The White House’s Revolving Door: Tillerson’s Dismissal and the Qatar-GCC Crisis

Since Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt severed ties with Qatar in June 2017, then- US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, invested considerable political will in trying to resolve the crisis. However, in March this year, US President Donald Trump suddenly dismissed Tillerson, nominating Michael Pompeo, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as his replacement. The dismissal was not directly linked to the ongoing crisis in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), but the nomination of the hawkish Pompeo could result in a cutback in US mediation efforts, further delaying resolution of the now nearly year-long dispute. 

Tillerson was widely credited with moderating President Trump’s initial stance on the crisis, when the latter sided with Saudi Arabia and its allies, and accused Qatar of funding terrorist groups. Tillerson consistently called on the disputing parties – mainly the Saudi-led bloc – to deescalate tensions and work towards a resolution, while stressing the importance of GCC unity. He was also committed to ensuring US-Qatar relations remain robust. Speaking at the inaugural US-Qatar Strategic Dialogue in late January, Tillerson praised Qatar for making “significant progress to improve efforts to combat terrorism”. His refusal to side with the Saudi-led bloc sparked some rumours that the UAE was behind a lobbying campaign to dismiss Tillerson. 

While Tillerson’s dismissal and Pompeo’s nomination are not directly linked to the Qatar-GCC crisis, these personnel changes could prolong the stalemate. As the CIA Director, Pompeo has not made any notable statements regarding the GCC crisis, and there is some uncertainty regarding how he will tackle this issue. Nevertheless, his hawkish foreign policy positions, particularly on the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and Iran, are aligned to the Saudi-led bloc’s strategic interests. He is believed to have forged good relations with prominent Saudi and UAE officials, including Mohammed Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince and de facto ruler. Trump has also nominated John Bolton as his new National Security Advisor, to replace Herbert McMaster. Bolton, another hawkish ideologue, is the chairman of Gatestone Institute, a right-wing think tank that has been heavily critical of Qatar, although McMaster has also previously accused Qatar of sponsoring radical Islamists.

Considering these factors, Pompeo’s nomination has likely pleased the Saudi-led bloc, leaving Qatari officials to assess the impact of the loss of a supposed ally in Tillerson. There remains a small possibility that, unlike Tillerson, Pompeo could push Qatar to accept some of the Saudi-led bloc’s 13 demands for the blockade to be lifted. These demands include scaling down diplomatic relations with Iran, closing the Turkish military base, severing ties to all militant groups, and shutting down the Al Jazeera media network. Qatar has repeatedly refused to acquiesce to these conditions, which it considers humiliating and an attack on its sovereignty.

However, there is little indication that if Pompeo is appointed, the US will re-escalate the crisis, as the Saudi-led bloc is hoping. Since June 2017, Qatar has been trying to bolster its counter-terrorism credentials according to the US’s expectations, giving the latter little justification to overtly side with the Saudi-led bloc. Many US officials hold that isolating Qatar is counter-productive to the US’s strategic interests in the Middle East, particularly fighting terrorism and reducing Iranian influence. For example, Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base – the largest US military base in the Middle East – which supports operations in several countries including Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. The facility has been instrumental in the fight against Islamic State, and some US officials are believed to be concerned that the Qatar- GCC crisis is disrupting these operations. Similarly, as a result of the blockade, Qatar has been bolstering diplomatic and trade relations with Iran, which runs counter to the US’s plan to isolate Iran internationally. 
There is also a sense that President Trump wants the crisis to be resolved. In mid- April, he hosted Qatar’s Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and stressed that the two countries “have been great friends in so many ways” and “are working very well together”. Two weeks before, he reportedly had a telephone conversation with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and stressed the importance of ending the rift as soon as possible. 

The failure to resolve the crisis is largely a result of the Saudi-led bloc’s intransigence, or refusal to engage in talks until Qatar accepts its extraordinary demands. Substantial mediation and pressure from the US could influence the Saudi-led bloc to soften its stance, but unlike Tillerson, Pompeo is not expected to invest significant efforts in trying to find a resolution. President Trump’s proposed summit with GCC leaders at Camp David in May – which was meant to announce an end to the crisis – has been postponed to September, and there is uncertainty regarding whether it will be held at all. With Pompeo as the Secretary of State, the US foreign policy agenda is more likely to prioritise escalating tensions with Iran over settling the GCC dispute.