Uncomfortable Viewing: Central Asia Watches the Taliban at its Borders

The disbandment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan in December 2014 has resulted in an escalation of the Taliban insurgency. Affected parts of the country include the historically safer Northern Afghanistan, where the Taliban has captured approximately a dozen districts. Unsurprisingly, Central Asian states bordering Northern Afghanistan – Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – have expressed concerns regarding the Taliban resurgence, the presence of Central Asian militants in the area, and potential spill-over violence. While there is a possibility of sporadic border skirmishes in the short to medium-term, the Taliban threat has been exaggerated by regional governments. However, the long-term impact on Central Asian security remains uncertain.

Since early September 2015, the Taliban has launched several major assaults in Northern Afghanistan, particularly in the Faryab, Jawzjan, Kunduz and Takhar provinces, all of which border Central Asian states. In late September, Taliban militants captured the strategic city of Kunduz for several days, before being driven out by Afghan government troops assisted by US air strikes. As of mid-November, the Taliban is estimated to control a dozen districts in Northern Afghanistan and is contesting an additional 15. 

Central Asian states, particularly those bordering Northern Afghanistan, view the Taliban insurgency as a major security threat. They are also specifically concerned about the presence of regional terrorist groups including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Northern Afghanistan, who are allegedly fighting alongside the Taliban. In the last two years, there have been several reported shootouts between militants and security forces along Afghanistan’s border with Central Asian states. In 2014, six Turkmen border guards were killed in separate attacks by unidentified armed groups who reportedly crossed the border from Northern Afghanistan. Nevertheless, given the remoteness of these regions and lack of accurate information, it is often difficult to distinguish between Islamist militants and armed criminals involved in drug trafficking.

In response to the Taliban insurgency, regional governments have been boosted their military capabilities. Turkmenistan has reportedly deployed 70 percent of its military resources to the Afghan border, and requested military aid from the US. Earlier in the year, Uzbekistan received the largest transfer of US military aid to a Central Asian country. Tajikistan has a security agreement with Russia and hosts three Russian military bases, where more Russian attack and military-transport helicopters will be deployed in the coming months. In mid-October, Russian President Vladimir Putin also called for the creation of a joint task force to strengthen regional border security, citing the “close to critical” situation in Northern Afghanistan. In a rare show of agreement between the two powers, in his recent visit to Central Asia, US Secretary of State John Kerry promised further US security assistance to the region. 

Despite the prospect of border skirmishes, the threats stemming from Northern Afghanistan have been exaggerated by Central Asian governments, likely as a pretext to suppress domestic opposition and request military aid from the US and Russia. There is no indication that the Taliban is interested in cross-border attacks against Central Asian countries. Taliban spokespersons have reportedly stated that they have no territorial ambitions beyond Afghanistan. It is also against the group’s interests to carry out cross-border attacks, which would likely prompt military interventions by Central Asian states. Aside from the Taliban, the IMU has failed to carry out major attacks in Central Asia in the last five years, mainly due to its diminished capabilities after years of fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan and Central Asian authorities also often mistake Tajik and Uzbek militants in Northern Afghanistan, who may or may not be the Taliban’s allies, for members of the IMU. Notably, reports of IMU members pledging allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) militant group, and an increasing presence of IS in Afghanistan, should be carefully scrutinised given the high level of sensationalism associated with both issues.
 

Over the longer term, the development of the Taliban’s regional capabilities and intentions will be a key determinant of the Central Asian security environment. The Taliban, and affiliated militant groups, are presently focussed on regaining or retaining territory in Afghanistan. Whilst territory under their control may become a viable base for militant groups intent on attacking Central Asia, any such groups may conversely face a hostile reception as the Taliban seeks to diminish external interest in their area of influence. Whilst this uncertainty remains, Central Asia governments will likely continue to pursue policies to render them safe rather than sorry.