The spark and the tinderbox: The implications of the rise of Islamic State on North African militancy

In January 2013, 32 Al Qaeda-linked terrorists stormed the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas Algeria, taking over 800 hostages, 132 of whom were foreign nationals. 30 of the assailants hailed from North African and Sahelian countries - Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Mali and Mauritania - and were well-equipped with small arms and plastic explosives. At least 37 hostages and 29 militants were killed during the three-day siege and subsequent rescue operation by Algerian security forces. The attackers were all members of Kitabat Al Mulathamin, or ‘The Masked Brigade’, commanded by the notorious Algerian jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, and stated the attack was a response to ongoing French counter-terrorism operations in Mali. 

The In Amenas attack demonstrated the scale of the threat posed by various militant networks operating in the Sahel, a band of desert extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, which had gone largely unreported by Western media until France launched Operation Serval, its military operation in Mali, in December 2012. Until January 2013, North African and trans-Sahelian Islamist militant networks such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) had attacked local security forces and civilian targets, generally avoiding large-scale attacks on Western interests beyond the occasional opportunistic kidnap for ransom of foreign nationals. However, after Operation Serval, trans-Sahelian militant networks carried out the attack at In Amenas, followed by a twin suicide bombing targeting a French-owned uranium mine in Arlit in north-west Niger. The message from North African terrorist groups to the West seemed clear: leave us alone… or else.

Although trans-Sahelian jihadist groups such as AQIM espouse grandiose transnational goals, such as the formation of a global Islamic empire (or ‘caliphate’), in reality, their operations are principally concerned with local political struggles and the maintenance of their economic interests: extortion rackets, smuggling and kidnap for ransom. The localised nature of North African terrorist networks is reflected by their internal structure, which is often highly devolved, consisting of largely autonomous brigades led by commanders who often only have limited ties to the group’s central command. 

Until 2012, these terrorist networks had benefitted from the security vacuum in the Sahel which allowed them a safe haven for training camps and a free rein to conduct smuggling operations. The intent of most terrorist networks in North Africa appears to be the preservation of their safe haven and economic interests in the Sahel, with major attacks against high-value targets remaining a secondary objective. Although undoubtedly a threatening presence, until the In Amenas and Arlit attacks, North African terrorist networks only represented a potential rather than imminent danger to Western interests in the region.

The emergence of Islamic State (IS) as the most capable transnational jihadist group in the Middle East may serve to shift this dynamic even further. At the time of writing, IS has no proven operational reach in North Africa. Rather, the potential impact of IS’s growing capabilities on North African terrorist groups in the short to medium term relates to the dissemination of IS rhetoric and modus operandi, possibly inspiring individual jihadists or small groups of militants to shift their intent from preserving their local interests in the Sahel to carrying out large-scale attacks. The devolved nature of trans-Sahelian terrorist groups, as described above, allows for the emergence of such splinter groups; indeed, Belmokhtar’s own Kitabat Al Mulathamin was formed following a split with AQIM.

The reaction within AQIM to IS’s declaration of a caliphate within its territories in Iraq and Syria also hints at the potential for new groups to form. Soon after IS’s announcement on 29 June, Abdullah Al Asemi, a senior religious cleric for AQIM, released an audio recording supporting IS; however, an AQIM letter issued in July rejected IS’s caliphate and reaffirmed the group’s allegiance to Ayman Al Zawahiri, the leader of Al Qaeda. Several media outlets have cited sources within the Algerian security services, claiming that the contradictory statements from AQIM point to deep divisions amongst the group’s brigades and senior leadership. This could allow pro-IS factions within AQIM to split away and form new militant groups which mirror IS’s modus operandi and stage attacks against Western targets.

However, the rise of IS has implications for terrorism in North Africa beyond its potential impact on the intent of Trans-Sahelian militant networks. In Algeria and Libya, local jihadist groups have pledged their loyalty to IS in the hopes of gaining greater legitimacy and international exposure. For example, Jund Al Khilafa fi Ard Al Jaza’ir (‘Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria’ or SCA), an Algerian jihadist movement, have released multiple statements swearing their loyalty to Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the leader of IS. In September, SCA kidnapped and beheaded Herve Gourdel, a French tourist, as he hiked through the group’s stronghold in Algeria’s Atlas Mountains.

SCA executed Gourdel after demanding that France ceases its involvement in the US-led air campaign against IS. If other North African terrorist groups follow SCA’s example and pledge allegiance to IS, it is reasonable to expect that the opportunistic targeting of Westerners within these groups’ areas of influence will increase.

In the city of Derna, north-west Libya, several extremist armed groups have exploited the political vacuum which has followed the 2011 revolution and significantly expanded their local influence and capabilities. In October, the Shura Council of Islamic Youth (SCIY), a coalition of several Derna-based extremist militant groups, declared their allegiance to IS and declared Derna to be a part of the IS caliphate.

SCIY followed this announcement with a military parade through Derna, flying the IS flag from their vehicles. However, unlike with SCA, SCIY’s support for IS may not translate into an increased targeting of foreigners – there is little to suggest that SCIY boasts the capability to carry out complex attacks outside Derna, where the group is already engaged in a bitter power struggle with other extremist organisations.

Whilst the short term implications of the rise of IS on North African terrorist groups are largely symbolic, the more serious consequences may only become apparent over the long term as North African IS fighters gradually return to their home countries. Recent figures suggest that over 5,500 North Africans have travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight with IS, with approximately 3,000 of these from Tunisia alone. Although IS’s intent in the short to medium-term is to secure its territorial gains in the Levant, at some point fighters will undoubtedly start to return to their countries of origin, bringing with them significant operational experience. Clearly, such a scenario represents a serious threat to North Africa’s security, particularly if returning fighters exploit existing trans-Sahelian terrorist networks to boost their capabilities. Algeria has faced this problem in the past; after all, it was Algerian citizens returning from fighting the invading Soviet army in Afghanistan during the 1980s who established the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, a jihadist group which would eventually form the basis for AQIM.