Articles

Tug-of-war: The Maldives and Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean Region

Wikimedia Commons
An ongoing political and constitutional crisis in the Maldives has shone a spotlight on emergent geopolitical competition, particularly between China and India, in the Indian Ocean region. For both Beijing and New Delhi, reliance on Indian Ocean trade routes is essential for their long-term economic prosperity. This reliance makes gaining influence with the Maldives, given its central location in the region, a key strategic objective of both countries. While multiple countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have similar economic and security interests in the country, the competition between China and India for influence in the Maldives has been particularly acute.

On 5 February 2018, Abdulla Yameen, the President of the Maldives, declared a state of emergency after the Supreme Court ordered the release of political prisoners and the reinstatement of opposition members of parliament, which would have threatened Yameen’s parliamentary majority. Two Supreme Court judges were subsequently arrested, as were dozens of opposition politicians from the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) and anti-government protesters. Shortly after these arrests, parliament rubber-stamped an extension to the state of emergency, which is currently scheduled to last until 22 March to give the president time to consolidate his hold on power.

This presents a challenge for India, which considers the Maldives and the broader Indian Ocean region, to fall within its sphere of influence. Under President Yameen, however, the Maldives has moved closer to China, for example, by signing a free trade agreement with Beijing in December 2017. India is also concerned that the planned construction of a Chinese maritime observation station on Mukunudhoo, an atoll in the country’s north, located just over 500 kilometres from the Indian coast, could be used for military purposes, or espionage. 

Shortly after the crisis began, former president Mohamed Nasheed, who fled the country in 2012 to escape allegedly dubious terrorism charges, encouraged India to send an envoy with “military backing” to the Maldives. He later clarified he was not calling for an intervention, and India has thus far shown itself to be unwilling to pursue such an option. Such overt interference in Maldivian domestic affairs would make other Indian Ocean countries such as Sri Lanka wary of India and may prompt them to deepen their relationships with China to balance against New Delhi. 
Wikimedia Commons

India has thus far limited itself to diplomatic options, such as refusing to meet a Maldivian special envoy shortly after the state of emergency was declared. Nevertheless, China was adamant that India should not intervene in Maldivian affairs, and briefly deployed eleven warships to the eastern Indian Ocean, allegedly as a warning to India. While India did not directly respond to the incursion, as the Chinese ships withdrew shortly afterward, it has announced it will hold naval exercises in the region in March, including joint drills with China’s rivals such as Vietnam. 

For China, the Maldives’ geographical position in the centre of the Indian Ocean makes it a valuable staging post for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative is a development strategy focused on creating a China-centred global trading network through various ambitious infrastructure development schemes, primarily in Central Asia and the Indian Ocean region. It was enshrined into the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) constitution at the 19th National Congress in October 2017, signalling Chinese President Xi Jinping’s centralisation of domestic power, and increasing the pressure on him to ensure the initiative’s success. The CCP generates political legitimacy through China’s continued economic growth and development, making the success of the Belt and Road Initiative a key concern and strategic objective for the Chinese government. 

For New Delhi, China’s interest in countries such as the Maldives seems designed to encircle India, and could potentially undermine its access to global shipping routes. China’s long-standing partnership with Pakistan, India’s arch-rival, is an added concern. Pakistan is a key partner in the Belt and Road initiative and Beijing has committed approximately US$ 60 billion to Pakistani infrastructure development initiatives, including a port construction project in Gwadar, Balochistan. As such, India is currently pursuing closer relations with the United States (US), Japan and Australia – a collection referred to as the democratic quad – to jointly counter China’s regional influence. In February 2017 these countries announced their intention to establish an alternative to the Belt and Road; although, the specifics of this plan have yet to be hammered out. The four countries have also announced plans to cooperate on maritime security issues. 

Given the incompatibility of Chinese and Indian interests in the region, the Indian Ocean will continue to be a source of geopolitical tension for both countries. Both will nevertheless do their utmost to avoid a direct military confrontation, as they are growing economies, and as such are dependent on Indian Ocean shipping routes for imported energy and access to markets for their manufactured goods. A military confrontation would jeopardise this flow. However, this dependency breeds anxiety, and both China and India will continue to keep a wary eye on each other, while jostling for influence with regional states in an attempt to gain geopolitical advantage.

Given the incompatibility of Chinese and Indian interests in the region, the Indian Ocean will continue to be a source of geopolitical tension for both countries.

S-RM’s GSI is the simplest way to get a fresh perspective on the security risks affecting you, your work, and your travel.

Find out more