Tunisia's transition to democracy

Having successfully accomplished its first-ever open democratic presidential election on 23 November, Tunisia is approaching the end of its democratic transition. As the birthplace of the Arab Spring, Tunisia’s success distinguishes it from other countries in the region that have struggled to realise democratic change. However, Tunisia’s transition has not been without pain; the assassination in 2013 of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahimi, two secularist politicians, ultimately led to the establishment of an interim caretaker government in early 2014 tasked with manoeuvring the country out of the political crisis. Tunisia’s political progress thus far owes much of its success to its population; namely, its relatively homogenous society with a middle class that is proportionally larger than in many Arab countries. Tunisia also has a political culture that has proven to be pragmatic and amenable to compromise. This was demonstrated by the consensus between political parties, among them Nahda, a moderate Islamist party and Nidaa Tounes, a secular political party, over the new constitution. 

Despite this, for Tunisia to achieve lasting progress, the government that emerges from the parliamentary and presidential elections must be able to effectively confront the political, security and economic challenges that continue to threaten the country’s stability. Nidaa Tounes, a patchwork of political tendencies that includes businessmen, leftists, trade unions and former regime members, gained 39% in the parliamentary elections and will take 86 seats in the 217 seat assembly, while its opponent, Nahda, won 31% and 69 seats. A runoff between the two leading candidates from the presidential election - Beji Caid Essebsi, the 88-year-old leader of Nidaa Tounes, and Moncef Marzouki, the interim president since 2011 - is likely to take place in December. Many observers believe Essebsi will win, resulting in Nidaa Tounes’s domination of both the legislative and executive. However, without a decisive majority in parliament, Nidaa Tounes will need to form a coalition government capable of legislating effectively. 

Herein lies the greatest potential spoiler of Tunisia’s political stability; namely, that after achieving its mandate and denying Nahda the opportunity to govern, Nidaa Tounes will disintegrate, thereby undermining effective policy-making with respect to controversial reforms that are demanded by the economic situation. Essebsi’s victory could also pave the way for a crackdown not only against Salafists but against Islamists in general. This would drive considerable civil unrest and likely push Tunisia’s more moderate Islamists towards extremism – a scenario that has been playing out in Egypt since the July 2013 military coup. Essebsi and Nidaa Tounes ought to remember the fragility of the democratic experiment in Tunisia and take heed of the consequences of marginalising sections of society. 

With regards to the economy, on paper Tunisia appears to be an exemplary North African investment destination. It is the leading North African industrial exporter to the European Union and boasts a well-educated youthful workforce and a strategic location supported by a developed infrastructure. However, investor confidence in Tunisia has been knocked by perceived political and security risks. These risks are real: in July 2014, the ongoing Islamist insurgency along the border with Algeria was responsible for the deadliest single attack on the Tunisian military, resulting in the death of 14 soldiers. However, the Tunisian security forces, in cooperation with regional and international allies, have generally proved effective in containing this militant Islamist threat. The biggest challenge for the government will be tackling the underlying causes: the average Tunisian regards political and economic instability as the principal driver of civil unrest, political violence and terrorism.  

A fall in investor confidence accounts for a decline in the country’s economic growth rate from 2.8% in the second quarter of 2013 to 2% during the same period in 2014. Tunisia’s political actors acknowledge the need to reform the restrictive business environment, a legacy of the Ben Ali regime which remains afflicted by excessive bureaucracy and nepotism. Yet neither Nidaa Tounes nor Nahda have outlined comprehensive policies to confront these issues. Without renewed investment, Tunisia is unlikely to be able to address high levels of unemployment, which is running at 15% overall and at 30% among the country’s youth. Unemployment is a potential driver of unrest and could push some youth towards radical Islam. Indeed, an estimated 2,500 Tunisians are reported to have travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside Islamist militant groups such as Jabhat Al Nusra and the Islamic State. The return of these combat-ready radicalised individuals will prove a major challenge to the security forces. 

Tunisia’s fledgeling democracy remains fragile; however, if the new government is able to demonstrate economic pragmatism and political compromise, Tunisia looks likely to weather the upheavals of the Arab spring, and emerge as a promising business hub.