Trouble in the Caucasus: Chechnya braces for further violence

In early December, Islamist militants in Chechnya allegedly linked to the Caucasus Emirate (CE) carried out a high profile attack, bringing an end to several years of relative stability in the formerly volatile North Caucasus republic. On the night of 3 December, militants drove to Grozny, capital of Chechnya, and attacked a police checkpoint. One group then occupied Grozny’s Press House while another group took refuge at a school building, where separate gun battles led to the death of 11 militants and 14 police officers, wounding an additional 36 police officers. The violence echoed the devastating attacks which characterised the Chechen wars of the 1990s and 2000s, when heavy fighting between Russian security forces and Chechen separatists destroyed much of the Chechen capital. However, the extent to which the attack represents a return to the instability of the previous decade, or merely an isolated incident, remains to be seen.

The timing of the attack, which took place hours before President Vladimir Putin’s State of the Nation address, suggests that it was intended to embarrass the Russian President, whose premiership has been characterised by a tough line on Islamist insurgency in the Republic. Within months of Putin coming to power in 2000, Russian forces had captured Grozny and installed a pro-Moscow government. Following several major terrorist attacks across Russia and Chechnya in the early and mid-2000s, Russia overhauled its counterterrorism policy, achieving several notable successes. Russian security forces killed a number of insurgent leaders, including Shamil Basayev, whose death in 2006 significantly weakened the militancy. Ramzan Kadyrov, the Head of the Chechen Republic, has also been a key figure in the suppressing Islamist militancy in the region. Kadyrov, a former rebel and Putin ally who came to power in 2007, has in recent years employed heavy handed tactics to push insurgents out of Chechnya and into the neighbouring republics including Dagestan and Ingushetia. Russia formally ended its counterterrorism operations in Chechnya in 2009. Although minor terrorist attacks and sporadic violent confrontations between militants and security forces have continued since then, there have been no reported terrorist attacks in Chechnya apart from an attack in 2010 on a parliament complex in Grozny. Both the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia’s internal security agency, and independent observers alike have reported a decrease in terror attacks in the North Caucasus in the past year.

There are signs, however, that Chechnya may be heading for a period of renewed instability. In October 2014, a suicide bomb attack outside a concert venue in Grozny killed five police officers and wounded 12 others.

Numerous commentators have suggested that Ali Abu Muhammad Al Dagestani, who assumed the leadership of CE in early 2014 following the death of Doka Umarov, was behind the attack. Al Dagestani has proposed several tactical changes in recent months, including carrying out more sophisticated economic warfare and cyber-attacks, as well as avoiding targeting civilians. Kadyrov’s heavy handed approach to tackling the insurgency, though successful in the short term, may also have further reaching negative consequences. The leader’s long-running policy of alleged wrongful detention, torture and murder of suspected militants, destruction of their family homes, and recent threats of deporting their family members may well serve only to radicalise future militants. Away from the domestic front, observers have also suggested a possible involvement of CE’s international jihadist allies in the near future. In a video message in early September, Islamic State (IS), which has Chechens in its ranks, threatened to attack Russia and “liberate Chechnya and the Caucasus”. Even though the Russian government tends to exaggerate the threat posed by foreign terror groups, independent reports have suggested that an estimated 800 Russian fighters – the majority of whom are ethnic Chechens – are fighting alongside IS in Syria and Iraq, which raises concerns about their potential to carry out attacks following their return to Russia.

The prospect of a Third Chechen War remains unlikely, and would in any case in all likelihood not be supported by a Chechen population traumatised by previous wars and the consequent cycles of retribution and destruction they have brought. However, contrary to Kadyrov’s earlier assertions, the Islamist militancy in Chechnya is far from over, and is likely to gain ascendancy as Russia’s economy is buffeted by low oil prices and Western sanctions. Over the years, Moscow has dispensed generous subsidies to North Caucasus republics including Chechnya in return for loyalty to the Kremlin. The possibility of lower subsidies will not immediately impact the political pact between Putin and Kadyrov, whose alliance is in both of their best interests. However, it is likely to exacerbate Chechnya’s high unemployment rate and low economic prospects, which may encourage more disenfranchised young Chechens to join the militancy.