Unleashing Vietnam’s anti-Chinese nationalism
In June 2018, tens of thousands of protesters opposed to proposed legislation governing Vietnam’s special economic zones (SEZs) staged numerous, and sometimes violent, demonstrations countrywide. The proposed legislation would allow foreign companies to operate in SEZs on 99-year leases. Anti-Chinese sentiment played a prominent role in the protests, as protest organisers alleged that state-owned Chinese firms would be the primary beneficiaries of such a policy. Protesters further alleged that large-scale Chinese investment in SEZs would allow Beijing to influence the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), potentially forcing Hanoi to make concessions regarding long-standing disputes over maritime territory in the South China Sea.
Anti-SEZ protests were reported in almost every Vietnamese province; however, the largest occurred in the cities of Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, Da Nang, and Nha Trang. The most violent demonstrations occurred throughout Bình Thuận Province, where protesters set fire to numerous vehicles, threw Molotov cocktails into the provincial People’s Committee headquarters, and rocks at security personnel. Additionally, riot police are accused of using excessive force against protesters in other locations; however, media restrictions mean there is a significant degree of uncertainty as to the number of casualties from alleged police violence. In sum, approximately 150 protesters were arrested in subsequent police operations, including one US national of Vietnamese descent.
Anti-Chinese nationalism has deep roots in Vietnam. For almost 1,000 years, much of what is now northern Vietnam was ruled by successive imperial Chinese dynasties. Popular heroes and heroines include the Trung Sisters, who led a rebellion against the Chinese Han Dynasty, and established the first independent Vietnamese state in the 1st century. Hồ Chí Minh, Vietnam’s revolutionary leader, famously said he would rather suffer under French colonialism for a lifetime than Chinese domination for a millennium.
Anti-Chinese sentiment has revolved around residual tensions from the 1979 border war and the rival claims to maritime territory in the South China Sea.
More recently, anti-Chinese sentiment has revolved around residual tensions from the 1979 border war and the rival claims to maritime territory in the South China Sea. In May-July 2014, for example, tens of thousands of anti-Chinese rioters set fire to predominantly Chinese-owned factories throughout the country after China attempted to establish an oil platform in disputed maritime territories. While Nguyễn Tấn Dũng, Vietnam’s Prime Minister at the time, initially praised the anti- Chinese protesters, saying they were expressing outrage at China’s actions, escalating violence raised concerns about Vietnam’s attractiveness as an investment destination. These concerns prompted a violent crackdown by security forces, in which some 21 people were killed, around 100 injured and over 1,000 arrested. Additionally, in response to the violence, Beijing evacuated some 3,500 Chinese nationals from Vietnam.
Anti-Chinese sentiment therefore raises significant concerns regarding business continuity and safety for Chinese firms operating in Vietnam. China is Vietnam’s largest trade partner, with bilateral trade projected to reach USD 100 billion in 2018. Additionally, China is one of Vietnam’s largest sources of foreign direct investment, having invested at least USD 12.1 billion in the country. Numerous Chinese manufacturing companies, for example, are looking to relocate their factories to Vietnam in light of rising labour costs at home.
Additionally, Vietnamese authorities have expressed public support for China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an attempt to create an international trade network connecting China to the European Union through numerous global infrastructure development initiatives. Vietnam stands to benefit significantly from potential BRI projects. The country’s infrastructure needs between 2016 and 2040 are projected to cost around USD 605 billion, with transport and electricity infrastructure expected to account for around 44 percent and 22 percent of these needs respectively.
However, from a political perspective, strong economic ties with China pose a significant dilemma for the ruling CPV. On the one hand, infrastructure development will strengthen the Vietnamese economy. On the other, the party needs to avoid being seen as a Chinese stooge to maintain its popular legitimacy, and needs to be mindful of how apparent concessions on bilateral issues, such as maritime disputes in the South China Sea, could escalate in ways that could undermine its authority. Towards the end of the June 2018 countrywide demonstrations, protesters were displaying placards with messages decrying corruption in the CPV, as well as proposed cyber-security laws, thereby illustrating how anti- Chinese protests can evolve into more generalised anti-government sentiment.
Anti-Chinese sentiment therefore raises significant concerns regarding business continuity and safety for Chinese firms operating in Vietnam.
This issue is exacerbated by the apparent pro- China leanings of the CPV’s current leadership. In January 2016, the CPV’s conservative, and allegedly pro-China, faction led by Party Secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, ousted former Prime Minister Dũng, who often directly confronted China on the South China Sea dispute. The current leadership has since made improving relations with China a priority and has demonstrated a willingness to make concessions towards Beijing. Already, in March 2018, it suspended a joint offshore natural gas project in disputed maritime territory, allegedly due to pressure from Beijing. These moves attracted significant criticism domestically; further illustrating that anti-Chinese sentiment remains a potent political force in Vietnam, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.
