Ukraine's Prospects for Peace Show Little Sign of Improvement
Editor
After more than two years of fighting, a peaceful resolution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine remains doubtful. Although heavy fighting has stopped following the February 2015 Minsk Protocol, consistent low-level skirmishes, with sporadic escalations, have become a key feature of the conflict. Despite the latest peace talks in Berlin, between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France, in October 2016, there were no major breakthroughs. There was tentative agreement on expanding the OSCE mission in eastern Ukraine, but exact details have not been decided. Talks of drawing up a new road map for peace in November 2016 did not materialise either. On 19 December 2016, the European Union (EU) extended the Ukraine-related economic sanctions on Russia for another six months, demonstrating the acute lack of progress in implementing the Minsk Protocol. Leaders of the four countries involved in the negotiations seem to agree that the talks should continue, but have doubts about their effectiveness, given the lack of progress on the ground.
The central obstacle to implementing the Minsk Protocol is the absence of political will to compromise on both sides, with Ukraine’s government, and the pro-Russian separatists and Russia, prioritising different provisions of the Minsk deal. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s administration has demanded a full ceasefire, complete control of Ukraine’s border with Russia, and the withdrawal of foreign troops from rebel-held territories. These demands run counter to the separatists’ interests, whose main objectives are holding local elections, and attaining greater autonomy for rebel-held territories. Therefore, the two parties’ diametrically opposing goals make reaching consensus highly improbable.
Although Poroshenko would please his Western allies by making some concessions to the separatists, such moves would be politically unpopular given an increasingly nationalist mood in Kyiv.
These disagreements also raise questions about whether both parties were fully committed to the deal in the first place. The separatists probably never fully accepted the Minsk Protocol, as they have previously demanded integration into Russia, or complete independence for rebel-held territories. They were not involved in direct negotiations either; according to some reports, they initially refused to sign the agreement, and only complied following pressure from Russia. Similarly, President Poroshenko likely calculated that if Ukraine had received military aid from the West, central government forces could have achieved outright military victory in the east.
The status quo currently suits all parties involved, and potentially in the long term too. The separatists are unlikely to ever acknowledge the legitimacy of the Poroshenko administration, or any pro- Western government after his. Conversely, President Poroshenko realises that full implementation of the Minsk Protocol would compel him to finance the reconstruction of rebel-held territories, a region that will probably never fully return to the Ukrainian fold. Furthermore, although Poroshenko would please his Western allies by making some concessions to the separatists, such moves would be politically unpopular given an increasingly nationalist mood in Kyiv.
In 2017, peace talks may also be affected by federal and presidential elections in Germany and France respectively. In France, the two leading candidates, François Fillon and Marine Le Pen, have previously expressed pro-Russian views and opposed Western sanctions on Russia. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s re-election campaign will face challenges due to the spate of terrorist attacks last year, and the controversial intake of almost one million migrants. The possible departure of French President François Hollande and Chancellor Merkel would weaken Ukraine’s position on the negotiating table. The election of Trump similarly creates further uncertainties regarding the role the US will play in this conflict, if at all. By all indications, the US – which has not participated in direct talks so far – will avoid significant involvement.
If the Minsk Protocol is to be saved, the terms of implementation have to be renegotiated this year. It is possible that some provisions will be fulfilled. For example, local elections in rebel-held territories could be held, or some foreign fighters could be withdrawn from eastern Ukraine. Nevertheless, a full implementation of the deal which satisfies all parties is highly unlikely. The notion of a sovereign Ukraine in which the separatists enjoy significant autonomy, while still accepting central government rule, looks increasingly unrealistic. These signs point to the rebel-held territories eventually becoming another Russia-backed ‘frozen conflict’ zone in the former Soviet Union, similar to the likes of Abkhazia and Transnistria.