead-fitted ICBM capable of reaching the US. In the unlikely event of a preemptive US strike on North Korea’s nuclear facilities, the country’s most likely response would be an artillery barrage targeting Seoul, located just 56km from the border. As if to highlight this threat, North Korea held its largest live-fire artillery drill in the county’s history in April 2017. However, in spite of Pyongyang’s sporadic assertions that it could turn Seoul into a “sea of fire,” most of its artillery units can only hit targets within 25km. Only 400 of Pyongyang’s weapons have the ability to hit targets 40-60km away, which may put Seoul’s northern districts at risk. However, to target Seoul, North Korea would need to move its artillery to the relatively flat border area, making its units vulnerable to US and South Korean airstrikes.
In a further indication that the US is unlikely to shift its foreign policy, the current administration has focused efforts on courting China and has continued calls for harsher sanctions against North Korea at the UN Security Council. China remains key to US efforts to contain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, as it accounts for an estimated 75-90 percent of North Korea’s external trade. Aware of this leverage, within his first 100 days in office, President Trump met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at a time when China has grown increasingly disenchanted with Pyongyang as a result of its nuclear provocations and the assassination of the estranged elder brother of Kim Jong Un. During this period, India also announced that it will ban all trade with North Korea; a significant victory for both the US and the UN Security Council.
As such, despite heightened tensions, an intensification of the status quo remains the most likely outcome. The US will continue to exert diplomatic pressure on Beijing and encourage further sanctions. In the short- to medium-term, this is likely to avert military conflict. The longer-term picture is less clear. China, which values the stable buffer presented by the current Pyongyang regime, may be receptive to marginally increasing sanctions, but will be keen to avoid any action which materially increases the risk of regime change. North Korea sees its nuclear programme as essential to the continued rule of the Kim family. North Korea is therefore likely to continue to gradually upgrade its nuclear capability. In five, perhaps ten years’, time, international leaders will find themselves facing an altogether more urgent dilemma.